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Executive functions are a group of top-down processes used in novel situations to develop new 
trigger-response contingencies or adapt existing responses to the task at hand. Even though several 
taxonomies of executive functions suggest that there are three (semi-)distinguishable functions, 
several important questions remain unanswered. Three critical examples are (a) Unity versus 
diversity: are these functions entirely separated top-down processes, or do they rely on a common 
underlying neurocognitive system? (b) Vocal and manual Stroop tasks: what do different versions 
of the Stroop task, one of the most common tasks used for tapping into the inhibition function, 
measure? (c) Resolving or suppressing: does inhibition always need to be effortful, or is there a 
subcomponent of inhibition that can be implemented effortlessly? To address these questions, I 
investigated neurocognitive correlates of executive functions and their enhancements by means of 
posthypnotic suggestions and event-related brain potentials (ERP). However, before one can use 
suggestions for investigating top-down processes, such as executive functions, it must be 
elucidated how they affect performance in cognitive tasks. Although task-relevant posthypnotic 
suggestions are used repeatedly for improving performance in inhibition tasks, it is unclear 
whether these enhancements are mediated by changes in bottom-up or top-down processes. By 
using an updating task, I showed that the effects of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions on 
cognitive tasks can indeed be attributed to alterations in top-down processes and enhanced 
deployment of executive functions. Based on this finding, a new theory of hypnosis, the 
simulation-adaption theory (SATH), was proposed and empirically tested by modeling hypnotic-
suggestibility scores with confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling. SATH 
suggests that three top-down cognitive processes are employed by willing and cooperative 




mental practice. After elucidating that the driving mechanism of task-relevant posthypnotic 
suggestions is mentally practicing a novel strategy, posthypnotic suggestions were used for 
addressing the above-mentioned questions regarding executive functions. Summarizing the 
findings (a) the psychometric and ERP results from several studies were employed to investigate 
updating and subcomponents of inhibition, and their enhancements by means of posthypnotic 
suggestions. The findings indicated that inhibition and updating rely on both function-specific and 
shared neurocognitive processes. In other words, there is both unity and diversity of executive 
functions. (b) Even though both the vocal and manual versions of the Stroop task are tapping into 
the inhibition function, the vocal version is more taxing, as it has at least an extra response-
production-related locus of interference, which is not affected by posthypnotic suggestions and is 
absent in the manual version. (c) Using posthypnotic suggestions for increasing and – by contrast 
– diminishing preferences for low- versus high-calorie food items, I investigated the 
implementation of resolve. The results showed that, similar to suppression, resolve is effortful to 
implement, as indicated by increased P300 amplitudes. Together, this project shows how 
employing task-relevant suggestions along with neuroimaging techniques can provide a novel 
approach for investigating long-lasting questions about executive functions and top-down 
processes. 
Keywords:  Hypnosis, Executive Functions, Unity versus Diversity, suggestions, mental 







Exekutive Funktionen sind eine Gruppe von Top-Down-Prozessen, die in neuartigen Situationen 
eingesetzt werden, um neue Trigger-Response-Assoziationen herzustellen oder vorhandene 
Handlungsoptionen an neue Situationen anzupassen. Obwohl mehrere Taxonomien drei 
(semi-)unterscheidbare Typen von Exekutivfunktionen vorschlagen, bleiben wichtige Fragen 
offen. Beispiele dafür sind (a) Einheit versus Vielfalt: Sind Exekutivfunktionen vollständig 
trennbar oder beruhen sie auf einem gemeinsamen neurokognitiven System? (b) Vokale und 
manuelle Stroop-Aufgaben: Was messen verschiedene Versionen der Stroop-Aufgabe, einer der 
meist-verwendeten Aufgaben zur Prüfung der Inhibitionsfunktion? (c) Auflösung oder 
Unterdrückung: Muss Inhibition immer Ressourcen-fordernd sein, oder gibt es eine Form der 
Inhibition, die mühelos implementiert werden kann? Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen, habe ich 
neurokognitive Korrelate von Exekutivfunktionen und ihrer Verbesserung mithilfe 
posthypnotischer Suggestionen und Ereigniskorrelierter Hirnpotentiale (EKP) untersucht. Bevor 
man jedoch Suggestionen zur Untersuchung von Top-Down-Prozessen, wie z.B. 
Exekutivfunktionen einsetzen kann, muss geklärt werden, wie sie sich auf die Leistung in 
kognitiven Aufgaben auswirken. Obwohl aufgaben-bezogene posthypnotische Suggestionen 
schon oft zur Leistungs-Steigerung in Inhibitionsaufgaben verwendet wurden, ist unklar, ob diese 
Verbesserungen auf Änderungen in Bottom-Up- oder Top-Down-Prozessen beruhen. Durch die 
Verwendung einer Arbeitsgedächtnis-Aktualisierungsaufgabe konnte ich zeigen, dass sich 
Aufgaben-bezogene posthypnotische Suggestionen in der Tat auf Top-Down-Prozesse und eine 
verbesserte Bereitstellung von Exekutivfunktionen auswirken. Basierend auf diesem Befund 
wurde eine neue Hypnosetheorie, die Simulations-Adaptionstheorie (SATH), vorgeschlagen und 




Faktorenanalysen und Strukturgleichungen modelliert wurden. SATH postuliert, dass willige und 
kooperative Probanden drei Top-Down Prozesse einsetzen, um auf Suggestionen zu reagieren, 
nämlich kognitive Simulation, sensorische Anpassung und mentale Übung. Nachdem mentale 
Übung als bedeutsamer Mechanismus für aufgaben-bezogenen posthypnotische Suggestionen 
nachgewiesen wurde, habe ich posthypnotische Suggestionen eingesetzt, um die oben 
aufgeführten Fragen zu Exekutivfunktionen zu klären. Zusammenfassend ergaben sich folgende 
Antworten: (a) Psychometrische und EKP-Daten aus den Studien zur Gedächtnisaktualisierung 
und Inhibition sowie deren Verbesserung anhand posthypnotischer Suggestionen zeigten sowohl 
funktionsspezifische als auch gemeinsame neurokognitive Prozesse der Inhibition und 
Aktualisierung. Mit anderen Worten, es gibt sowohl einheitliche als auch spezifische 
Komponenten von Exekutivfunktionen. (b) Obwohl sowohl die vokale als auch die manuelle 
Version der Stroop-Aufgabe Inhibitionsfunktionen erfordern, ist die vokale Version Ressourcen-
fordernder, da sie mindestens einen zusätzlichen Lokus der Interferenz im Antwort-
Produktionsprozess aufweist, der nicht mit posthypnotischen Suggestionen beeinflussbar ist und 
der in der manuellen Version fehlt. (c) Unter Verwendung posthypnotischer Vorschläge zur 
Erhöhung und - im Gegensatz dazu - Verringerung der Präferenzen für kalorienarme und 
kalorienreiche Lebensmittel untersuchte ich die Auflösung von Konflikten. Die EKP-Ergebnisse 
zeigten, dass auch Konflikt-Auflösung, ähnlich wie Inhibition, Ressourcen konsumiert. Insgesamt 
zeigt dieses Projekt, dass die Verwendung Aufgaben-bezogener Suggestionen in Kombination mit 
Neuroimaging-Techniken einen fruchtbaren Ansatz für die Untersuchung ungeklärter Fragen über 
Exekutivfunktionen und Top-Down-Prozesse darstellt. 
Schlüsselwörter:  Hypnose, Exekutive Funktionen, Einheitlichkkeit und Spezifität, Suggestions, 
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Synopsis of Dissertation 
1.   Introduction 
As Heraclitus put it, “the only constant in life is change.” Even though natural selection 
offers a unique way for species to adapt themselves to long-lasting environmental changes, it 
cannot be of any help for individuals facing rapid changes in their surroundings (Campbell et al., 
2018). Individuals of most species are confined to stimulus-driven actions. However, bottom-up 
stimulus-driven actions are not sufficient for handling a novel situation, for which there is no 
preexisting stimulus-response contingency. Intriguingly, evolution had bestowed a set of cognitive 
capabilities to primates in general and particularly humans for flexibly adapting their actions to 
novel situations by using their greatly enlarged prefrontal cortex (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; 
Gazzaniga, 2000; Goldman-Rakic, 1991; Goldman-Rakic, 1995). A group of top-down processes 
called executive functions, which strongly rely on the prefrontal cortex (for review, see Alvarez & 
Emory, 2006; Rottschy et al., 2012; Yuan & Raz, 2014), provide the basis of this cognitive 
adaptability (Baddeley, 1996, 2003; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). 
1.1.   Executive Functions 
For the first time suggested by Baddeley and Hitch (1974), the term “executive function” was used 
to describe cognitive functions attributed to the central executive unit, which is a module in 
working memory (Baddeley, 1996, 2003). Working memory, in contrast to short-term memory 
(Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968), is not a mere inactive depository between sensory and long-term 
memory but an active component that provides an interface for communication between 
perceptions, actions, and cognitions. Even though there is a consensus that for understanding 
human cognition, it is necessary to assume a group of “executive” functions (Baddeley, 1996, 
2003; Norman & Shallice, 1986), defining these functions is a more contentious matter (Baddeley, 






2003; Miyake et al., 2000). Many approaches, such as structural equation modeling (e.g., Karr et 
al., 2018; Miyake et al., 2000), neuroimaging (e.g., Collette et al., 2005; Miyake & Friedman, 
2012; Smolker, Friedman, Hewitt, & Banich, 2018), and metanalysis (e.g., Niendam et al., 2012; 
Rottschy et al., 2012; Wager & Smith, 2003), have been used to offer a parsimonious number of 
executive functions. Based on these investigations, there is a tentative consensus that one needs to 
assume three (semi-)distinguishable executive functions to adequately interpret existing 
observations in the literature (for review, see Diamond, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000). These functions 
are (1) updating: storing, retrieving, and substituting information in working memory buffers. (2) 
Inhibition: suppressing prepotent but task-inappropriate actions. And (3) shifting: redistributing 
attentional resources between sub-tasks (Diamond, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000). However, several 
important questions regarding the structure and nature of these functions are not addressed yet. In 
the following, three critical questions are going to be presented in more detail. 
1.1.1. Does Unity Describe Executive Functions better or Diversity? 
The first question is whether executive functions share a common neurocognitive structure 
(i.e., the unity proposition), or they are entirely separated (i.e., the diversity proposition) (Collette 
et al., 2005; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al., 2000; Niendam et al., 2012). Both 
psychometric and neuroimaging approaches are employed for addressing the question of unity 
versus diversity of executive functions. For instance, by using confirmatory factor analysis and 
structural equation modeling, Miyake et al. (2000) had investigated psychometric data obtained 
from 9 different cognitive tasks. Although their results indicated that a model with three latent 
factors can explain their data better compared to one- or two-factor models, latent factors in the 
three-factor model were strongly correlated with each other (i.e., 𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔−𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 =





(2000) can corroborate both accounts. Regarding the diversity proposition, the one-factor model 
was significantly worse than the three-factor model. Therefore, assuming diversity of executive 
functions might be necessary for explaining empirical evidence. Simultaneously, these results can 
be interpreted in favor of the unity proposition, as latent factors in the three-factor model were 
strongly correlated. 
When considering executive functions at the cognitive level, it should be noticed that not 
all studies converge on the results of Miyake et al. (2000). For instance, in a systematic review and 
re-analysis of existing confirmatory factor analyses of executive functions, Karr et al. (2018) noted 
that the results of many studies (especially those focusing on child/adolescent samples) indicate 
that a model with one-factor (i.e., the unidimensional model) can explain their data better than a 
three-factor model. These results can further complicate the question of unity versus diversity of 
executive functions. 
At the neural level, the existing observations are inconclusive, as well. For instance, 
inspired by the work of Miyake et al. (2000), Collette et al. (2005) recorded positron emission 
tomography (PET) during performing several cognitive tasks, measuring updating, shifting, and 
inhibition, to compare brain areas activated by each executive function. Their results indicated that 
there are several foci of activation common to all tasks, such as the right intraparietal sulcus, the 
left superior parietal gyrus, and the left lateral prefrontal cortex. However, their results also 
indicated that there are function-specific foci of activation. For instance, performing inhibition 
tasks but not updating or shifting tasks is correlated with activation of the left middle frontal gyrus 
and the (bilateral) inferior frontal cortex. The results of Collette et al. (2005) are in line with the 
conclusions of several metanalyses (e.g., Niendam et al., 2012; Rottschy et al., 2012; Wager & 
Smith, 2003) that have shown there are both common and function-specific foci of activation. 






Therefore, the results of neuroimaging studies can also corroborate both the unity and diversity 
propositions. Concerning, the existence of function-specific foci of activation might indicate that 
different executive functions rely on distinguishable neural systems. However, common foci of 
activation might be interpreted as an indicator that a shared attentional system exists, required for 
every task, regardless of the function that it measures. 
Why cannot existing neuroimaging results firmly corroborate one of these two accounts? 
A general criticism regarding the above-mentioned neuroimaging studies is related to the low 
temporal resolution of fMRI, PET, and similar methods with a high spatial resolution (Amaro & 
Barker, 2006). In a typical study using these techniques, neuroimaging data are recorded while 
subjects participate in a cognitive task, and then, averaged brain activity for each condition is 
calculated. Consequently, the foci of activation during task completion can be related to the 
perception of stimuli, processing, or response production (Amaro & Barker, 2006; Constable, 
2006); however, only processing is related to executive functions. This issue, hence, might be the 
underlying reason for the inconclusiveness of neuroimaging results with regard to the question of 
unity versus diversity. A method that has been used for circumventing this issue is comparing data 
collected from multiple tasks measuring a specific function (e.g., Collette et al., 2005) or 
conducting metanalyses of studies using different tasks for measuring a given function (e.g., 
Rottschy et al., 2012; Wager & Smith, 2003). In this way, those foci of activation shared between 
several tasks that measure a given function are considered to be related to the targeted function. 
However, the low temporal resolution still does not allow a firm conclusion to be made about the 
functional role of a given focus of activation (Amaro & Barker, 2006; Constable, 2006). 
A solution for avoiding issues related to the low temporal resolution of the above- 





Innumerable studies had employed ERPs for investigating executive functions (e.g., Badzakova-
Trajkov, Barnett, Waldie, & Kirk, 2009; Brouwer et al., 2012; Dong, Reder, Yao, Liu, & Chen, 
2015; Evans, Selinger, & Pollak, 2011; Liotti, Woldorff, Perez, & Mayberg, 2000; Nakao, 
Kodabashi, Yarita, Fujimoto, & Tamura, 2012; Scharinger, Soutschek, Schubert, & Gerjets, 2017; 
Watter, Geffen, & Geffen, 2001). Notably, empirical evidence shows that the increase in the load 
of executive function tasks is correlated with the increase of P300 amplitude, a positive deflection 
around 300-500 ms after stimulus onset (for review, see Fonken, Kam, & Knight, 2020; Polich, 
2007). However, one should notice that the definition of task load can vastly differ from one 
cognitive task to the other. Let us consider the Stroop and the N-back tasks, measuring inhibition 
and updating, respectively. In the Stroop task, color words, written in different ink colors, are 
consecutively presented to participants as they are instructed to identify the ink color of a given 
word while ignoring the meaning (MacLeod, 1991; Stroop, 1935; Zahedi, Stuermer, Hatami, 
Rostami, & Sommer, 2017). Since reading is a prepotent, habitual response, it cannot be easily 
suppressed despite being irrelevant in the Stroop task. Hence, commonly in the Stroop task, three 
task loads, namely incongruent, congruent, and neutral, are defined based on the existence of 
interference, facilitation, or no interaction, between an irrelevant source of information (i.e., word 
meanings) and a relevant one (i.e., ink colors), respectively. In the N-back task, however, stimuli, 
such as written letters, are consecutively presented to participants as they are instructed to 
determine whether the current stimulus and the one presented N steps back are similar. Therefore, 
different task loads in the N-back task are related to the number of items that should be actively 
maintained in working memory. Consequently, the increase in P300 amplitude, corresponding to 
the increased task load in the Stroop versus the N-back tasks, can be neural markers of vastly 
different cognitive processes, which might be irrelevant to executive functions, per se. 






In order to compensate for the different definitions of task load across executive function 
tasks, one can suggest using interventions that aim to enhance executive functions and compare 
the neural correlations of these enhancements. In this way, regardless of the definition of task load, 
changes in the deployment of a function can be compared across cognitive tasks measuring 
different executive functions. One such intervention is using posthypnotic suggestions for 
enhancing performance in cognitive tasks (e.g., Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Iani, Ricci, Baroni, 
& Rubichi, 2009; Iani, Ricci, Gherri, & Rubichi, 2006; Lindelov, Overgaard, & Overgaard, 2017; 
Palfi, Parris, McLatchie, Kekecs, & Dienes, 2020; Parris, Hasshim, & Dienes, 2021; Raz, Fan, & 
Posner, 2005; Raz, Kirsch, Pollard, & Nitkin-Kaner, 2006; Raz et al., 2003).  
In the current project, therefore, I used posthypnotic suggestions for enhancing 
performance in several tasks, measuring different executive functions, and compared 
neurocognitive correlates of enhancements in these tasks for addressing the question of unity 
versus diversity of executive functions. 
1.1.2. What Do Manual and Vocal Versions of The Stroop Task Measure? 
The Stroop and Stroop-like tasks, such as the emotional Stroop task (Williams, Mathews, 
& MacLeod, 1996) and the picture-word interference paradigm (Shitova, Roelofs, Schriefers, 
Bastiaansen, & Schoffelen, 2016; Starreveld & La Heij, 2017; van Maanen, van Rijn, & Borst, 
2009) are among the most common tasks used for tapping into the inhibition function (MacLeod, 
1991). In the Stroop and Stroop-like tasks, two kinds of information superimposed on each other 
are presented simultaneously, one task-relevant and the other task-irrelevant, which are processed 
effortfully and automatically, respectively. For producing the correct response, task-irrelevant 
information (e.g., the word meanings in the Stroop task) must be suppressed in favor of the task-





cognitive control processes for responding correctly to the Stroop task (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; MacLeod, 1991). 
The initial version of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) and those used nowadays in 
neurocognitive studies have several important differences. In the initial version, several color-
words written in different colors were printed on a card in multiple columns and rows, side by side, 
and participants needed to name the ink colors one by one while ignoring the word meanings 
(Stroop, 1935). In the newer versions, however, firstly, words are presented consecutively (i.e., 
single-trial), and secondly, participants need to press corresponding buttons to the ink colors (i.e., 
the manual version) instead of naming them (i.e., the vocal version) (MacLeod, 1991). Each one 
of these differences might change the required cognitive control processes altogether. For instance, 
in contrast to the card version, the single-trail version does not require selective attention, as the 
contextual interference is eliminated (Kindt, Bierman, & Brosschot, 1996). 
The second change, that is, using the manual rather than the vocal output modality, was 
first integrated into the Stroop task to make it appropriate for being used in EEG and ERP studies. 
In other words, since naming the ink colors would have caused substantial articulation artifacts, 
researchers developed the manual version, so responses can be produced without moving facial 
muscles  (Liotti et al., 2000; Redding & Gerjets, 1977; Sharma & McKenna, 1998). However, it is 
a matter of debate whether the vocal and manual versions are measuring similar (Dhooge & 
Hartsuiker, 2010, 2011; Geng, Schnur, & Janssen, 2013) or different cognitive functions (Liotti et 
al., 2000; Redding & Gerjets, 1977; Sharma & McKenna, 1998). Recently, there is a resurrected 
interest in investigating what forms of interference these two versions of the Stroop task are 
measuring (Augustinova, Parris, & Ferrand, 2019; Banich, 2019; Parris et al., 2019). 






In the current project, I employed two novel techniques for investigating the commonalities 
and differences between these two task versions. First, as mentioned above, the EEG and ERP data 
from the vocal version cannot be analyzed due to articulation artifacts. Here, however, the problem 
of articulation artifacts was solved by applying the residue iteration decomposition method (RIDE; 
Ouyang et al., 2016) that can separate the brain-derived ERPs from overlapping articulations 
artifacts. Second, there are many studies showing that posthypnotic suggestions can reduce 
interference in the manual version of the Stroop task (Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Raz et al., 
2005; Raz et al., 2003; Zahedi et al., 2017). However, to the best of my knowledge, no previous 
study used posthypnotic suggestions for reducing Stroop effects in the vocal version. Therefore, 
in the current project, I used posthypnotic suggestions to affect both the manual and vocal task 
versions to compare the loci of interference in these two tasks. Using these two techniques, that is, 
task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions and ERPs, I could functionally localize the Stroop effects 
in these two versions. 
1.1.3. Does Inhibition Always Need to be Effortful? 
Many researchers in the field of cognitive control and executive functions suggested that 
two subcomponents of the inhibition function should be separated, that is, suppression and resolve 
(for review, see Ainslie, 2020; Diamond, 2013). Commonly used inhibition tasks, such as the 
Stroop task (MacLeod, 1991), are focused on the short-term effort to suppress a prepotent, habitual, 
irrelevant trigger-response contingency and substitute it with an appropriate one. This form of 
inhibition, called suppression, requires an immediate mental effort that results in mental fatigue 
(Hockey, 2011; Shenhav et al., 2017). Notably, mental fatigue must not be confused with the 





considered as the consequence of the aversiveness of using cognitive control instead of relying on 
automatic processes (Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Shenhav et al., 2017). 
However, in quotidian events, another aspect of inhibition is also of great relevance, that 
is, forming motivational contingencies for overriding temptations. This form of inhibition can be 
designated as resolve (Ainslie, 2020). Let us examine situations that delaying immediate smaller 
gratification can cause a later, more significant outcome. In these situations, conflict arises as there 
are two possibilities, one results in a smaller-faster, and the other, in a bigger-slower reward 
(Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). For handling these conflicts, one can stay focused on the 
desired behavior (choosing the bigger-slower reward) and suppress distracting information 
(Diamond, 2013; Mischel et al., 1989). Alternatively, the desired action can be exerted by changing 
one’s preferences to make the bigger-slower option more appealing and/or the smaller-faster one 
less incentivizing. This latter form of cognitive control is related to the resolve function (Ainslie, 
2020; Diamond, 2013). A frequently-encountered situation that demand delayed gratification is 
when one wants to decide between delicious high- versus insipid low-calorie food items, as the 
former is appealing but has negative long-term consequences and the latter is less tasty but 
healthier and more environmentally-sustainable (Clark, Springmann, Hill, & Tilman, 2019). For 
achieving the desired action of choosing the low-calorie food, one can either (I) suppress the 
temptation to pick delicious high-calorie food and stay focus on the low-calorie food, or (II) form 
a motivational contingency regarding the low-calorie option, such as connecting it to a more 
critical issue like self-worth. 
An important question about resolve is whether its implementation is effortful? One can 
postulate that resolve immediately results in dissolving the conflict at hand and, therefore, can be 
implemented effortlessly (Ainslie, 2020). On the other hand, it can be proposed that resolve, at the 






time of implementation, is as effortful as suppression, since during resolve one needs to halt a 
habitual response and employ cognitive control processes for developing a new trigger-response 
(motivational) contingency, which, as discussed above, is effortful (Botvinick & Braver, 2015; 
Diamond, 2013; Shenhav et al., 2017). However, there is an intimidating obstacle in the way of 
addressing this question; that is, resolve does not lend itself easily to be manipulated or measured 
by commonly available experimental paradigms (Ainslie, 2020). In other words, for manipulating 
or measuring resolve, it is necessary to affect participants’ intrinsic preferences and not extrinsic 
reward and punishment regimes. For instance, if the bigger-slower option will be incentivized by 
increasing its appeal, then the conflict is solved externally by changing the balance between the 
smaller-faster and bigger-slower options, rather than by manipulating participants’ preferences.  
However, there are many examples of clinical (for review see Hammond, 1990; Hammond, 
1998; Kirsch, 1996; Milburn, 2010; Milling, Gover, & Moriarty, 2018) and experimental (Ludwig 
et al., 2014) applications of hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions that target participants’ 
preferences, making them an appropriate experimental manipulation for addressing the 
effortfulness of resolve. For instance, Ludwig et al. (2014) used posthypnotic suggestions to induce 
disgust toward pictures containing different food categories when they were superimposed on a 
background with a specific color. Even though their posthypnotic suggestion was targeting the 
background color and not the food stimuli themselves, the changes in perception were correlated 
with decreased activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), which indicates that 
posthypnotic suggestion possibly caused participants to devalue objects suggested to be disgusting. 
Therefore, in the current project, I used posthypnotic suggestions for affecting (food) 
preferences to manipulate resolve. Then, by measuring neurocognitive correlates of changes in 





Huster, 2010; Liu, Xiao, & Shi, 2017), and comparing them with effects of increased deployment 
of suppression in the Stroop task, the effortfulness of resolve was investigated. 
1.2.   Hypnosis 
For responding to the above-posed questions, I argued that using posthypnotic suggestions can be 
of great importance. However, before using suggestions for studying these questions, one 
fundamental issue should be addressed: How do posthypnotic suggestions affect performance in 
cognitive tasks? For instance, if the effects of posthypnotic suggestions are mediated by changes 
in bottom-up processes, they can be of no help in investigating top-down processes, such as 
executive functions. In the following, I will, firstly, present a procedural description of hypnosis 
and then try to demonstrate that previous theories of hypnosis have severe problems in elucidating 
the driving mechanisms of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions. 
Hypnosis commonly consists of three semi-distinguishable stages (Hammond, 1998; 
Kihlstrom, 2008), namely, induction, deepening, and termination. All three stages are induced 
through presenting suitable suggestions to a given participant by another person, designated the 
hypnotist (Kihlstrom, 1985; Lynn, Green, et al., 2015; Lynn, Laurence, & Kirsch, 2015). The term 
“suggestion” highlights that participants are going to experience intentional responses that can be 
distinguished from “instruction” or “command” that allude to nonvoluntary acts (Kirsch, 1999).  
For inducing hypnosis, many different suggestions can be used (Hammond, 1998), all of 
which aim to (1) establish some basic expectancies about the procedure (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999) 
and (2) attract participants’ attention and cause absorption in the presented suggestions and in their 
thoughts and feelings (Brown, Antonova, Langley, & Oakley, 2001). However, several studies 
have shown that hypnotic induction might have no effect on participants’ responsiveness to 
suggestions (Mazzoni et al., 2009; McGeown et al., 2012). 






Hypnotic induction might be followed by deepening, in which case, more suggestions 
aiming to induce relaxation will be presented to participants. Alternatively, suggestions following 
induction may be directed toward a targeted change in overt behavior, perception, or cognition, in 
which case, they are called hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions. Posthypnotic suggestions, in 
contrast to hypnotic suggestions, will become effective only after the termination of hypnosis. 
Usually, for activating and deactivating posthypnotic suggestions after the termination of hypnosis, 
a cue, mentioned in the suggestions, will be presented, such as the sound of a specific ring. This 
process is called anchoring. 
Finally, a suggestion at the end of hypnosis will cue the hypnotic procedure’s termination, 
aiming to re-establish the previous expectancies about the external world and the effects of one’s 
own behavior and actions (Hammond, 1998; Shor & Orne, 1962). 
1.2.1. Effects of Posthypnotic Suggestions on Executive Function Tasks 
 It is well-established that posthypnotic suggestion can enhance performance in various 
cognitive tasks, such as the Stroop (e.g., Parris, Dienes, & Hodgson, 2012; Raz et al., 2005; Raz 
et al., 2006; Zahedi et al., 2017), Eriksen (Iani et al., 2006), and Simon tasks (Iani et al., 2009). 
Noticeably, most published experimental studies applying posthypnotic suggestions have focused 
on tasks capitalizing on the inhibition function (for review, see Lifshitz, Aubert Bonn, Fischer, 
Kashem, & Raz, 2013). Such tasks require refraining from a habitual, prepotent response in favor 
of a novel trigger-response contingency. The immediate implementation of the required response 
is difficult to achieve for most participants. For instance, in the Stroop task, attending to ink colors 
while ignoring word meanings cannot be implemented immediately by most participants. This fact 
is evidenced in the existence of the Stroop effect, that is, slower reaction times when word 





suggestions, on the other hand, can efficiently enhance performance in the Stroop and other 
inhibition tasks. For instance, posthypnotic suggestions have been shown to decrease or eliminate 
the Stroop effect (Raz, 2005; Raz & Shapiro, 2002; Zahedi et al., 2017). Posthypnotic suggestions 
are usually elaborated rephrasings of standard task instructions or repetitions of critical elements 
thereof. For instance, a common posthypnotic suggestion used for the Stroop task is: “You will not 
be able to read the words presented on the monitor, and they will seem to you like words from a 
foreign language” (Zahedi et al., 2017, p. 72). This suggestion is very similar to the standard 
instruction: “do not read the words and only respond to the ink colors” (Zahedi et al., 2017, p. 72). 
Posthypnotic suggestions do not introduce new strategies, so how can they enhance performance 
in cognitive tasks? 
1.2.2. Can Existing Theories of Hypnosis Explain the Effects of Posthypnotic 
Suggestions? 
To understand the underlying mechanisms of posthypnotic suggestions, it is essential to 
first refer to existing theories of hypnosis. This section is not supposed to be an exhaustive review 
of existing hypnosis theories (for a complete review, see Manuscript 2) but instead presents an 
overview of those theories that try to explain the effects of posthypnotic suggestions. Traditionally, 
hypnosis has been defined by two different approaches. (I)The state account conceives hypnosis 
as an “altered” state of consciousness, which is characterized by increased concentration, 
dissociation, and increased suggestibility (Elkins, Barabasz, Council, & Spiegel, 2015). (II) The 
sociocognitive approach, on the other hand, emphasizes the top-down cognitive mechanisms 
utilized for responding to suggestions and psychosocial factors involved in the procedure (Green 
& Lynn, 2011; Jensen et al., 2017; Kihlstrom, 1985; Lynn & Green, 2011; Lynn, Green, et al., 
2015; Lynn et al., 2019). For instance, the sociocognitive approach highlights the importance of 






the hypnotic situation, as it can dictates conformity to social expectations (Lynn, Green, et al., 
2015). However, as Jensen et al. (2015) discussed, describing the existing theories as dichotomous 
gives a false account of the literature. More accurately, there is a spectrum of theories, many of 
which only partially overlap with the traditional accounts (for review, see Manuscript 2). However, 
regardless of their underlying assumptions, one should ask whether any of these theories can help 
us understand how posthypnotic suggestions affect performance in executive function tasks. 
Interestingly, the only theory of hypnosis that tries to explain the observed effects of 
posthypnotic suggestions on performance in executive function tasks is the decoupling theory 
(Egner & Raz, 2007), which has been based on the state definition. 
1.2.2.1. Dissociation and Decoupling Theory of Hypnosis 
The dissociation theory (Woody & Bowers, 1994) is based on the concept of contention 
scheduling proposed by Norman and Shallice (1986). In essence, Norman and Shallice (1986) 
postulate that there is an intermediate domain of action, called contention scheduling, situated in 
between two extremes, that is, (I) reflexive schemata, which cannot be controlled at all, and (II) 
scripts that are flexibly controlled by the supervisory attentional system (SAS; Cooper & Shallice, 
2000). Norman and Shallice (1986) assume that contention scheduling is in control in all situations 
where several “source schemata” compete with each other in “the determination of their activation 
value”. Conspicuously, source schemata are well-learned responses, and they are not related to 
new responses. Contention scheduling ensures that the schema, which first exceeds a certain 
threshold, will be selected. In non-demanding conditions, contention scheduling can operate 
without any input from the SAS. In contrast, in demanding conditions where the operation of 
contention scheduling in itself cannot result in correct and appropriate responses, the SAS has to 





implementing cognitive control and biasing activation of different schemata. Two pivotal examples 
are: (1) when a well-learned trigger-response contingency has to be suppressed in favor of a new 
response, and (2) when a new trigger-response contingency should be formed. 
The dissociation theory was developed to explain alterations in the sense of agency during 
responding to hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions (Woody & Bowers, 1994). Alteration in the 
sense of agency refers to the frequent observations that participants report a sense of semi-
automaticity, effortlessness, and involuntariness when exerting hypnotic-suggestion-induced 
responses (Blakemore, Oakley, & Frith, 2003; Kirsch & Lynn, 1997; Lynn, Rhue, & Weekes, 1990). 
However, as Lynn et al. (1990) discussed, the experience of involuntariness does not imply a loss 
of control over the exerted responses. If encouraged, participants are able to resist the hypnotic-
suggestion-induced responses (Lynn, Nash, Rhue, Frauman, & Sweeney, 1984; Spanos, Cobb, & 
Gorassini, 1985). Further, hypnotic-suggestion-induced responses are not automatic because they 
are resource-consuming (e.g., Tobis & Kihlstrom, 2010) and are executed by utilizing of top-down 
cognitive processes (Terhune, Cleeremans, Raz, & Lynn, 2017). Therefore, alterations in the sense 
of agency during hypnosis may be better explained as not attributing one’s responses to the 
exertion of volitional effort (Lynn et al., 1990). 
 In the dissociation theory, the basic assumption is that hypnosis disables the SAS and 
therefore, participants will act only based on lower-level cognitive control processes, that is, 
contention scheduling. Thus, the sense of passivity occurs since higher cognitive control processes 
are disrupted, and participants cannot relate their actions to intention implementation or planning 
(Brown & Oakley, 2004; Jamieson & Woody, 2007; Woody & Bowers, 1994).  
If under the influence of hypnosis, the SAS would be disabled, one expects that hypnotized 
participants cannot perform any executive function tasks. For instance, let us consider the Stroop 






task; according to the principles of contention scheduling, without any top-down control, the more 
robust schema (word reading) will be selected. For the weaker but task-relevant schema (color 
detection) to be chosen, cognitive control is required. Even though there are contradictory results 
regarding the effects of neutral hypnosis (i.e., hypnosis that does not contain any task-relevant 
suggestions) on task performance, but there is no doubt that participants can perform in executive 
function tasks under the influence of hypnosis similar to non-hypnotized conditions (e.g., Egner, 
Jamieson, & Gruzelier, 2005; Zahedi et al., 2017). For solving this contradiction, by using the 
conflict monitoring theory proposed by Botvinick et al. (2001), Egner et al. (2005) offered a 
revised version of the dissociation theory, called the decoupling theory. Botvinick et al. (2001) 
propose that cognitive control should be distinguished from monitoring processes at both 
anatomical and functional levels. Monitoring for cognitive conflicts takes place in the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), whereas cognitive control processes are initiated in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). The decoupling theory claims that under the influence of hypnosis, the 
ACC will be disabled or decoupled from the rest of the SAS. 
The decoupling account might explain why hypnotized participants can perform in the 
executive function tasks, but it cannot justify how task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions can 
enhance performance in cognitive tasks. Trying to solve this issue, Egner and Raz (2007) suggested 
that even though under the influence of hypnosis, there is “no internal generation and 
implementation of performance adjustments” (Egner & Raz, 2007, pp. 34-35), under the influence 
of posthypnotic suggestions participants can better follow externally presented strategies “due to 
the fact that task-processing is unencumbered by signals from internal performance monitoring” 
(p. 35). However, being unencumbered by monitoring signals does not answer how innate conflicts 





Stroop task, can be resolved more efficiently. For answering this point, Egner and Raz (2007) 
suggested that the effects of posthypnotic suggestions can be similar to “contention scheduling”. 
Two interpretations concerning the suggestion of Egner and Raz (2007) can be offered. (1) 
Posthypnotic suggestions instigate learning a new response in hypnotize participants. However, 
learning is the paragon of using top-down processes, which has been shown consistently to depend 
on the activation and coordination of cognitive control and cognitive monitoring (e.g., Gobel, 
Parrish, & Reber, 2011; van der Graaf, Maguire, Leenders, & de Jong, 2006), the latter of which 
Egner and Raz (2007) suggested to be disrupted during hypnosis. Consequently, the first 
interpretation of the decoupling theory has severe internal inconsistencies. (2) The decoupling 
account attributes improvements in performance to alterations in bottom-up processes. In other 
words, if internal cognitive control and cognitive monitoring processes are decoupled, and 
consequentially, executive functions are impaired, task-inappropriate, but automatic responses 
cannot be controlled by top-down modulations. Therefore, the only possible manner to make an 
automatic response ineffective without top-down regulation is by disrupting bottom-up processes. 
For instance, if posthypnotic suggestions in the Stroop task made participants temporarily dyslexic 
– dyslexia is the difficulty in reading in individuals who otherwise possess the cognitive 
functioning and education required for fluent reading and has been related to the disruption of 
activities in occipitotemporal visual cortices (Eden et al., 1996; Lobier, Peyrin, Pichat, Le Bas, & 
Valdois, 2014) – the weaker schema (color detection) could be selected without utilizing top-down 
regulation. 
Concerning the second interpretation of the decoupling theory, it is not in line with 
empirical evidence. For instance, (1) it has been shown that enhancements in performance due to 
posthypnotic suggestions are related to more efficient utilization of executive functions, as 






evidenced by higher frontal theta and beta activations under the influence of posthypnotic 
suggestions compared to no-hypnosis or neutral hypnosis (Zahedi et al., 2017). (2) enhancements 
in performance cannot be attributed to the exertion of an automatic response, as “posthypnotic 
responding” is resource consuming (Tobis & Kihlstrom, 2010). Further, (3) many studies had 
shown that suggestions, regardless of being delivered during or outside of hypnosis, can enhance 
executive functioning (e.g., Palfi et al., 2020; Parris & Dienes, 2013), which indicates that the 
disabling of the ACC during hypnosis cannot explain the effects of posthypnotic suggestions. 
In conclusion, none of the existing theories of hypnosis can offer a plausible, mechanistic 
explanation for the effects of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions. Therefore, before using 
posthypnotic suggestions for studying executive functions, one needs to elucidate the driving 
mechanisms of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions themselves.  
1.3.  Summary 
In brief, the current project had two overarching and interdependent goals. (1) Several fundamental 
questions regarding the nature and structure of executive functions remained unanswered. That is, 
(a) Does unity explain executive functions better or diversity? (b) Are all subcomponents of 
inhibition implemented effortfully? (c) What do different versions of the Stroop task measure? 
Employing novel techniques and approaches are necessary for addressing these questions. One 
such experimental manipulation is using task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions for affecting 
executive functioning. (2) Even though post-hypnotic suggestions are repeatedly used to enhance 
performance in executive function tasks, the empirical evidence and existing theories cannot 
explain whether their effects are mediated through alterations in bottom-up or top-down processes. 
Hence, before using posthypnotic suggestions as an intervention for investigating executive 





experimental manipulation must affect the deployment of top-down processes in cognitive tasks 
to be relevant in studying executive functions’ nature and structure. Consequently, in the current 
project, firstly, I tried to elucidate the underlying mechanisms of task-relevant posthypnotic 
suggestions and then employed them for addressing several long-lasting, fundamental questions 
regarding the nature and structure of executive functions.





2.   Summary of Original Studies 
In the following, I present a summary of the results of five studies, which were conducted 
to achieve the above-mentioned goals. In the first study, for elucidating whether the effects of 
posthypnotic suggestion are mediated by top-down or bottom-up processes, a task-relevant 
posthypnotic suggestion was used to enhance performance in a pure top-down component of 
executive functions, that is, updating in working memory. In the second study, a novel theory of 
hypnosis is suggested that can mechanistically explain fundamental hypnotic phenomena. In the 
third study, by applying confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling to hypnotic-
suggestibility scores, the proposed theory of hypnosis was tested empirically. In the fourth study, 
by employing task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions, loci of interference in the manual and vocal 
versions of the Stroop task were compared. Additionally, the neurocognitive correlates of the 
enhancement of suppression were elucidated. Finally, in the fifth study, using posthypnotic 
suggestions, food preferences for low- and high-calorie food items were manipulated to study the 
effortfulness of resolve at the time of implementation and further determine neurocognitive 
correlates of its enhancement. 
2.1.   Study 1: Can Posthypnotic Suggestions Boost Updating in Working Memory? 
Behavioral and ERP Evidence (Zahedi, Sturmer, & Sommer, 2020). 
As mentioned above, there are many studies that have shown posthypnotic suggestions can 
enhance performance in inhibition tasks (for review, see Lifshitz et al., 2013). However, existing 
observations cannot answer whether the effects of posthypnotic suggestions are related to 
alterations in bottom-up or top-down processes. Part of this confusion is related to the nature of 
inhibition tasks. That is, an inhibition task, such as the Stroop task, can be enhanced both by 




alterations in the bottom-up processes (e.g., becoming temporarily dyslexic) and top-down 
modulations (e.g., learning a novel stimulus-response contingency and more efficient utilization 
of cognitive control processes). In contrast to inhibition tasks, enhancements in updating tasks can 
only be related to changes in top-down modulations. In updating tasks, different pieces of 
information are consecutively presented, and all of them have to be encoded and processed for 
solving the task. Nevertheless, these pieces of information are needed only for a short time, after 
which they become irrelevant and must be substituted by more recent information. Therefore, in 
contrast to inhibition tasks, suppressing a source of information by alterations in bottom-up 
processes will be of no help in updating tasks. Further, as updating tasks require different responses 
depending on highly variable conditions, using inflexible lower-level schemata that cannot be 
controlled or adapted are also not able to enhance performance. Therefore, if posthypnotic 
suggestions can improve performance in updating tasks, it will strongly indicate that alterations in 
top-down modulations and not bottom-up processes are the driving mechanism of task-relevant 
posthypnotic suggestions’ effects. 
The second goal of Study 1 was to elucidate the neural correlates of working memory load 
in updating tasks. This step was necessary as most neurocognitive studies of updating have mainly 
used the N-back task (e.g., Brouwer et al., 2012; Dong et al., 2015; Evans et al., 2011; Nakao et 
al., 2012; Scharinger et al., 2017; Watter et al., 2001), which has been disputed as a pure measure 
of updating (Miyake et al., 2000; Schmiedek, Hildebrandt, Lovden, Wilhelm, & Lindenberger, 
2009). Therefore, before generalizing ERP results from the N-back task to the updating function, 
they should have been cross-validated by another task measuring updating (Scharinger et al., 2017) 
to rule out task-specificity rather than function-specificity.  






Therefore, in Exp. 1 of Study 1, we used a tone-monitoring task, which is a pure measure 
of updating in working memory (Miyake et al., 2000), in order to investigate updating load effects 
and their neural correlates. In the tone-monitoring task, different syllables are consecutively 
presented in random order, requiring a response to every N (e.g., four in our study) presentation of 
a given syllable. In Exp. 1, 19 healthy adults participated in the tone-monitoring task while ERP 
data were recorded during task completion. Together, the results of Exp. 1, in line with the results 
of studies using the N-back task, showed several ERP components, including N1, N2, P2, P3, and 
the frontal and posterior old/new component, were sensitive to updating load. 
In Exp. 2, based on the results of Exp. 1, we decide to use a tone-monitoring task for 
investigating the underlying mechanisms of posthypnotic suggestions’ effects on updating tasks. 
However, for scrutinizing the specificity of the posthypnotic suggestion’s effects, Load 1 was 
included in the tone-monitoring task. Load 1 is superficially isomorphic with the other load 
conditions, as it requires the same auditory input and manual output; however, it consists of a 
simple counting task and does not require the updating function. We tested 18 high-hypnotic-
suggestible healthy adults with the tone-monitoring task while ERP data were recorded. Further, a 
counterbalanced repeated-measure design was used, with two sessions, that is, the posthypnotic 
suggestion and no-hypnosis sessions. The only difference between the two sessions was that in the 
posthypnotic session but not the no-hypnosis session, participants received hypnosis, including a 
posthypnotic suggestion. The posthypnotic suggestion was designed to be an elaborated rephrasing 
of the task instructions to prevent introducing a new strategy for task completion. We used only 
high-hypnotic-suggestibles since it is commonly held that posthypnotic suggestions affect them 
more substantially (Green & Lynn, 2011; Jones & Spanos, 1982; Lynn et al., 2019; Woody & 
Barnier, 2008). The high-hypnotic-suggestibles recruited for Exp. 2 were invited from a poll of 




157 participants, who were screened by the German version (Bongartz, 1985) of the Harvard group 
of hypnotic susceptibility scale (HGSHS; Shor & Orne, 1962; Shor & Orne, 1963). 
The results of Exp. 2 indicated that posthypnotic suggestion, relative to the no-hypnosis 
condition, enhanced performance in the tone-monitoring task. Notably, for Load 1 in Exp. 2, the 
performance was not significantly affected by the posthypnotic suggestion. The absence of 
significant posthypnotic suggestion’s effects in Load 1 supports the selectivity of the posthypnotic 
suggestion to updating requirements. In other words, the posthypnotic suggestion did not affect 
performance in general, but specifically the updating function. Further, these enhancements were 
correlated with the increase in P2 and P3 amplitudes, indicating the proactive recruitment of 
control-related attention (e.g., Dunn, Dunn, Languis, & Andrews, 1998; Han, Liu, Zhang, Jin, & 
Luo, 2013) and updating-related cognitive control processes (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Polich, 
2007), respectively. The posthypnotic suggestion also reduced updating load effects in the 
posterior recognition (old/new) component, suggesting that demands on working memory buffers 
were diminished (Rugg & Curran, 2007; Wilding & Ranganath, 2011). Noticeably, the load-
independent increase in recruitment of attention- and cognitive-control-related processes was 
followed by the decrease in subsequent working memory buffer activity. This fact indicates that 
the enhancement in updating was related to the improved deployment of proactive control that 
decreased the need for reactive control. In contrast to reactive control, proactive control processes 
are recruited in advance, regardless of their necessity in the forthcoming situation (Braver, 2012; 
Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009). Noticeably, proactive control is related to sustained 
preparedness and maintenance of goal-related information in the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) 
in contrast to reactive control that reflects stimulus-driven goal reactivation (Braver, 2012; Braver 
et al., 2009). 






In conclusion, the results of Study 1 showed that (1) load effects in the tone-monitoring 
task consistently resemble neurocognitive effects reported in the N-back and other memory tasks. 
(2) The enhancements in executive functioning due to task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions are 
related to the improved deployment of top-down modulations and cannot be attributed to 
alternations in bottom-up processes. 
2.2.   Study 2: How Hypnotic Suggestions Work – Critical Review of Prominent Theories and 
a Novel Synthesis. (Zahedi & Sommer, in prep). 
The aim of Study 2 was to either find an existing theory of hypnosis or propose a novel one that 
can account for key hypnotic phenomena, including the effects of task-relevant posthypnotic 
suggestions on executive functioning. 
Study 2 consists of three parts. First, we procedurally described hypnosis, hypnotizability, 
and effects of hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions on behavior, perception, cognition, and the 
subjective sense of agency. Then we provided a comprehensive systematic and comparative review 
of the most prominent theories of hypnosis. In this systematic review, theories are explained and 
evaluated based on a set of clearly defined criteria, focusing on their adequateness, 
parsimoniousness, and falsifiability.  These criteria loosely follow those outlined by philosophers 
of science like Karl Popper (1971). Although there is a plethora of theories that try to account for 
pivotal hypnotic phenomena, we believe that our systematic review demonstrated, none of them 
can fully explain all critical hypnotic phenomena. 
In the final part, aiming to remediate the shortcomings of existing theories, we proposed a 
novel theory of hypnosis, called the simulation-adaptation theory of hypnosis (SATH). In short, 
SATH claims that there are three top-down cognitive processes, which can be employed by a 
cooperative and willing participant to successfully exert hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestion-




induced responses. These basic top-down processes are (1) cognitive-simulation (for review, see 
Hesslow, 2002): imagining a stimulus, which can lead to perceptual and neural responses similar 
to experiencing the corresponding stimulus in reality. (2) sensory-adaptation (for review, see Frank, 
2016; Lopresti-Goodman, Turvey, & Frank, 2013): top-down downregulation of sensory input, 
which can cause alterations in perception of stimuli, including agnosia. (3) mental practice (cf. 
Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020): mentally simulating a novel situation employed as a practice 
environment, where new strategies are practiced to learn a new, context-dependent trigger-
response contingency. These processes can be employed to different extents and in different 
combinations, depending on the individual capabilities of participants. 
Noteworthy, in contrast to the dissociation/decoupling account, SATH argues that the 
effects of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions are related to the enhanced utilization of top-
down processes. For instance, let us consider the effects of posthypnotic suggestions in inhibition 
tasks. SATH’s suggestion implies that posthypnotic suggestions cause (1) learning new responses 
and making them semi-automatic, so they can compete with automatic, task-irrelevant responses, 
and (2) faster detection of conflicts and enhanced deployment of inhibition to suppress irrelevant 
schemata. Hence, in contrast to the decoupling account, SATH predicts that under the influence of 
task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions, cognitive monitoring processes are in close contact with 
cognitive control processes. Further, performance improvements are related to increased 
deployment of proactive control processes, eliminating the need for reactive control.  
In conclusion, in Study 2, it has been shown that none of the existing theories of hypnosis 
can explain all pivotal hypnotic phenomena. Consequently, a novel theory of hypnosis (SATH) 
was proposed, which can mechanistically explain all key hypnotic phenomena, including the 
effects of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions on executive functioning. 






2.3.   Study3: Is There a G-factor in Hypnotic Suggestibility? Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
of the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility. (Zahedi & Sommer, in prep). 
The aim of Study 3 was to test SATH empirically. In doing so, SATH was used for addressing one 
of the contentious issues in the field of hypnosis regarding the structure of hypnotic-suggestibility 
scores. That is, we tried to elucidate the number and nature of latent factors that are required for 
modeling hypnotic-suggestibility scores.  
Noteworthy, there is an unwavering consensus between researchers in the field of hypnosis 
about the existence of substantial within- and between-subject variability in responding to 
(post)hypnotic suggestions (for review, see Kirsch, 1997; Lynn et al., 2019; Terhune et al., 2017). 
Commonly, for quantifying individual differences in responsiveness to suggestions, standardized 
scales of hypnotic susceptibility, such as the HGSHS (Bongartz, 1985; Shor & Orne, 1962; Shor 
& Orne, 1963; Woody & Barnier, 2008), are used. However, these scales are not measuring (a) 
general suggestibility: the capability to respond to suggestions regardless of hypnosis, or (b) 
hypnotizability: the increase in general suggestibility due to the hypnosis induction, per se (Kirsch, 
1997). Instead, these scales are measuring a mixture of general suggestibility and hypnotizability 
that can be called hypnotic-suggestibility (Kirsch, 1997). SATH, based on existing empirical 
evidence, suggests that (1) suggestibility or, more accurately, suggestibilities are related to top-
down cognitive functions (for review, see Terhune et al., 2017), (2) hypnotizability, however, is 
more strongly associated with psychological factors, such as willingness and openness (for review, 
see Lynn et al., 2019). Considering these points, one might expect that two sources of variance 
simultaneously affect hypnotic-suggestibility scores. This argument highlights the importance of 
using bifactor modeling (Reise, 2012) for analyzing the structure of hypnotic-suggestibility scores. 




Previous studies investigating the structure of hypnotic-suggestibility scales (e.g., 
McConkey, Sheehan, & Law, 1980; Oakman & Woody, 1996; Piesbergen & Peter, 2006) had used 
data-driven exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Even though EFA is a necessary first step as it does 
not rely on any theory, but it has two critical shortcomings (Coulacoglou & Saklofske, 2017; 
Harrington, 2009). (I) Its data-driven nature hinders any firm interpretation of latent factors or their 
indicators in the selected model (Coulacoglou & Saklofske, 2017; Harrington, 2009). (II) In EFA, 
it is only possible to test basic multifactor but not bifactor models (Eid, Geiser, Koch, & Heene, 
2017; Eid, Krumm, Koch, & Schulze, 2018; Reise, 2012).  
In Study 3, for compensating shortcomings of previous EFAs, we use SATH to derive 
appropriate hypotheses necessary for employing confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural 
equation modeling (SEM) for analyzing hypnotic-suggestibility scores. The HGSHS, one of the 
canonical examples of hypnotic-suggestibility scales, was used to obtain hypnotic-suggestibility 
scores from a sample of 477 volunteers. Based on SATH, several models were suggested and tested 
with CFA. Two more consequential models were (I) a basic multifactor model, closely 
corresponding to the dominant solution of previous EFAs (e.g., McConkey et al., 1980), and (II) a 
bifactor model, consisting of a G-factor tapping into hypnotizability and three correlated specific 
grouping factors measuring different suggestibilities. Noticeably, suggestibilities are distinguished 
as each requires a unique combination of three top-down cognitive functions proposed by SATH, 
that is, cognitive-simulation, sensory-adaptation, and mental practice/problem-solving. The results 
showed that HGSHS scores, as predicted by SATH, were best explained by the bifactor model. 
Further, structural equation modeling of causal pathways between latent factors revealed that the 
outcome of the suggestions, requiring a combination of cognitive-simulation and sensory-
adaptation, can predict responses to other suggestions. These results have several critical 






implications for future applications of hypnotic-suggestibility scales in clinical and experimental 
settings. One of these implications related to the utilization of posthypnotic suggestions as an 
experimental manipulation will be discussed in section 3.3. 
In conclusion, Study 3 showed that a bifactor model, proposed based on the hypotheses 
derived from SATH, can adequately explain the variance in hypnotic-suggestibility scores. These 
results, in turn, provided empirical support for SATH and its postulation that three top-down 
processes are employed by willing and cooperative participants for responding to suggestions 
2.4.   Study 4: Common and Specific Loci of Stroop Effects in Vocal and Manual Tasks, 
Revealed by Event-Related Brain Potentials and Posthypnotic Suggestions. (Zahedi, Abdel 
Rahman, Sturmer, & Sommer, 2019). 
In Study 4, we had two overarching goals. First, we wanted to find the neural correlates of the 
inhibition function’s enhancements. And second, we wanted to compare the loci of interference in 
the two versions of the Stroop task, that is, the manual and the vocal task versions. For achieving 
these aims, similarities and differences in ERPs of these two tasks and the neurocognitive effects 
of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions on them were investigated. 
We tested 16 high-hypnotic-suggestible healthy adults in a counterbalanced design with 
two sessions, that is, no-hypnosis and posthypnotic suggestion sessions. In both sessions, both 
versions of the Stroop task were administered while ERP data were recorded. Similar to Study 1, 
the only difference between the two sessions was that in the posthypnotic session, prior to task 
completion, participants were hypnotized and received a posthypnotic suggestion. The 
posthypnotic suggestion was designed to be an elaborated rephrasing of the task instructions and 
do not introduce any new strategies for task completion. The order of the tasks was 
counterbalanced across participants but fixed for each participant in both sessions. In Study 4, 




similar to Study 1 (Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020), we used only high-hypnotic-suggestibles.  The 
high-hypnotic-suggestibles were recruited from a poll of 122 participants, who were screened by 
the German version (Bongartz, 1985) of the HGSHS (Shor & Orne, 1962; Shor & Orne, 1963). 
Considering the ERP data in the vocal version, the problem of articulation artifacts, typically 
arising during overt naming, was resolved by applying RIDE (Ouyang et al., 2016). The benefit of 
RIDE is that it can separate the brain-derived ERPs from overlapping articulations artifacts. Hence, 
in Study 4, we were able to also use ERP data for addressing the similarities and differences 
between the two Stroop versions.  
The results of the psychometric measurements showed that the Stroop effect 
(𝑅𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑅𝑇𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡) in the vocal version was twice its manual counterpart, and the 
posthypnotic suggestion strongly reduced both effects by a similar amount. In the ERPs, our 
articulation-artifact-corrected results showed enhancements in performance caused by the 
posthypnotic suggestion were correlated with the increase of N1 amplitudes and the decrease of 
N2 amplitudes. These results possibly indicate that the posthypnotic suggestion improved the 
initial recruitment of cognitive control processes, which was followed by diminished demands on 
the conflict monitoring processes (Coderre, Conklin, & van Heuven, 2011; Coderre & van Heuven, 
2014). Additionally, the posthypnotic suggestion increased the P300 amplitudes in congruent 
(significantly) and incongruent trials (marginally). P300 is positively correlated with incorporating 
cognitive-control-related processes (Fonken et al., 2020; Polich, 2007). Additionally, the 
posthypnotic suggestion modulated N400, a negative-going parieto-central deflection that is 
typically larger in response to incongruent than congruent trials. N400 is considered as the neural 
marker of semantic processing (Hanslmayr et al., 2008; Liotti et al., 2000; West & Alain, 1999). 
Together, the changes in P300 and N400 possibly indicate that the posthypnotic suggestion’s 






effects were mediated through enhancing proactive executive control over lexico-semantic 
conflicts. Finally, response-locked ERPs revealed a task-specific Stroop effect in the vocal task 
over left-inferior frontal and parietal scalp sites, which was absent in the manual version and was 
not modulated by the posthypnotic suggestion. 
In conclusion, our results indicated that even though the manual and vocal versions are 
both tapping into the inhibition function, they are not identical. These two versions have a common 
semantic locus of interference during reading. However, there was an exclusive locus of 
interference during response production in the vocal version, which was absent in the manual 
version. Furthermore, the enhancements due to the posthypnotic suggestion were related to 
proactive recruitment of cognitive control processes, which decreased the necessity of reactive 
control.  
2.5.   Study 5: Modification of Food Preferences by Posthypnotic Suggestions: An Event-
Related Brain Potential Study. (Zahedi, Luczak, & Sommer, 2020). 
In Study 5, we investigated whether posthypnotic suggestions can also improve the resolve 
function, and if so, what are the neural correlates of these enhancements. For achieving these aims, 
we employed posthypnotic suggestions to enhance preferences for low-calorie food preferences, 
and by contrast, make high-calorie food items less appealing.  
In Study 5, 20 medium- and high- hypnotic-suggestible participants were hypnotized at the 
beginning of the session and received a posthypnotic suggestion that focused on increasing the 
preference for low-calorie food items. After the termination of hypnosis, our task-set was 
administrated once when the posthypnotic suggestion was activated and once when deactivated 
while ERP data were recorded. The task-set consisted of two tasks: the food-face classification and 
the Go-NoGo task. The order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants, but the order 




of tasks in the task-set was fixed. In the food-face classification, pictures of food items and faces 
were consecutively presented on the monitor. Participants were instructed to identify whether a 
given picture shows a food item or face by pressing corresponding buttons. Notably, the calorie-
unrelated task of explicitly classifying stimuli into food or face categories aimed to distract 
participants from forming hypotheses regarding the experimenters’ intentions. Hence, the food-
face classification possibly measures implicit changes in food preference induced by the 
posthypnotic suggestion. In the Go-NoGo task, which was used to measure the effects of resolve 
on the inhibition function, participants were instructed to choose those items they did not wish to 
put in their salad. Therefore, high- and low-calorie food items were Go (frequent) and NoGo 
(infrequent) trials, respectively. Considerably, in Study 5, based on a call from Jensen et al. (2017), 
and in line with the results of Study 3, we recruited both high- and medium-hypnotic-suggestibles 
to increase the generalizability of our results. 
The food-face classification results showed that even though when the posthypnotic 
suggestion was deactivated high- compared to low-calorie food items provoked higher P1 
amplitudes, these differences were eliminated when the posthypnotic suggestion was activated. 
These changes were mainly due to the increased P1 to low-calorie items. P1 amplitude has been 
reported to be larger in response to reward-associated than neutral or punishment-associated 
stimuli (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010; Schacht, Adler, Chen, Guo, & Sommer, 2012). 
Therefore, the modulation of P1 amplitude by the posthypnotic suggestion possibly indicates that 
the intervention successfully altered food-preferences.  
By considering the food-face classification results, we utilized the Go-NoGo task to 
investigate behavioral and neural correlates of resolve. The Go-NoGo task results showed that 
participants were faster in rejecting salad-inappropriate high-calorie food items in the posthypnotic 






suggestion active compared to inactive condition. Further, the enhancements in performance were 
correlated with the decrease in NoGo-N2 amplitudes and the increase in Go- and NoGo-P3 
amplitudes. These results possibly indicate that the posthypnotic suggestion enhanced performance 
by increasing the recruitment of proactive control processes, which subsequently decreased the 
need for reactive control. Finally, the posthypnotic suggestion increased the amplitude of the late 
Go-P3 component. This result possibly shows that classification of high-calorie items was 
facilitated due to increased response monitoring under the influence of the posthypnotic suggestion 
(Fonken et al., 2020; Polich, 2007). 
In conclusion, the results of Study 5 indicate that changes in preferences for different food-
items improved resolve, which in turn enabled participants to handle the conflict between bigger-
slower versus smaller-faster rewards better. Noticeably, implementing resolve was effortful, as 
indicated by the increase in P300 amplitudes. Finally, the resolve function was enhanced by 






3.   General Discussion 
This project had two interdependent overarching goals. (1) I wanted to investigate how 
task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions can enhance executive functioning in different cognitive 
tasks. (2) Using appropriate posthypnotic suggestions, I tried to address several fundamental 
questions concerning the structure and nature of executive functions. To this end, five studies were 
conducted. In Study 1, task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions were used to improve a pure 
component of executive factions, that is, updating. The results indicated that posthypnotic 
suggestions improved updating in the working memory through affecting top-down processes. In 
other words, posthypnotic suggestions helped participants to learn a novel stimulus-response 
contingency and deploy their cognitive control processes more efficiently. In Study 2, a novel 
theory of hypnosis was proposed that, in contrast to other theories, can cover all fundamental 
hypnotic phenomena, including the effects of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions on executive 
functioning. Based on SATH, task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions enabled hypnotized 
participants to utilize a mentally simulated environment for practicing a strategy presented by the 
hypnotist. In Study 3, SATH was tested empirically by investigating its hypotheses regarding the 
structure of hypnotic-suggestibility scores. Study 3 showed that a bifactor model proposed by 
SATH explains variance in HGSHS scores better than the dominant solution of previous EFAs 
(e.g., McConkey et al., 1980; Oakman & Woody, 1996; Piesbergen & Peter, 2006). Study 4, using 
posthypnotic suggestions for comparing manual and vocal versions of the Stroop task, showed that 
the vocal task version is more taxing than the manual version, as it engages an extra response-
production-related locus of interference. Finally, in Study 5, using posthypnotic suggestions to 
affect preferences for different food-categories, the effortfulness of implementing resolve was 






investigated. The results revealed that the implementation of resolve is, similar to suppression, 
strenuous. Additionally, Studies 4 and 5 indicated that improvements in both suppression and 
resolve are related to the increased deployment of proactive cognitive control processes, 
decreasing the necessity of reactive control. In the following, firstly, the obtained results will be 
discussed according to each of our questions, and then, implications, limitations, and future 
perspectives will be considered. 
3.1.  Mental Practice Can Explain Different Aspects of Task-Relevant Posthypnotic 
Suggestions’ Effects 
The first aim of the current project was to discern driving mechanisms of task-relevant 
posthypnotic suggestions’ effects. Study 1 showed that the effects of posthypnotic suggestions 
could not be attributed to alterations in bottom-up processes. Instead, changes in top-down 
modulations must be propelling posthypnotic suggestions’ effects since posthypnotic suggestions 
can also affect updating in working memory, a pure top-down component of executive functions. 
In addition, Studies 1, 2, and 3 proposed mental practice as the driving mechanism of task-relevant 
posthypnotic suggestions’ effects in an attempt to specify the top-down processes affected by them. 
And finally, Studies 4 and 5 corroborated this account by showing that the effects of posthypnotic 
suggestions are related to increased deployment of proactive control and more efficient 
implementation of control processes. Noteworthy, even though there is no consensus in the 
literature about top-down processes that are influenced by post(hypnotic) suggestions, most 
researchers agree that the effects of suggestions should be attributed to changes in top-down 
modulations (for review, see Landry, Lifshitz, & Raz, 2017; Terhune et al., 2017), and empirical 
evidence corroborate this account (e.g., Landry, Da Silva Castanheira, Sackur, & Raz, 2021; Lush 





Assuming mental practice as the mechanism that drives the effects of posthypnotic 
suggestions can adequately explain existing observations in the literature. Let us consider several 
critical examples; (1) suppose posthypnotic suggestions’ effects are related to mental practicing 
and not any unique characteristics of hypnosis; in that case, hypnosis without task-relevant 
hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions (i.e., neutral hypnosis) must not affect performance in 
executive function tasks. This prediction is in line with empirical evidence that neutral hypnosis, 
if not destructive, is unable to enhance executive functioning (e.g., Egner et al., 2005; Sheehan, 
Donovan, & MacLeod, 1988; Zahedi et al., 2017). (2) If the same suggestions are presented outside 
of hypnosis, they must have comparable effects to posthypnotic suggestions. Again, existing 
observations corroborated that task-relevant suggestions, inside or outside of hypnosis, can 
similarly affect perception and cognition (e.g., Mazzoni et al., 2009; McGeown et al., 2012; Palfi 
et al., 2020; Parris, Dienes, & Hodgson, 2013). (3) As the effects of posthypnotic suggestions are 
related to mental practice, they must be effective in improving many different functions and not 
only inhibition. In line with Study 1, other researchers also reported that posthypnotic suggestions 
could affect other functions besides inhibition (e.g., Landry et al., 2021; Lindelov et al., 2017). (4) 
Noteworthy, strategies suggested in posthypnotic suggestions are commonly similar to those 
offered by task instructions (e.g., Iani et al., 2009; Iani et al., 2006; Parris et al., 2012; Raz et al., 
2005; Raz et al., 2006; Zahedi et al., 2017). Consequently, posthypnotic suggestions’ effects 
cannot be attributed to using a different strategy compared to no-hypnosis conditions but 
implementing the same strategy more robustly and efficiently. Therefore, assuming mental 
practice as the driving mechanism of the posthypnotic suggestions’ effects can congruently explain 
existing observations in the literature. 






Two points, however, should be discussed about SATH’s proposition. Firstly, if mental 
practice enhances performance in both inhibition and updating tasks, standard practice should also 
enhance these functions. Regarding the inhibition function, one should notice that even though 
inhibition tasks are resilient to practice, they are not immune. Let us consider Stroop effects; many 
studies showed that Stroop effects can be significantly reduced by practice in participants of almost 
every age (e.g., Dulaney & Rogers, 1994; Protopapas, Vlahou, Moirou, & Ziaka, 2014). 
Intriguingly, according to MacLeod (1991), Ridley Stroop himself was the first to report the effects 
of practice on Stroop task performance. He observed that after several days of extensive training, 
the response of color detection becomes semi-automatic, and there can be even a reversed Stroop 
effect. In other words, in Ridley Stroop’s study, when after extensive training, the task was changed 
from detecting colors to reading words, the ink colors interfered with the word meanings 
(MacLeod, 1991). Notably, it has been argued that the mechanism underlying changes in Stroop 
effects due to practice is related to developing a new semi-automatic response of color detection, 
which can compete with the previously established automatic response of word reading. 
Concerning updating in working memory, it has also been shown that extensive training 
can enhance performance in updating tasks (Diamond & Ling, 2016). Notably, enhancements in 
the updating function due to extensive practice cannot be attributed to the increased working 
memory capacity (Diamond & Ling, 2016), indicating that forming a well-learned trigger-response 
contingency had empowered participants to utilize their cognitive control more efficiently. 
Therefore, not only practice can improve both updating and inhibition, but the effects of practice 
are mediated by top-down processes and are closely related to mechanisms propose by SATH to 





The second point is related to the possibility of activating and deactivating effects of 
posthypnotic suggestions. One might ask if mental practice is the driving mechanism of 
posthypnotic suggestions, why are their effects restricted to the condition, during which they are 
activated, and vanish after they are deactivated? Learning can be context-dependent, especially if 
learned responses are not extensively practiced. For instance, Abrahamse and Verwey (2008) have 
shown that changing the context causes participants to inhibit learned responses. Further, 
Ruitenberg, De Kleine, Van der Lubbe, Verwey, and Abrahamse (2012) showed that changing 
contextual cues can be detrimental to learned responses, especially if practice time is limited. As 
discussed above, posthypnotic suggestions do not result in an automatic response, and therefore, 
contextual dependencies are unavoidable. Consequently, it is predictable that the enhancements in 
performance due to posthypnotic suggestions will be present only when they are activated and 
vanish when deactivated. 
3.2.  Unity and Diversity Executive Functions 
Now that the driving mechanisms of posthypnotic suggestions are elucidated, the results of Studies 
1, 4, and 5 can be used to address unity versus diversity of executive functions. In Table 1, a 
summary of the neural correlates of executive functions’ enhancements due to the application of 
task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions are presented. Notably, in each function, the enhancement 
is correlated with some load-independent unidirectional changes in early ERP components, such 
as P1, N1. N2, and P2. These changes are followed by load-dependent modulations in subsequent 
ERP components, such as N400, late Go-P3, and the posterior old/new component.  
However, one should notice that the above-mentioned ERP components are related to 
vastly different cognitive functions. Regarding early ERP components, P1 has been associated 
with the processing of rewarding value of stimuli (Hickey et al., 2010; Schacht et al., 2012). N1, 






on the other hand, is related to the initial recruitment of cognitive control processes (Coderre et al., 
2011; Coderre & van Heuven, 2014). N2 is a neural marker of conflict detection (Enriquez-Geppert 
et al., 2010; Folstein & Van Petten, 2008; Gajewski & Falkenstein, 2013; Yang et al., 2014; Yuan 
et al., 2011). And finally, P2 is related to incorporating attentional resources (e.g., Dunn et al., 
1998; Han et al., 2013). Concerning late ERP components, N400 is the ERP marker of semantic 
processing  (Hanslmayr et al., 2008; Liotti et al., 2000; West & Alain, 1999). Late Go-P3, however, 
has been related to response monitoring (Fonken et al., 2020; Polich, 2007). And finally, the 
posterior old/new component has been associated with retaining a mental representation in 
working memory buffers (Rugg & Curran, 2007; Wilding & Ranganath, 2011). Therefore, the 
unique ERP components affected by the enhancement of each function can corroborate the 
diversity proposition. However, the fact that P3 is affected by the improvements of all executive 
functions indicates that these top-down processes share at least one common neural system. 
Interestingly, P3 is the ERP component that has been repeatedly associated with the recruitment 
of executive functions (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Polich, 2007). 
Table 1. The Summary of the neural correlates of enhancements in executive functioning due to 
the application of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions. 






Early component P2 Δ ↑ 
Late component 








N1 Δ ↑ 




Inhibition: Resolving Early component 
P1 Δ𝑋 












P3 Δ ↑ 
Late Go-P3 Δ𝑋 
Note: a Δ ↑  and Δ ↓  designate a load-independent increase or decrease in ERP amplitudes, 
respectively. In contrast, Δ𝑋 denotes a load-dependent modulation of a given ERP component. 
 A possible interpretation of the current results, which can solve the above-mentioned 
conundrum, is that even though executive factions are distinguishable, there is a central processing 
unit on which all of them depend. In other words, each executive function relies on a unique set of 
early processes that break down the complete task into processable pieces. These mini-tasks are 
parceled and sent to the central unit, activation of which is marked by the onset of the P3 
component. Afterward, when these mini-tasks are adequately processed, the output of these 
processes will be sent to late processing units, whose activities are tightly related to response 
production. That is, one can suggest a shared attentional system, which is activated whenever the 
existing repertoire of stimulus-response contingencies are not appropriate or sufficient for the task 
at hand. 
The proposition of a shared attentional system can explain the previous findings at both the 
cognitive and neural levels. For example, if we assume a shared attentional system, it should 
incorporate task-specific functions or systems based on the particular requisites of the task at hand. 
For instance, the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological loop are engaged for visual versus 
auditory tasks, respectively (Baddeley, 2003). The incorporation of different cognitive systems 
predicts that tasks measuring different functions should load on distinguishable latent factors. 
However, executive functions rely on both function-specific early processes, marked by unique 
ERP components, and a shared central cognitive unit, activation of which triggers P3. Therefore, 
at the cognitive level, one expects executive functions to be correlated, despite loading on different 






factors. The results of Miyake et al. (2000) corroborate this prediction. They found that a three-
factor model with strongly correlated latent factors could explain psychometric data obtained from 
9 different executive function tasks better than one- or two-factor models. 
The existence of a shared attentional system can also answer why in studies using 
adolescent/child samples, CFAs favor a unidimensional model, but in adults, a multifactor one 
(Karr et al., 2018). It can be stated that in adolescents/children, whose central unit capacity is not 
fully developed yet (Best, Miller, & Jones, 2009), the differences between executive functions will 
be overshadowed by the existence of a bottleneck in the central unit. Hence, in these samples, a 
unidimensional model explains the distribution of executive functions better. However, in adults, 
who are fully developed, differences between early-stage processes are more critical in defining 
each executive function rather than the central unit capacity. Consequently, a multifactor model 
will be better for explaining the variance in their performance. 
At the neural level, assuming a shared attentional system predicts that employing different 
executive functions would be correlated with both function-specific neural systems and a shared 
frontocentral neural system. This prediction is also in line with findings of previous studies and 
metanalyses. (Collette et al., 2005; Niendam et al., 2012; Rottschy et al., 2012; Wager & Smith, 
2003; Yuan & Raz, 2014). Notably, the shared foci of activation between different executive 
functions observed by previous neuroimaging studies have considerable overlap with the 
topographies of the P300 component, observed in Studies 1, 4, and 5.  For instance, Collette et al. 
(2005) found that all executive functions rely on the activation of the right intraparietal sulcus, the 
left superior parietal gyrus, and the left lateral prefrontal cortex. These frontoparietal foci of 





3.3.  The Manual and Vocal Versions of The Stroop Task are Different 
The overarching aim of Study 4 was to compare the manual and vocal versions of the Stroop task. 
For reaching this aim, performance and ERP data obtained in the no-hypnosis and the posthypnotic 
suggestion conditions were employed. The psychometric results of the no-hypnosis session 
showed that the Stroop effect (i.e., the difference in performance between incongruent versus 
congruent trials) in the vocal version was twice its manual counterpart. This finding was in line 
with previous studies comparing the vocal and manual versions (Liotti et al., 2000; Redding & 
Gerjets, 1977). Notably, even though the posthypnotic suggestion reduced the Stroop effect in both 
manual and vocal versions by a similar amount, the Stroop effect in the vocal version was still 
substantially bigger compared to the manual version under the influence of the posthypnotic 
suggestion.  
For investigating sources of differences between the two task versions, it is necessary to 
consider the ERP results. Both the manual and vocal versions evoked large N400 ERP effects 
between incongruent and congruent trials, reflecting the existence of semantic interference in both 
tasks (Hanslmayr et al., 2008; Liotti et al., 2000; West & Alain, 1999). Further, under the influence 
of the posthypnotic suggestion, N400 was attenuated in both task versions. However, analysis of 
N400 in the no-hypnosis condition and its modulation by the posthypnotic suggestion did not 
reveal a clear dominance of the vocal over the manual version. However, there was a discrepancy 
between the two task versions in response-lock ERPs, indicating a response-related conflict in the 
vocal version that was absent in the manual version. This response-related conflict was present at 
the left inferior-frontal (including Broca’s area) and parietal (including Wernicke’s area) scalp 
regions, which have been related to phonological retrieval and syllabification (Indefrey, 2011; 
Indefrey & Levelt, 2004). Noticeably, the conflict component with parietal ERP distribution was 






not affected by the posthypnotic suggestion, whereas the conflict with left inferior-frontal 
manifestation was marginally mitigated by the posthypnotic suggestion. This result possibly 
indicates that even though the posthypnotic suggestion reduced conflict in the language production 
layer in the vocal version, it could not eliminate it. 
By considering both psychometric and ERP results, it is possible to conclude that even 
though both task versions cause semantic interference, and therefore, require inhibition 
implementation for overriding incorrect responses with correct ones (Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004), the vocal and manual task versions are not identical. That is, a 
response-related locus of interference that exists in the vocal version is absent in the manual 
version. Further, as this response-related locus of interference is not affected by the posthypnotic 
suggestion, it is comprehensible why the differences between the two task versions are persistent 
and do not vanish even under the influence of the posthypnotic suggestion.  
A critical implication of these findings for the theories that try to account for the Stroop 
effect is that in the Stroop task, perceptual input from two sources of information, that is, word 
meanings and ink colors, interact with each other at multiple loci. Therefore, any account that 
focuses only on one locus of interference, for instance, the lexico-semantic level (e.g., Dell, 1986; 
Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999; Shitova, Roelofs, Schriefers, Bastiaansen, & Schoffelen, 2017) 
or the response-production level (Mahon, Costa, Peterson, Vargas, & Caramazza, 2007), and 
neglect the others cannot fully explain the Stroop effects. This conclusion is in line with existing 
empirical evidence (Banich, 2019). 
3.4.  No Matter Resolving or Suppressing, Inhibition Implementation is Effortful 
Studies 4 and 5 showed that posthypnotic suggestions could enhance inhibition. In both Studies, 





increased P3 amplitudes in conditions that cognitive control was required. These ERP changes 
possibly indicate an increased deployment of proactive control processes, which, in turn, decreased 
the desideratum for reactive control (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2009). However, in these two 
studies, inhibition was improved by vastly different approaches. In Study 4, the posthypnotic 
suggestion was focused on boosting suppression of a prepotent but task-irrelevant response in the 
Stroop task so that the task-relevant response could be exerted more efficiently and proficiently. 
In Study 5, on the other hand, the posthypnotic suggestion concentrated on increasing preferences 
for low-calorie food items and, by contrast, decreasing the preferences for high-calorie food. When 
the posthypnotic suggestion was activated, implementing new preferences caused participants to 
reject high-calorie food items faster than when the posthypnotic suggestion was deactivated. In 
other words, when participants were suggested to form a novel motivational contingency, high-
calorie food items could be rejected easier. In Study 5, hence, the posthypnotic suggestion 
improved inhibition by affecting resolve implementation. 
SATH suggests that posthypnotic suggestions enhance performance as they provide an 
environment for hypnotized participants to mentally practice a suggested strategy. The new trigger-
response contingency, however, does not become automatic (Tobis & Kihlstrom, 2010). Therefore, 
posthypnotic suggestions result in newly learned trigger-response contingencies that are semi-
automatic responses. These semi-automatic responses can be implemented more efficiently 
compared to when new trigger-responses are not practiced at all. Hence, in Studies 4 and 5, 
posthypnotic suggestions enhanced the implementation of suppression and resolve, respectively, 
and did not create automatic responses. Interestingly, improved resolve or suppression 
implementation both required increased recruitment of proactive control. 






Accordingly, our findings indicate that cognitive control exertion, regardless of being in 
the form of suppression or resolve, requires an immediate mental effort. Considering the argument 
of Ainslie (2020) that resolve is the effortless component of the inhibition, it seems that his 
statement does not delineate between “changing” and “changed” preferences. Ainslie (2020) 
discussed that in situations where delayed gratification is required (Mischel et al., 1989), 
individuals have two choices, either using suppression or resolve. For instance, when choosing 
between unhealthy/satisfying or healthy/unsatisfying food, one can effortfully suppress the urge to 
pick the unhealthy/appealing food. Alternatively, one can effortlessly choose the healthy/insipid if 
the preferences for unsatisfying food items would be changed. In the same sense suppressing the 
irrelevant response in the Stroop task can also become effortless. If participants practice the task 
to the degree that the task-relevant response becomes automatic, then suppressing task-irrelevant 
response can be effortless (Dulaney & Rogers, 1994; MacLeod, 1991; Protopapas et al., 2014). In 
other words, implementing resolve must be distinguished from relying on habits, that is, automatic 
trigger-response contingencies. Consequently, resolve, like suppressing, depends on expenditure 
of mental effort since an automatic response must be stopped, and limited cognitive resources 
should be employed to form a new trigger-response (motivational) contingency (Botvinick & 
Braver, 2015; Shenhav et al., 2017). The main difference between resolve and suppression is what 
kind of novel trigger-response contingencies are created. In resolve implementation, new trigger-
response contingencies are related to associating a stimulus with negative or positive 
consequences; on the other hand, during suppression, trigger-response contingencies are 
proactively blocking distracting information. In conclusion, no matter resolve or suppression, 
inhibition implementation requires immediate mental effort, which results in mental fatigue 





3.5.  Implications, Limitations, and Future Perspectives 
As the current project is concerned with the application of posthypnotic suggestions in cognitive 
neuroscience, it is appropriate to discuss an implication of the current results for future utilizations 
of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions in experimental investigations. It is common practice to 
use standardized hypnotic-suggestibility tests to categorize participants as low- and high-hypnotic-
suggestibles and then, for curbing the effects of confounding variables, low- and high-hypnotic-
suggestibles are compared (Iani et al., 2009; Iani et al., 2006; Raz et al., 2006; Raz et al., 2003). 
This design effectively employs the participants of the former group as controls for the latter (Cox 
& Bryant, 2008; Wagstaff, 1996). A group of participants can only be utilized as controls if 
participants in the control and experimental conditions are identical in every possible aspect except 
for one measurable property. When this assumption is not met, no conclusion can be drawn from 
differences between the control and the experimental groups. The results of Study 3 indicate that 
the variance in hypnotic-suggestibility scores originates from two sources, that is, differences in 
suggestibility and hypnotizability. Based on the SATH proposition, variance in suggestibility is 
caused by individual differences in the employment of several top-down processes, including 
cognitive-simulation, sensory-adaptation, and mental practice/problem-solving. On the other hand, 
differences in hypnotizability can be related to various psychosocial variables, including 
willingness and openness (Green & Lynn, 2011; Lynn, Laurence, et al., 2015), the prior 
expectations about hypnosis (Kirsch & Lynn, 1997; Terhune et al., 2017), expectations induced by 
the wordings of suggestions (Lynn, Neufeld, & Matyi, 1987; Matthews, Bennett, Bean, & 
Gallagher, 1985; Spanos, 1971), rapport with the hypnotist (Lynn et al., 2019), and motivation to 
respond to suggestions (Jones & Spanos, 1982). Low-hypnotic-suggestible participants, therefore, 
are distinguishable from high-hypnotic-suggestibles due to differences in cognitive factors, 






psychosocial factors, or a combination of both. In line with Study 3, many other studies had also 
shown the HGSHS and similar hypnotic-suggestibility scales are not homogenous (e.g., 
McConkey et al., 1980; Oakman & Woody, 1996; Piesbergen & Peter, 2006). This fact underscores 
our concerns that hypnotic-suggestibility scores are not suitable for predicting participants’ 
responses to a random experimental suggestion. 
Therefore, in line with other researchers (e.g., Acunzo & Terhune, 2021; Jensen et al., 
2017), our findings suggest that utilization of low-hypnotic-suggestibles as the only constituents 
of control groups may be misleading. A better approach, which has been discussed by Jensen et al. 
(2017), is to utilize medium- and low-hypnotic-suggestible participants in both the control and 
experimental groups to increase the generalizability of findings. Responding to this call, in Study 
5, both medium- and high-hypnotic-suggestibles have been included in the sample. The results 
showed they were indistinguishable, both at the behavioral and neural level, with regard to 
responsiveness to our posthypnotic suggestion. In line with our results, several clinical (e.g., 
Alladin & Alibhai, 2007; Golden, 2012; Schoenberger, 2000) and experimental studies (e.g., Perri, 
Rossani, & Di Russo, 2019) found that hypnotic-suggestibility scores were a poor predictor of 
participants’ responsiveness to a given experimental suggestion. 
The first limitation in the current project was related to the fact that I focused on two 
functions, inhibition and updating. This focus resulted in the absence of a task measuring the 
shifting function in the current project. As discussed in the introduction, most taxonomies of 
executive functions consist of three functions, including shifting besides inhibition and updating 
(Diamond, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000). Noteworthy, before using posthypnotic suggestions for 
examining neurocognitive correlates of different executive functions, it was necessary to elucidate 





function, as, in contrast to inhibition and shifting, it can only be enhanced by alterations in top-
down processes, and (2) the inhibition function, as many studies had shown that posthypnotic 
suggestions could improve it (Lifshitz et al., 2013). However, in future studies, it is vital to 
investigate whether task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions can also affect shifting tasks and, if so, 
elucidate the neurocognitive correlates of these enhancements. 
The second limitation of the current project is related to the low-spatial resolution of EEG 
and ERP. Even though ERPs have a high temporal resolution, however, due to the inverse problem 
issue, no firm conclusion can be made about the sources of observed ERP components (Luck, 
2014). The information about the sources of components could enable us to scrutinize engaged 
neural circuits more precisely. In the current project, however, I used ERPs to compensate for the 
low-temporal resolution of fMRI and similar techniques (Amaro & Barker, 2006; Constable, 2006), 
which was more critical than having a high spatial resolution for addressing my questions. It is 
interesting to use multimodal neuroimaging data in future studies, as it can have a high temporal 
and spatial resolution simultaneously (Uludag & Roebroeck, 2014). 
4.  Conclusion 
In conclusion, by focusing on updating in working memory, a pure top-down component 
of executive functions, we showed that the effects of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions on 
performance can indeed be attributed to alterations in top-down and not bottom-up processes. 
Based on this finding, we proposed a new hypnosis theory that, besides other critical hypnotic 
phenomena, can explain the effects of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions. The simulation-
adaption theory of hypnosis (SATH), which was empirically tested by modeling hypnotic-
suggestibility scores with CFA and SEM, suggests that three fundamental top-down cognitive 
processes are employed by willing and cooperative participants for responding to suggestions 






offered by the hypnotist. These top-down processes are cognitive-simulation (i.e., imagination), 
sensory-adaptation (i.e., top-down downregulation of sensory input), and mental practice (i.e., 
practicing a novel strategy in a mentally simulated environment). After elucidating the driving 
mechanism of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions, they have been utilized for addressing 
several long-lasting questions concerning the structure and nature of executive functions. In 
summary: (a) the psychometric and ERP results pointed to both unity and diversity of executive 
functions. Inhibition and updating rely on both function-specific early-stage processing and a 
shared attentional system, whose activation triggers the frontocentral P3 ERP component. (b) Even 
though both the manual and vocal versions of the Stroop task measure suppression, the vocal 
version is more taxing. Specifically, the vocal task version engages a response-production-related 
locus of interference, which is absent in the manual version and cannot be affected by posthypnotic 
suggestions. (c) Both subcomponents of the inhibition function, that is, suppression and resolve, 
are implemented effortfully. Together, the current project not only contributed to understanding 
hypnosis and suggestions but presented successful examples of how task-relevant posthypnotic 
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Abstract 
Hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions are frequently and successfully implemented in behavioral, 
neurocognitive, and clinical investigations and interventions. Despite abundant reports about the 
effectiveness of suggestions in altering behavior, perception, cognition, and subjective sense of 
agency (SoA), there is no consensus about the neurocognitive mechanisms driving these changes. 
The present review starts with procedural descriptions of hypnosis, suggestions, and suggestibility, 
followed by a systematic and comparative review of prominent theories of hypnosis, highlighting 
their strengths and weaknesses, based on their power to explain existing observations in the domain 
of hypnosis. Thereafter, we propose a novel theory of hypnosis, accounting for empirical evidence 
and synthesizing concepts from hypnosis and neurocognitive theories. The proposed simulation-
adaption theory of hypnosis (SATH) is founded on three elements: cognitive-simulation, top-down 
sensory-adaptation, and mental training. SATH mechanistically explains different hypnotic 
phenomena, such as alterations in the SoA, positive and negative hallucinations, motor suggestions, 
and effects of suggestions on executive functions and memory. Finally, based on SATH and its 
postulated neurocognitive mechanisms, a procedure-oriented definition of hypnosis is proposed. 
Keywords:  Cognitive Control, Sense of Agency, Hypnotic Suggestions (HS), 
Posthypnotic Suggestions (PHS), Hypnosis, Suggestibility, Hypnotizability, Cognitive 
Simulation, Top-Down Sensory Adaption, Predictive Coding Model, Mental Practice, 
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How hypnotic suggestions work – critical review of prominent theories and a novel synthesis 
1. Introduction
Hypnosis is an effective intervention used in clinical settings, among others for treating 
depression (e.g., Alladin & Alibhai, 2007), anxiety-related disorders (e.g., Valentine, Milling, 
Clark, & Moriarty, 2019), acute and chronic pain (Thompson et al., 2019), obesity and overweight 
(Kirsch, 1996; Milling, Gover, & Moriarty, 2018), for enhancing self-acceptance (e.g., Milburn, 
2010), and as an adjunct to cognitive-behavior therapy (e.g., Schoenberger, 2000). In basic 
psychological research, hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions are frequently employed to 
investigate psychological functions and their neurocognitive mechanisms, among others for 
enhancing inhibition (e.g., Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Iani, Ricci, Gherri, & Rubichi, 2006; 
Raz, Kirsch, Pollard, & Nitkin-Kaner, 2006; Zahedi, Abdel Rahman, Sturmer, & Sommer, 2019; 
Zahedi, Stuermer, Hatami, Rostami, & Sommer, 2017), boosting working memory (e.g., Lindelov, 
Overgaard, & Overgaard, 2017; Zahedi, Sturmer, & Sommer, 2020), modifying perception (e.g., 
Derbyshire, Whalley, Stenger, & Oakley, 2004; McGeown et al., 2012; Perri, Rossani, & Di Russo, 
2019), and altering implicit motivation (e.g., Ludwig et al., 2014; Zahedi, Luczak, & Sommer, 
2020). According to these reports, hypnosis is an established procedure with proven efficacy. 
However, there is no consensus about the mechanisms underlying the effects of hypnosis and 
hypnotic suggestions. What is common to the phenomena subsumed under the name of hypnosis 
and why it is effective in changing such diverse functions as behavior, perception, cognition, and 
the subjective sense of agency (SoA)? We begin our review by describing the procedures of 
hypnosis, discuss individual differences in responding to suggestions, and address the possible 
changes in psychological functions caused by hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions. Then, we 
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in explaining the observed effects in the literature. Finally, we will introduce a new theoretical 
framework, which offers a broader explanatory framework and better predictive power in 
comparison to existing theories. 
1.1. Hypnosis 
The procedure of hypnosis commonly consists of three semi-distinguishable stages 
(Hammond, 1998; Kihlstrom, 2008), namely, induction, deepening (including hypnotic and 
posthypnotic suggestions), and termination. All three stages are induced in a participant by another 
person, called the hypnotist, who presents suitable suggestions (Kihlstrom, 1985; Lynn, Green, et 
al., 2015; Lynn, Laurence, & Kirsch, 2015). The term “suggestion” indicates that participants are 
going to experience intentional responses, and can be distinguished from “instruction” or 
“command” that allude to nonvoluntary acts (Kirsch, 1999). For hypnotic inductions, innumerable 
different suggestions can be used (Hammond, 1998), and there is a long debate about their 
importance and role (Terhune & Cardena, 2016). However, most inductions share some basic 
characteristics. Two aims are commonly attributed to induction-related suggestions, firstly, to 
establish some basic expectancies about the procedure, which assumingly increases the 
responsiveness of the participants (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999). For instance, the word “hypnosis” 
will cue participants that their experience of the current situation may vastly differ from usual 
conditions and make them more responsive to future suggestions (Gandhi & Oakley, 2005). 
Secondly, induction aims to attract participants’ attention and cause absorption in the suggestions 
presented by the hypnotist and in their own thoughts and feelings and, consequentially, being less 
attentive to their surroundings (Brown, Antonova, Langley, & Oakley, 2001), further consolidating 
adherence to the new expectancies. However, there is abundant evidence that hypnotic induction 
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2009; McGeown et al., 2012), may not be necessary for the effectiveness of suggestions (Parris & 
Dienes, 2013), and even in those cases where they enhance responsiveness, their effects are usually 
small in comparison to other predictors of responsiveness, such as suggestibility outside of 
hypnosis, imagination, or absorption capabilities (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; Lynn, Laurence, et 
al., 2015). Hence, although part of the standard hypnotic procedure, the contribution of the 
induction phase to the efficacy of hypnotic suggestions are contested. 
If hypnotic induction is followed by deepening, more suggestions will be presented to 
participants, which may try to relax participants or to achieve the same aims as induction-related 
suggestions. Alternatively, suggestions during deepening may be directed toward a targeted change 
in overt behavior, perception, or cognition. Throughout the remaining article, we refer to these 
targeted suggestions when discussing hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions and their effects, 
especially in sections 1.2. Objective Changes in Overt Behavior, Perception, and Cognition, and 
1.3. Alterations in the Subjective Sense of A. 
Finally, a suggestion at the end of hypnosis will usually cue the termination of the hypnotic 
procedure. Again, as for induction-related suggestions, there are a plethora of commonly used 
suggestions for hypnotic termination, but all have similar goals. That is, aiming to unwind the 
effects of hypnotic induction, these instructions direct attention to the surroundings and reestablish 
the normal expectancies about the effects of one’s own behavior and perception of external stimuli 
(Hammond, 1998; Shor & Orne, 1962). 
According to Kihlstrom (2008), the domain of hypnosis consists of any effect that 
suggestions – including those given during induction, deepening, or termination periods – have on 
hypnotized participants. Thus, the domain of hypnosis incorporates, firstly, objective and 
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subjective SoA or the sense of conviction. In the two following sections, we will briefly review 
the objective and subjective effects of suggestions. 
1.2. Objective Changes in Overt Behavior, Perception, and Cognition 
Most commonly, hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions trigger well-learned or well-
known responses. These responses can be physical movements triggered by the suggestion to think 
of a movement, such as the ideomotor suggestions of the Harvard group-scale of hypnotic 
susceptibility (HGSHS; Shor & Orne, 1962). For instance, the suggestion “think of your head 
falling forward … and you feel a tendency to make the movement” (Shor & Orne, 1962; p.p. 4), 
typically causes participants’ head to drop forward. Physical movements can also be triggered by 
the suggestion to imagine a well-known stimulus, for instance, the suggestion “your hand starts to 
feel heavy… imagine that a weight is pulling it down… as it feels heavy it begins to move“ (Shor 
& Orne, 1962; p.p. 7), often leads to dropping one’s hand.  
Suggestion-triggered responses can also be physiological reactions induced by the 
imagination of a well-known stimulus; for example, when participants are asked to imagine the 
sourness of a lemon, saliva secretion may be triggered (Hammond, 1990, 1998). Notably, the 
secretion of saliva here is a response to a conditioned stimulus (imagined lemon taste) rather than 
an unconditioned stimulus (real lemon taste). Suggestion-induced well-known responses may also 
be a change in perception without any overt action. Notably, here we refer to these responses as 
well-known responses, to emphasize that participants can only imagine stimuli, which they had 
been previously exposed to several times and, hence, are well-acquainted with them (these items 
may not only be physical entities but also abstract concepts, such as angels). In the hypnosis 
nomenclature, these changes in perception are commonly designated as hallucinations; positive 
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hallucinations refer to the complete, partial, or temporary agnosia of stimuli that are in fact present. 
A common example of positive hallucinations is a color hallucination, for example, when 
hypnotized participants see a gray scale in different colors when suggested to do so (Mazzoni et 
al., 2009; McGeown et al., 2012). An example of negative hallucinations is the hypnosis-induced 
elimination or reduction of pain, inflicted by noxious stimuli (e.g., Perri et al., 2020; Perri et al., 
2019; for review please see Thompson et al., 2019). Noteworthy, we categorized these responses 
as objective, as these suggestion-induced changes in perceptions can be objectively measured, for 
instance by implicit tasks or neuroimaging. 
Hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions can also affect cognitive functions (for review 
please see Kihlstrom, 2014; Lifshitz, Aubert Bonn, Fischer, Kashem, & Raz, 2013), that is, they 
can modify responses to external stimuli, substitute habitual responses with new responses that are 
more appropriate for the task at hand, or facilitate learning and generation of new responses. These 
cognitive functions are considered top-down processes and are often referred to as executive 
functions (EF; Baddeley, 2003; Diamond, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000). Even though there are 
different proposed taxonomies of EFs (Diamond, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000), two EFs are 
considered to be pivotal: (1) updating (sometimes called working memory), that is, storing, 
retrieving, and substituting information in working memory buffers, and (2) inhibition, that is, 
suppressing prepotent but task-inappropriate actions (Diamond, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000). Many 
studies have shown that task-relevant hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions can enhance 
performance in both inhibition (e.g., Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Iani, Ricci, Baroni, & Rubichi, 
2009; Iani et al., 2006; Raz, Fan, & Posner, 2005; Raz et al., 2006; Zahedi et al., 2019; Zahedi, 
Luczak, et al., 2020; Zahedi et al., 2017) and updating tasks (e.g., Lindelov et al., 2017; Zahedi, 
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Considerably, despite some evidence that hypnosis without task-relevant hypnotic or 
posthypnotic suggestions (sometimes referred to as neutral hypnosis) may negatively affect 
performance in tasks challenging executive functions (Sheehan, Donovan, & MacLeod, 1988), 
other studies found no effect (Egner, Jamieson, & Gruzelier, 2005; Zahedi et al., 2017), or even 
improvements, for example, in implicit serial reaction-time tasks (Nemeth, Janacsek, Polner, & 
Kovacs, 2013). 
Finally, hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions can also affect long-term memory 
(Kihlstrom, 2014). More precisely, posthypnotic suggestions have been used to induce amnesia 
(i.e., posthypnotic amnesia). This amnesia affected episodic rather than semantic memory (e.g., 
Kihlstrom, 1980), lending credibility to claims that posthypnotic amnesia is related to amnesia for 
the source of knowledge (i.e., source amnesia). Further, it has been shown that posthypnotic 
amnesia is related to modulations of explicit but not implicit memory (Barnier, Bryant, & Briscoe, 
2001; Bryant, Barnier, Mallard, & Tibbits, 1999; David, Brown, Pojoga, & David, 2000). 
1.3. Alterations in the Subjective Sense of Agency 
Numerous reviews and theoretical treatises regarding hypnosis put alterations in the SoA 
to the forefront of their discussions (e.g., Hilgard, 1973; Kihlstrom, 2008; Lynn, Laurence, et al., 
2015; Martin & Pacherie, 2019; Terhune, Cleeremans, Raz, & Lynn, 2017). The reason for this 
emphasis is, it is very common that participants report a sense of semi-automaticity, effortlessness, 
and involuntariness, when they exert hypnotic-suggestion-induced responses (Blakemore, Oakley, 
& Frith, 2003; Kirsch & Lynn, 1997; Lynn, Rhue, & Weekes, 1990). However, as discussed by 
Lynn et al. (1990) the experience of involuntariness does not imply a loss of control over exerted 
responses. If appropriately encouraged, participants are able to resist hypnotic-suggestion-induced 
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Further, hypnotic-suggestion-induced responses are not automatic, since it is shown that they are 
resource-consuming (e.g., Tobis & Kihlstrom, 2010) and executed through the utilization of 
cognitive top-down processes (e.g., Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020). Therefore, alterations in the 
SoA during hypnosis may be better explained as responses that are not attributed to the exertion 
of volitional effort (Lynn et al., 1990). 
Alterations in the SoA are not irrelevant to objective overt responses, as positive responses 
to hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions are correlated with the experience of involuntariness 
(Bowers, Laurence, & Hart, 1988). Furthermore, the subjective sense of conviction is an important 
variable for separating hypnotic suggestions from normal suggestions (Spanos & Barber, 1968). 
Therefore, any successful theory must be capable to explain subjective alterations in the SoA 
besides overt responses to hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions. 
1.4. Hypnotizability 
Participants are different in their responsiveness to hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions, 
that is, some are more hypnotizable than others (Bongartz, 1985; McConkey, Sheehan, & Law, 
1980; Shor & Orne, 1963; Woody, Barnier, & McConkey, 2005). Hypnotizability can be defined 
as what is measured by standardized scales of hypnotic susceptibility (for review please see Woody 
& Barnier, 2008). Most of these scales consist of a normal hypnosis procedure, that is, induction, 
commonly by relaxation-inducing suggestions, followed by several suggestions, differing in 
difficulty; the (subjective or objective) compliance with these suggestions is then used to measure 
the responsiveness of a given participant (Woody & Barnier, 2008). 
But can hypnotizability be defined independently of these standardized scales? To this end, 
Kirsch (1997) distinguished between (I) suggestibility as the capability to respond to suggestions 
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the influence of hypnosis, and (III) hypnotizability as the increase in suggestibility due to the 
induction of hypnosis (that is, the difference between hypnotic suggestibility and suggestibility). 
Noteworthy, according to Kirsch (1997), common hypnotic susceptibility scales measure hypnotic 
suggestibility rather than hypnotizability per se. Furthermore, there are strong correlations between 
general suggestibility and hypnotic suggestibility (r = .67 for behavioral scores; r = .82 for 
subjective scores; Braffman & Kirsch, 1999), and therefore, measuring hypnotizability as defined 
by Kirsch (1997) is challenging. 
Several studies (e.g., McConkey et al., 1980; Woody et al., 2005) have shown that hypnotic 
suggestibility as measured by common scales does not consist of a unitary capability, but instead 
is composed of several factors. In other words, the intraindividual heterogeneity in responding to 
different hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions cannot be attributed simply to the difficulty of 
items; to the contrary, it seems that different items tap into distinguishable capabilities, and 
therefore, hypnotic suggestibility is composed of several different capabilities  (McConkey et al., 
1980; Woody et al., 2005). But as yet, the precise number and nature of these factors have proven 
to be elusive (for review please see Lynn et al., 2019).  
Both psychosocial and cognitive factors affect how participants respond to hypnotic and 
posthypnotic suggestions. For instance, it is been shown that willingness and openness of 
participants (Green & Lynn, 2011; Lynn, Laurence, et al., 2015), their prior expectations about 
hypnosis (Kirsch & Lynn, 1997), rapport with the hypnotist (Lynn et al., 2019), and motivation to 
respond to suggestions (Jones & Spanos, 1982), are critical for hypnotic susceptibility. However, 
the relationship between cognitive capabilities and hypnotic suggestibility is more complex. For 
instance, even though several recent neurocognitive studies showed that hypnotic suggestibility is 
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Novototsky-Vlasov, & Gordeev, 2019; Srzich et al., 2019), other studies found no meaningful 
correlation between cognitive control and hypnotic suggestibility  (Dienes et al., 2009; 
Khodaverdi-Khani & Laurence, 2016). An explanation for understanding these conflicting results 
can be found in the study of Terhune, Cardena, and Lindgren (2011). They suggested that 
dissociative tendencies might be a mediating factor between cognitive capabilities and hypnotic 
suggestibility. Dissociation can be defined as the disruption of the integration of thoughts, feelings, 
and experiences in one stream of consciousness; even though in severe forms it can be related to 
psychological disorders, in milder forms (i.e., dissociative tendencies), everyone may experience 
it (DePrince & Freyd, 1999; Kihlstrom, Glisky, & Angiulo, 1994). 
As different theories usually emphasize different factors as essential variables in 
determining hypnotic suggestibility, we will postpone more detailed discussions about these 
capabilities to section 2.   Critical Review of Prominent Theories and 3.   Simulation-Adaptation 
Theory of Hypnosis. 
 2.   Critical Review of Prominent Theories 
In this section, we will review and critically evaluate existing theories of hypnosis. Before 
doing so, it is useful to explicate our criteria. Simply put, any acceptable theory should 
parsimoniously account for a range of observable phenomena without contradiction and allow to 
make testable, that is, refutable predictions. When comparing such theories, those are to be 
preferred that (I) can account for more phenomena without contradiction (adequacy) (II) ceteris 
paribus, makes fewer assumptions (parsimony), and (III) ceteris paribus, generates more refutable 
predictions (fertility). These criteria loosely follow those outlined by philosophers of science like 
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Lynn et al., 2019) that the adequacy of a corresponding theory is more important than its parsimony 
(Jensen et al., 2015). 
We will first describe each theory and then evaluate it according to the above-mentioned 
criteria. Specifically, in our critical assessment, we will ask, which of the following phenomena a 
given theory aims to explain: (1) hypnotizability, (2) objective effects of hypnosis and posthypnotic 
suggestions on perceptions, (3) cognition, and (4) behavior, and (5) their effects on the subjective 
SoA. A special issue is (6) whether the neural underpinnings of phenomena in question taken into 
account by a given theory. In each case, we will consider the outcomes of empirical tests of 
predictions derived from a given theory.  
It is important to notice that traditionally, there have been two perspectives on hypnosis, 
namely, the state and sociocognitive approaches. In the state approach, hypnosis has been 
conceived as an “altered” state of consciousness, which more recently is specified as a state of 
consciousness characterized by increased concentration, dissociation from the surroundings, and 
increased suggestibility (Elkins, Barabasz, Council, & Spiegel, 2015). Based on this definition, the 
state of consciousness during hypnosis differs from the waking state similar to meditation and 
mindfulness (Elkins et al., 2015).  On the other hand, the sociocognitive approach emphasizes the 
social and cognitive elements of the procedure (Green & Lynn, 2011; Jensen et al., 2017; Kihlstrom, 
1985; Lynn & Green, 2011; Lynn, Green, et al., 2015; Lynn et al., 2019). For instance, Kihlstrom 
(1985, p. 385), defined hypnosis as the process “in which one person, designated the subject, 
responds to suggestions offered by another person, designated the hypnotist, for experiences 
involving alterations in perception, memory, and voluntary action”. Hence, the hypnotic situation 
is of great importance as it demands conformity to social expectations (Lynn, Green, et al., 2015). 
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false account of the literature. More accurately, there is a spectrum of theories, many of which only 
partially overlap with the traditional accounts. Next, we will discuss prominent theories of 
hypnosis and their strengths and limitations in interpreting empirical findings. 
2.1. Response-Set Theory and Integrative Model 
The response-set theory (Kirsch & Lynn, 1997; Lynn, Laurence, et al., 2015) assumes that 
all actions, whether in response to hypnotic or non-hypnotic suggestions, whether learned or novel, 
have automatic precursors and are activated by environmental cues. Hence, responses to hypnotic 
suggestions are also instigated automatically. In other words, hypnotic suggestions trigger the 
precursors of actions outlined by suggestions, which in due course bring about objective overt 
responses. Importantly, thoughts, feelings, and actions under the influence of hypnosis are identical 
with everyday quotidian activities, which means they are goal-directed, aligned with the 
motivations and believes of participants, and under their complete control (Lynn, Laurence, et al., 
2015). With regard to changes in the subjective SoA during hypnosis, Kirsch and Lynn (1997) 
discuss that attributes, such as involuntariness, are “post-facto” interpretations. These 
interpretations are derived from both expectations about the hypnotic situation, as well as 
perceiving automatic precursors of actions, which are usually ignored during normal quotidian life.  
To justify their claim that all actions are instigated automatically, Kirsch and Lynn (1997) 
refer to the contention scheduling theory of Norman and Shallice (1986) and the unconscious will 
theory of Custers and Aarts (2010). In essence, Norman and Shallice (1986) postulate that there is 
an intermediate domain of action, called contention scheduling, situated between reflexive 
schemata, which cannot be controlled at all, and scripts that are flexibly controlled by the 
supervisory attentional system (SAS; Cooper & Shallice, 2000). Norman and Shallice (1986) 
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each other in “the determination of their activation value”; here, contention scheduling ensures 
that the schema is selected that first exceeds a threshold. In non-demanding conditions, contention 
scheduling can operate without any input from the SAS. Source schemata, however, are well-
learned responses and are not related to new responses; hence, when new responses are called for, 
the SAS is needed. Also, if a well-learned response has to be suppressed in favor of a new response, 
that is, in demanding conditions where contention scheduling in itself cannot provide correct and 
appropriate responses, the SAS has to interfere, and ensure that the correct response is selected by 
contention scheduling through implementing cognitive control and biasing the activation of 
different schemata. 
The second concept on which the response-set theory is founded was introduced by Custers 
and Aarts (2010) and can be referred to as “the unconscious will”. Custers and Aarts (2010) argue 
that all basic processes essential for intention implementation, that is, recruiting the resources 
required for action and evaluating the reward value of the action outcomes can transpire outside 
of conscious awareness. In other words, an unconsciously activated goal may cause people to 
invest effort and select actions from their repertoire, in order to attain the goal in novel settings 
without being aware of the goal or its operation (Custers & Aarts, 2010). 
How does the response-set theory justify its fundamental claim that “all actions, hypnotic 
or otherwise, are at the moment of activation triggered automatically” (Lynn & Green, 2011; p. 
281)? Kirsch and Lynn (1997) gave examples that even creative actions, such as professional piano 
playing or communicating about new topics in one’s mother tongue, are instigated automatically 
and executed with little to no burden on attentional resources. However, Kirsch and Lynn (1997) 
did not consider that a person playing piano for the first time, or learning a foreign language, which 




THE SIMULATION-ADAPTION THEORY OF HYPNOSIS  16 
these new trigger-response contingencies. These new responses cannot have substantial automatic 
precursors and learning new responses is resource-consuming. Lynn and Green (2011) justified 
their claim by referring to the concept of the unconscious will (Custers & Aarts, 2010). However, 
in reviewing priming effects, Custers and Aarts (2010) mention that the intention to perform an 
action can spring from outside of consciousness, and also that consciousness is not necessary to 
evaluate the reward value of an action. In other words, the intention to execute an action, already 
existing in one’s repertoire, can be implemented without conscious awareness; however, this does 
not mean that all actions are triggered automatically at the moment of activation. New actions 
without established trigger-action contingencies, are not part of one’s repertoire and need to be 
learned first. Can hypnotic suggestions affect new responses, which do not have any automatic 
precursors?  
As reviewed in section 1.2. Objective Changes in Overt Behavior, Perception, and 
Cognition, executive functions (EF; Baddeley, 2003; Diamond, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000), which 
are closely related to the concept of the SAS, can be affected by task-relevant hypnotic and 
posthypnotic suggestions. Consequently, suggestions are able to both, trigger automatic precursors 
of actions, as well as to establish new trigger-response contingencies. Therefore, even though 
capable of accounting for a range of responses to hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions, for 
instance, triggering well-learned or well-known actions, the response-set theory has shortcomings 
in explaining the effects of suggestions when it comes to situations where novel responses are 
required. For instance, situations that require substituting automatic, prepotent but task-irrelevant 
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In a recent version of their theory called the integrative model, Lynn, Laurence, et al. (2015) 
and Lynn et al. (2019) focused on changes in the subjective SoA during hypnotic-suggestion-
triggered responses. Importantly, Lynn, Laurence, et al. (2015) distinguished between 
suggestibility and hypnotizability, based on the suggestion of Kirsch (1997) (discussed in section 
1.4. Hypnotizability). As in their previous accounts, the authors maintained that since there is a 
high correlation between suggestibility and hypnotic suggestibility (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999), 
objective responses to hypnotic suggestions are caused by the same mechanisms underlying 
responses to normal suggestions. However, in the new version of their theory, they discussed that 
there is only one difference between normal suggestions and hypnotic suggestions, that is, 
hypnosis induces the feeling of involuntariness in hypnotized participants when they are executing 
hypnotic suggestions. To understand this kind of passivity, Lynn, Laurence, et al. (2015) referred 
again to the Custers and Aarts’ (2010) theory of the unconscious will. Except that here, they suggest 
that the response that is triggered automatically is the unconscious will to follow experimenters’ 
expectations. 
One should keep in mind that most of the studies on which Custers and Aarts (2010) 
grounded their theory are related to priming (e.g., Lau & Passingham, 2007; Naccache & Dehaene, 
2001; Strahan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2002). For instance, Lau and Passingham (2007) used a task, in 
which each trial could be related to one of two sub-tasks measuring two different cognitive control 
processes. Before each trial participants were primed, correctly or incorrectly, about the subtask 
involved in the trial. This manipulation significantly affected performance, and fMRI recordings 
during task completion revealed that priming had activated the brain areas related to the primed 
task, demonstrating that diminished performance in incorrectly primed trials is not related to 
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asked after the study, participants denied noticing the experimental manipulation and believed that 
it had not affected their performance. Quintessentially, priming stimuli are very short, which can 
affect behavior outside of conscious awareness. In contrast, hypnotic suggestions are clear and 
explicit and, therefore, hypnotized participants are unlikely to be unaware of the manipulation.  
If their unconscious will to follow experimenters’ intention were the only determinant of 
changes in the SoA of hypnotized participants, the nature of the suggestions should be unrelated 
to the experience of involuntariness felt when receiving different suggestions, as participants 
should have clear expectations about the experimenters’ intentions, independent of the wordings 
of suggestions. However, this contrasts with the hypnosis literature emphasizing the importance 
of the type of suggestions for the experience of involuntariness. This is reflected in contrasting 
effects of, for instance, goal-directed imaginative versus non-imaginative suggestions (Spanos, 
1971), direct versus indirect suggestions (Lynn, Neufeld, & Matyi, 1987), and elaborated-indirect 
versus short-direct suggestions (Matthews, Bennett, Bean, & Gallagher, 1985), where the former 
variants supposedly cause a higher sense of involuntariness or passivity as compared to the latter. 
Here one should point out that long-indirect suggestions in comparison to short-direct suggestions 
may signal participants to feel less involuntary; however, the exact opposite effect has been 
reported (Matthews et al., 1985). In other words, suggestions are not necessarily inducing specific 
expectations in participants in terms of a greater or smaller change in their SoA but there may be 
a mechanism that makes participants feel more involuntary in response to some suggestions than 
to others. Even Lynn, Laurence, et al. (2015) themselves emphasized that the wording of 
suggestions is a determining factor for the degree of change in the SoA. Hence, besides 
performance enhancements in executive function tasks, also in regard to the SoA, the response-set 
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2.2. Dissociation and Decoupling Theories 
There are several accounts of the dissociation theory, which despite their great differences, 
share the basic concept that hypnosis is a state of mind during which normal conscious cognitive 
control processes are inaccessible or disrupted, and hence, their functions are delegated to the 
subconscious or lower-level processes. Amongst dissociation theories, several prominent variants 
can be distinguished. 
2.2.1. Neo-Dissociation Theory 
The “neo-dissociation” account (Hilgard, 1973, 1977) assumes that hypnosis builds a 
communication barrier, or “amnestic barrier” (Woody & Bowers, 1994), between the normal 
stream of consciousness and the subconscious “hidden observer”. Even though participants 
maintain their normal cognitive functioning, a part of perceptual information and/or cognitive 
control processes become inaccessible to consciousness, which explains the changes in the 
subjective SoA. Hence, the sense of passivity accompanying hypnotic-suggestion-induced 
responses is due to the inaccessibility of some cognitive processes and information, as they are 
hidden behind an amnestic barrier. The neo-dissociation account is currently out of favor even 
among advocates of dissociation theory (Jamieson & Woody, 2007; Woody & Bowers, 1994), 
mainly because amnesia during hypnosis is a rare and controversial experience, and grounding a 
definition on an exceptional phenomenon is perilous (Kirsch & Lynn, 1998; Woody & Bowers, 
1994). 
However, some parts of the neo-dissociation theory have been integrated into other theories. 
For instance, Lynn and Green (2011), proposed a path for rapprochement by suggesting that the 
response-set theory is closely related to the neo-dissociation theory because both theories assume 
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the two theories end here, as for explaining hypnotic phenomena the neo-dissociation theory 
assumes an amnestic barrier whereas the response-set theory maintains that all actions are 
automatic. The neo-dissociation theory’s claim that an amnestic barrier divides consciousness into 
two streams limits its applicability to the few participants experiencing hypnotic amnesia (Hilgard, 
1973, 1977). Further, the response-set theory’s assumption that all actions are initiated 
automatically precludes its applicability to conditions without preexisting automatic response-
action contingency. 
2.2.2. Dissociation Theory 
The second variant of the dissociation theory was first proposed by Woody and Bowers 
(1994) and later was reframed as the decoupling theory (Egner et al., 2005; Egner & Raz, 2007; 
Jamieson & Sheehan, 2004) and the dissociated control theory (Jamieson & Woody, 2007). Here, 
the basic assumption is that during hypnosis frontal lobe functions are disabled or disrupted and, 
therefore, the sense of passivity is not an illusion, in contrast to what is maintained by the neo-
dissociation account (Woody & Bowers, 1994). Instead, the sense of passivity occurs since higher 
cognitive control processes are disrupted and participants, rightfully, cannot relate their actions to 
intention implementation or planning (Brown & Oakley, 2004; Jamieson & Woody, 2007; Woody 
& Bowers, 1994). Variants of dissociation theories mainly diverge in answering which higher-
order cognitive functions are supposedly disrupted during hypnosis. Employing contention 
scheduling (see section 2.1. Response-Set Theory and Integrative Model), Woody and Bowers 
(1994) claimed that hypnosis disables the SAS and therefore, participants will act only based on 
lower-level cognitive control processes, that is, contention scheduling. However, according to 
Norman and Shallice (1986), contention scheduling is a system of functioning where no novel 
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source schemata are activated, and contention scheduling is only responsible to select the first 
schema that reaches a certain threshold. If cognitive control is required, for example, if a prepotent 
but irrelevant response has to be inhibited, the SAS must interfere. Consequentially, as Brown and 
Oakley (2004) and Jamieson and Woody (2007) noticed, if the suggestion of Woody and Bowers 
(1994) that the SAS is disabled during hypnosis was correct, participants should have been unable 
to perform any executive function tasks during hypnosis because such tasks require the SAS. 
Although there is a dispute whether participants perform executive function tasks better or worse 
under the effects of neutral hypnosis (i.e., hypnosis without task-relevant suggestions) (Egner et 
al., 2005; Nemeth et al., 2013; Zahedi et al., 2017), it is undisputed that performance under the 
influence of hypnosis is similar to normal conditions (Jamieson & Woody, 2007; Parris, 2017). 
Therefore, hypnotized participants can still deploy executive functions, which shows that during 
hypnosis the SAS cannot be (completely) disabled. 
2.2.3. Decoupling Theory 
In order to account for the essentially unimpaired executive functions under the influence 
of hypnosis Jamieson and Sheehan (2004) and Egner et al. (2005) suggested that only part of the 
SAS is disabled (decoupled) under hypnosis, namely, cognitive monitoring. The decoupling 
account is based on the conflict monitoring theory proposed by Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, 
and Cohen (2001), which distinguishes cognitive control from monitoring processes at both 
anatomical and functional levels (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). Monitoring for cognitive 
conflicts takes place in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) whereas cognitive control processes 
are initiated in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Indeed, many studies (e.g., Botvinick 
et al., 2004; Carter et al., 2000; Kerns et al., 2004) indicate that ACC activation is related to 
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of conflict, and signals the necessity for cognitive control implementation. However, the ACC is 
not directly engaged in implementing cognitive control. Referring to the conflict monitoring theory, 
the decoupling account claims that hypnotized participants can still perform executive function 
tasks under the influence of hypnosis since they still can initialize their executive functions. For 
instance, if necessary, hypnotized participants can inhibit a prepotent response and, instead, select 
a more relevant one for the task at hand, comparable to normal conditions, even though probably 
less successfully. However, this implementation of executive functions is supposed to be inflexible 
and cannot be modulated by internal monitoring signals, since monitoring and cognitive processes 
are disconnected (Egner et al., 2005; Jamieson & Sheehan, 2004).  
Two points need to be discussed about the newt dissociative conjunction. First, the results 
of Kerns et al. (2004) mentioned above had shown that lower activation of the ACC in a given trial 
predicts decreased performance (i.e., longer reaction times) in the next trial. Following the 
suggestion of Egner et al. (2005) that during hypnosis the ACC and DLPFC are disconnected, one 
should expect that hypnotized participants do not detect the need for implementing cognitive 
control, which in turn should severely deteriorate performance (e.g. increase reaction times). 
However, many studies failed to observe performance decrements as a result of hypnosis (e.g., 
Egner et al., 2005; Zahedi et al., 2017). To address this contradiction, Jamieson and Woody (2007) 
proposed that hypnosis affects the outgoing signals from the rostral section of the ACC and not the 
dorsal part. They explained further that the dorsal ACC, which is related to conflict monitoring, 
should be unaffected by hypnosis but the rostral ACC, which is associated with error monitoring 
and feedback evaluation, is hampered by hypnosis. Therefore, they claimed, even though 
hypnotized participants can perform well in executive function tasks, they cannot enhance their 
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assigned to the rostral ACC originate from competing theories about the ACC function. The 
conflict monitoring account considers the ACC as being responsible for conflict detection 
(Botvinick, 2007; Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick et al., 2004). In contrast, in the outcome 
evaluation and decision making account, the ACC monitors action outcomes and guides decision 
making based on its evaluation (Botvinick, 2007). That means, these two sets of functions are 
assigned to the whole ACC, rather than a special part of it.  For instance, many studies have shown 
that both prediction-based signals and outcome evaluation signals originate from the posterior and 
middorsal regions of the ACC (Botvinick, 2007; Jahn, Nee, Alexander, & Brown, 2014). Therefore, 
the proposition of Jamieson and Woody (2007) that there are two sets of overlapping functions 
related to the ACC, which can be anatomically distinguished does not align with empirical findings. 
Therefore, the claim of Jamieson and Woody (2007) that during hypnosis one set of ACC actions 
is intact whereas the other set is blocked appears unwarranted. 
Second, and more importantly, as mentioned above, one of the major predictions of the 
dissociation theory is the alleged incapability of hypnotized participants to enhance their 
performance in executive function tasks. However, as discussed in section 1.2. Objective Changes 
in Overt Behavior, Perception, and Cognition, the capability of task-relevant posthypnotic 
suggestions to enhance performance in executive function tasks is one of the best-established 
findings in the hypnosis literature (e.g., Iani et al., 2009; Iani et al., 2006; Lindelov et al., 2017; 
Raz et al., 2005; Raz et al., 2006; Zahedi et al., 2019; Zahedi, Luczak, et al., 2020; Zahedi et al., 
2017). Egner and Raz (2007) tried to reconcile the performance enhancements in executive 
function tasks under the influence of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions with the decoupling 
account. However, in doing so they retreated to the basic form of contention scheduling. They 
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being hampered in using their SAS, can perform more automatically akin to following contention 
scheduling. As mentioned above, contention scheduling is only applicable to source schemata, that 
is, well-learned, automatic responses. As discussed by Zahedi, Sturmer, et al. (2020), the 
suggestion of Egner and Raz (2007) is only plausible if: (1) Participants have learned a task-
appropriate, novel response to the point where it has become semi-automatic and, therefore, this 
“new” response is capable of overriding a prepotent response without employing the SAS. (2) 
Bottom-up processes have been modified to disrupt the prepotent response (e.g., becoming 
temporarily dyslexic during the Stroop task) and therefore, the SAS is not be required anymore. 
The former assumption contradicts the basic assumptions of the dissociation theory, as learning 
requires the coordination between cognitive control and monitoring (e.g., Gobel, Parrish, & Reber, 
2011; van der Graaf, Maguire, Leenders, & de Jong, 2006). The latter option is at variance with 
observations that posthypnotic suggestions can affect performance in updating tasks (e.g., 
Lindelov et al., 2017; Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020), where changes in bottom-up processes cannot 
significantly enhance performance (cf. Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020). Hence, the decoupling 
account appears to be unsuited to explain performance enhancements due to hypnotic and 
posthypnotic suggestions. 
2.3. Unified Cognitive Model 
In their unified cognitive model, Brown and Oakley (2004) also tried to reconcile the 
response-set and dissociation theories. Brown and Oakley (2004) outlined different levels of 
cognitive control based on the contention scheduling theory described above (see 2.1. Response-
Set Theory and Integrative Model). Then they distinguished between hypnotizability and 
suggestibility, based on the proposition of Kirsch (1997) (see 1.4. Hypnotizability) and defined 
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suggestions by directly activating the appropriate schemata through contention scheduling, 
without incorporating the SAS, it is labeled concentrative style. In contrast, when hypnotized 
participants deliberately use their SAS in order to guide and help contention scheduling to choose 
the proper source schema, it is called constructive style. Noticeably, these postulated styles 
resemble the dissociation and response-set theories, respectively. Brown and Oakley (2004) argued 
that suggestibility outside of hypnosis is related to the constructive style but hypnotizability (i.e., 
increased in suggestibility due to hypnotic induction) is more closely aligned with the 
concentrative style. However, participants can use both styles interchangeably, depending on their 
inner motivations and environmental signals. 
An ambiguous point in the unified cognitive theory is whether these styles allude to states 
(i.e., temporary modes of operation), or traits (i.e., stable characteristics). One should consider that 
the concentrative and constructive styles in Brown and Oakley’s (2004) account are incompatible. 
That is, in concentrative style the SAS is inhibited but in the constructive style the SAS is heavily 
utilized. Therefore, the unified cognitive theory allows four possible specifications. (1) The styles 
are suggestion-related states: hypnotized participants can use the concentrative or constructive 
styles in responding to different suggestions; which one they chose, may depend on the wordings 
of suggestions and external cues. This leads to the prediction that there are two separable categories 
of suggestions. Empirically, there are three to four distinguishable categories of suggestions, 
namely, ideomotor, challenge, and cognitive suggestions (McConkey et al., 1980; Woody et al., 
2005). However, suggestions from all these categories involve imagination (related to the 
constructive style), which is probably the shared characteristic of all suggestions (for review please 
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(2) Styles are induction-related states: even though styles of responding are states, they are 
fixed for a given participant during a given hypnotic procedure but may change in a different 
procedure. Which style is used, depends on the rapport between the participant and hypnotist, or 
other external cues. Following this interpretation, one expects that hypnotic suggestibility scales 
have low reliability. However, HGSHS-A scores are very reliable with, 
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 0.82 (15 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) 𝑎𝑛𝑑  .71 (25 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡)  (Piccione, 
Hilgard, & Zimbardo, 1989). 
(3) Styles are related to general traits: there are two distinguishable groups of individuals, 
one relying on the constructive style, and the other, on the concentrative style for responding to 
suggestions. These differences may originate from differences in the cognitive capabilities of 
participants. In this form, the unified cognitive theory can explain the results of Terhune et al. 
(2011), who had observed there are two groups of high-hypnotizables, one with higher dissociative 
tendencies and the other with higher imaginative capabilities. Nevertheless, the unified cognitive 
theory still inherits all the issues discussed with regard to the response-set and dissociation theories 
(see 2.1. Response-Set Theory and Integrative Model and 2.2. Dissociation and Decoupling 
Theories). For instance, as in the concentrative style, the SAS is supposed to be disabled, one 
expects that some hypnotized participants cannot perform executive function tasks at all, which 
contrasts with published reports (cf. Jamieson & Woody, 2007; Parris, 2017). Further, considering 
the concentrative style, the unified cognitive theory can only explain enhancements in performing 
executive function tasks under the influence of suggestions by attributing them to bottom-up 
processes, which again is at variance with empirical findings (cf. Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020). 
 (4) Finally, the constructive style is related to responding to suggestions in general, and 
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This assumption is contradicted by existing observations. If participants exclusively used the 
concentrative style during hypnosis, they should be very responsive to suggestions only during 
hypnosis, but not so much when receiving suggestions outside of hypnosis. However, it has been 
shown that hypnotic suggestibility and general suggestibility are highly correlated (e.g., Braffman 
& Kirsch, 1999; Kirsch, 1997). 
Summarizing, the unified cognitive model does not go beyond the response-set and 
dissociation theories and therefore, the problems discussed in sections 2.1. Response-Set Theory 
and Integrative Model and 2.2. Dissociation and Decoupling Theories also pertain to the unified 
cognitive theory. 
2.4. Predictive Coding Models 
The predictive coding approach has gained prominence in several fields and has recently 
been applied to hypnosis, as well. In essence, the predictive brain model (Fig. 1A, B), also called 
the Bayesian brain or predictive coding model (for review please see Yon, de Lange, & Press, 
2019), postulates that the brain acts like a scientist trying to understand the world via Bayesian-
type modeling. Bayesian systems involve three integral elements, priors (i.e., epistemological 
uncertainty), evidence, and posteriors (i.e., updated epistemological uncertainty). In the predictive 
coding model, priors are top-down predictions (i.e., efferent signals), which are based on our 
cognitive or heuristic model of the world, and constantly interact with exteroceptive, perceptual, 
and somatosensory proprioceptive evidence (i.e., afferent signals). Through these interactions, 
posteriors are formed, that is, priors are updated by considering the probability of the priors given 
the evidence (Clark, 2013).  
The free-energy principle holds that “any living or non-living self-organizing system that 
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Combining the free energy principle and the predictive coding model, it is conspicuous that if a 
prediction error (i.e., being in a surprised state) arises, that is, if there is a disparity between 
predictions (i.e., prior distributions) and sensory feedback (i.e., evidence), the system tries to return 
to a stable condition without error signals. This can be achieved by active inference or perceptual 
inference. Perceptual inference (Clark, 2013) refers to situations, where prediction errors are 
eradicated by updating priors. That is, by changing the cognitive model based on which predictions 
are formed, predictions become aligned with sensory feedback (Fig. 1A). Hence, perceptual 
inference results in perceptions. Active inference, on the other hand, refers to conditions, where 
prediction errors are eliminated by modifying actions in order to align outcomes with predictions 
(Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010; Yon et al., 2019). Therefore, active inference results in actions. During 
active inference (Fig. 1B), top-down predictions (descending proprioceptive predictions) are 
formed and sent through cortico-cortical and corticospinal projections to target muscles. However, 
prediction errors (i.e., afferent signals) are used in reflex arcs to correct the action and match it 
with predictions. Hence, prediction errors are gradually downregulated in a process called sensory 
attenuation, and their projection beyond thalamic gates is inhibited, therefore, they are not 
integrated into the system beyond reflex arcs (Brown, Adams, Parees, Edwards, & Friston, 2013; 
Yon et al., 2019). For instance, when an agent wants to grasp a glass of water, first, a prediction is 
made about the next location of the hand. Since at the beginning the hand is still in its original 
location there will be a disparity between the prediction and sensory feedback. Based on the free 
energy principle, the agent tries to reduce the error signal. Here, the disparity is eliminated by 
active inference. That is, sensory feedback is used in reflex arcs to correct the position of the hand. 
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attenuation. As the agent’s hand starts to move based on the prediction, the disparity between the 
prediction and sensory feedback is resolved. 
 
Figure 1.   The schematic representation of (A) Perceptual inference as suggested by the predictive coding 
model; (B) Active inference as suggested by the predictive coding model. “P” refers to predictions and “PE” 
to prediction errors; as evident, there are multiple layers where prediction and prediction errors interact 
with each other. (C) The comparator model. 
 
One of the important concepts in the predictive coding model is that efferent signals, which 
are sent through descending cortico-cortical and corticospinal projections, are predictions and not 
motor commands (Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013). This is in contrast with the comparator model 
(Blakemore et al., 2003; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000), which later has been transformed 
into the predictive coding model. In the comparator model (Fig. 1C), motor commands are sent to 
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dynamic and a forward output model. For instance, when a person is engaged in a physical action 
(moving the hand in order to grasp a glass of water), an efferent copy of the motor command is 
used to build a forward dynamic model, that is, a prediction of what will be the next state of the 
system to be compared to the desired state (if I move my hand in direction X and with velocity Y, 
I should reach and grab the glass at time Z). Then, based on the causal representation of the motor 
system, the system forms a forward output model, which predicts the sensory input to be received 
if the motor system acts in that particular way (Miall & Wolpert, 1996). The production of the 
forward dynamic and output models are based on the operator’s knowledge about the system’s 
behavior and are compared continuously with proprioceptive signals. Now, if there are any 
disparities between the forward output model and the actual sensory feedback (my hand is in 
position Z instead of X), the behavior will be modified to diminish the discrepancy (the hand will 
be moved in the other direction to compensate the disparity). However, in the predictive coding 
model, in contrast to the comparator model, there are no motor commands, and the only descending 
signals are predictions. Hence, the necessity for postulating the existence of an efference copy of 
motor command for producing forward models (both dynamic and output models) is eliminated. 
The predictive coding model has been employed in two very different theories of hypnosis for 
explaining changes in the subjective SoA in hypnotized participants. 
2.4.1. Interoceptive Predictive Coding 
The first application of predictive coding to hypnotic phenomena (i.e., interoceptive 
predicting coding) was made by Jamieson (2016). Interoceptive predictive coding extending the 
decoupling account, based on results of Blakemore et al. (2003). Blakemore et al. (2003) had used 
hypnosis to scrutinize neural underpinnings of misattribution of movements to alien sources in 
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experiment had three conditions, where hypnotized healthy participants would either move their 
hand upward or notice it is being moved upward. (1) They should have moved their hand actively 
by themselves. (2) They should have noticed that their hand would be moved by a mechanical 
device attached to them. And (3) participants were informed that their hand would be moved by 
the device, however, in reality, the device was inactive. The third condition resembles the common 
hand levitation suggestion. After receiving these suggestions, the participants’ hands started to 
move upward in all conditions. From the results of the third condition, Blakemore et al. (2003) 
concluded that under the influence of the hand-levitation suggestion (1) participants must have 
formed appropriate motor commands and a functioning forward dynamic model. (2) With positron 
emission tomography (PET) Blakemore et al. (2003) observed that hand levitation performance in 
condition 3 was correlated with increased glucose metabolism in the parietal cortex and cerebellum. 
They suggested that the increased activity indicates deactivation of the forward output model, 
causing a persistent, unresolved error signal, which causes participants to misattribute their own 
action to an external source.  
Jamieson (2016) reframed the results of Blakemore et al. (2003) into a predictive coding 
model. He argued that since other studies had shown that under the influence of hypnotic 
suggestions, both blocking a movement (i.e., hypnotic paralysis) or inducing a movement (e.g.., 
hand-levitation), disrupt the connection between the frontal cortex and the parietal-cerebellum 
network (e.g., Cojan et al., 2009; Deeley et al., 2013; Walsh, Oakley, Halligan, Mehta, & Deeley, 
2015). Therefore, hypnotic-suggestion-induced actions are governed by different processes in 
comparison to normal actions. Further, Jamieson (2016) argued that the results of Blakemore et al. 
(2003) suggest that hypnotized participants cannot perceive the source of their actions because 
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terminus” (Jamieson, 2016; p. 320); as the neural motor network consists of highly divergent 
pathways, the possible point of disruption must be at the source. In conclusion, Jamieson (2016) 
suggested that misattribution of movements to external sources in hypnotized participants must be 
related to the formation of internal models based on hypnotist’s suggestions. Further, these internal 
models are not implemented through normal pathways but by lower-level perceptual and 
proprioceptive units. Therefore, no predictions will be formed and due to their absence, 
participants cannot recognize the source of their actions. 
In evaluating Jamieson’s (2016) predictive coding model, it seems that he utilized a mixture 
of both the comparator and predictive coding models. In the predictive coding model, suggested 
by Friston (2010), only predictions and not motor commands are formed and sent through 
downward projections (Adams et al., 2013). Therefore, no efference copy of motor commands or 
forward models will be generated. Following Jamieson’s (2016) proposition that no prediction is 
generated during hypnosis, if actions are explained by the predictive coding model, one should 
expect no action, at all. Jamieson (2016) further claims that frontal lobe functioning is diminished 
during hypnosis. However, multiple studies have shown increased rather than decreased frontal 
lobe activity during hypnotic-suggestion-induced actions and enhanced functional connectivity 
between the frontal lobe and some sections of the parietal lobe (e.g., Cojan, Archimi, Cheseaux, 
Waber, & Vuilleumier, 2013; Cojan et al., 2009; Ludwig et al., 2015; Pyka et al., 2011). Therefore, 
the interoceptive predicting coding model has severe internal inconsistencies, which makes the 
theory infertile. 
2.4.2. New Predictive Coding Model 
The second application of predictive coding to hypnotic phenomena was put forward by 
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al., 2013). Focusing on motor suggestions, Martin and Pacherie (2019) proposed that, in contrast 
to active inference under normal conditions, during hypnotic-suggestion-induced actions 
somatosensory and proprioceptive signals are not downregulated. Instead, they are incorporated 
into the system even beyond reflex arches and thalamic gates. Further, somatosensory feedback is 
even more precise in comparison to normal conditions. That is, sensory feedback is given a higher 
weight in the (Bayesian) model. However, if predictions do not have a higher weight in comparison 
to prediction errors, there will be no action. Hence, the predictions will also be more precise in 
comparison to normal conditions. Noticeably, this scenario is neither related to the normal 
perceptual inference nor active inference. In normal conditions, during active inference 
somatosensory feedback is downregulated and given lower weight than predictions. In contrast, 
during perceptual inference, somatosensory feedback is given higher weight than predictions, 
which causes perceiving a stimulus and does not lead to a movement. Martin and Pacherie (2019) 
continue that during hypnosis, predictions are based on hypnotic suggestions and therefore they 
are more precise in comparison to normal conditions. In a periodical manner, these precise 
predictions will be given higher weight in comparison to prediction errors, which enables actions 
to be started and continued. Further, as the relative weight of predictions and prediction errors will 
be periodically changed, the commonly observed phenomenon that hypnotic-suggestion-induced 
actions are hesitant and slow can be explained. Consequently, as both predictions and 
somatosensory feedback are precise, a sizeable prediction error is generated, which is precise, 
persistent, and unresolved. In order to interpret their strong prediction error signal, hypnotized 
participants will attribute their actions to external forces rather than self-generated volition.  
Even though the predictive coding account of Martin and Pacherie (2019) appears to be 
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use different strategies to implement the same suggestion. For instance, Galea, Woody, Szechtman, 
and Pierrynowski (2010) investigated the physiological effects of hypnotic-paralysis by asking 
high-hypnotizable participants to feel rigidity and stiffness in their arms and then asked them to 
move their hands with the implication that it cannot be done. To implement this suggestion the 
participants seemed to use very divergent strategies, namely, (1) some simultaneously activated 
agonist and antagonist muscles (biceps and triceps), (2) some others only activated the antagonist 
(triceps) but inactivated the agonist, and some (3) did not activate any muscle group. These results 
show that participants individually formulate unique and different predictions based on the same 
suggestion. This contrasts with the claim of Martin and Pacherie (2019) that predictions are more 
precise during hypnosis in comparison to normal conditions because they come from the hypnotist 
and are reinforced by the hypnotist’s words. If predictions are generated by the participants, similar 
to normal conditions, and not by the hypnotist, why should predictions under the influence of 
hypnosis be more precise than in normal conditions? 
Second, there are also intraindividual differences in responding to the same suggestion 
depending on how they are phrased. For example, in comparison to succinct and short suggestions 
imaginative and elaborated ones may induce a higher sense of passivity and diminish the subjective 
SoA more strongly (Lynn et al., 1987; Matthews et al., 1985; Spanos, 1971). It is hard to explain 
the intraindividual differences in response to different wordings with the account of Martin and 
Pacherie (2019). That is, based on the new predictive coding model when the same person receives 
suggestions from the same hypnotist aiming to induce the same action, priors and the weights 
allocated to them should be invariant. 
Third, the main focus of Martin and Pacherie (2019) was on motor suggestions and their 
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the authors themselves, in hallucinatory suggestions, participants seem to have sensory input from 
an imaginary source, which is given higher value in comparison to sensory feedback from the 
outside reality. Why is the same process not governing motor suggestions? That is, during motor 
suggestions also feedback from imaginary stimuli might be given higher weight in comparison to 
feedback from the real world, and predictions could be formed based on imaginary stimuli. (II) 
One of the most reliable observations in the field of hypnosis is the effectiveness of pain-reducing 
suggestions (for review please see Thompson et al., 2019). Here, attention to noxious stimuli is 
reduced rather than increased, which again contrasts with the account of Martin and Pacherie 
(2019). (III) As discussed in section 1.2. Objective Changes in Overt Behavior, Perception, and 
Cognition, one of the most robust hypnotic phenomena is that posthypnotic suggestions can help 
hypnotized participants to learn new trigger-response contingencies. However, the account of 
Martin and Pacherie (2019) cannot explain this phenomenon. (IV) Martin and Pacherie (2019) 
expected that training of suggestions before hypnosis would decrease the sense of involuntariness 
during hypnosis. However, Gorassini and Spanos (1986) have shown that such training can 
enhance suggestibility. 
2.5. Cold Control Theory 
In their cold control theory, Dienes and Perner (2007) accounted for changes in the 
subjective SoA during hypnosis by focusing on ascriptive metacognition. Ascriptive metacognition 
emphasizes the judgment of agency, differentiating it from other forms of metacognition that focus 
on the judgment of performance (Dienes, Beran, Brandl, Perner, & Proust, 2012; Miele, Wager, 
Mitchell, & Metcalfe, 2011). Based on the higher-order thought model (Rosenthal, 2002; 
Rosenthal, 2006), Dienes and Perner (2007) distinguished first-order thoughts from second- and 
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cat), second-order thoughts refer to the consciousness of being aware of sensations (I know that I 
see a black cat), and third-order thoughts designate the consciousness of being conscious of 
sensations (I am aware to know that I see a black cat). Dienes and Perner (2007) contended that 
hypnosis does not affect first-order thoughts (perception and cognition) but may render second- 
and third-order thoughts dysfunctional and inaccurate. Specifically, they assumed that high-
hypnotizable participants can bypass second and third-order thoughts altogether, while medium-
hypnotizables are only capable of bypassing third-order thoughts. In line with findings that relate 
ascriptive metacognition to the DLPFC (e.g., Miele et al., 2011), the cold control theory attributes 
the dysfunctionality of higher-order thoughts during hypnosis to the disruption in DLPFC activity.  
Several studies have tested this postulation. For instance, Dienes and Hutton (2013) 
showed that low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) of the frontal lobe, 
in comparison to rTMS of sensory and motor cortices (control condition), increased the 
responsiveness to some hypnotic suggestions. However, it must be considered that the hypnotic 
suggestions were related to motor actions. Hence, it is possible that differences between the 
stimulation conditions were due to decreased responsiveness in the control condition, where 
sensory and motor cortices were stimulated, rather than enhanced responsiveness in the frontal-
stimulation condition.  
Furthermore, Semmens-Wheeler, Dienes, and Duka (2013) found that alcohol consumption 
can increase subjective responsiveness to hypnotic suggestions. Because, in lower doses, alcohol 
can attenuate fear responses by affecting limbic and visual brain regions (Gilman, Ramchandani, 
Davis, Bjork, & Hommer, 2008) the participants of Semmens-Wheeler et al. (2013) may have been 
more euphoric and less stressed under alcohol and, hence, might have followed hypnotic 
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of Semmens-Wheeler et al. (2013) is further limited by the absence of significant alterations in 
objective responsiveness to hypnotic suggestions. Therefore, under the influence of alcohol, the 
participants might have been less able to judge their SoA rather than being truly more responsive 
to suggestions. 
Finally, Terhune and Hedman (2017) used a task assessing the judgment of agency 
(Metcalfe, Van Snellenberg, DeRosse, Balsam, & Malhotra, 2012), where participants had to select 
target stimuli with the mouse cursor while avoiding other stimuli that moved across the monitor. 
By manipulating cursor lag Terhune and Hedman (2017) showed that although the judgment of 
performance in high-hypnotizables was equivalent to other participants, their SoA was less 
affected by cursor lag.  A caveat here is that Terhune and Hedman (2017) used relatively short 
cursor lags (i.e., 50 and 100 ms) in comparison to studies investigating the SoA in schizophrenic 
patients with the same task (i.e., 250 ms and 500 ms; Metcalfe et al., 2012). Further, they had not 
applied other manipulations, such as turbulence of cursor position, as usually are used in addition 
to cursor lag, in order to affect the SoA more robustly.  
Explaining the sensation of involuntariness during hypnosis by the proneness to disruption 
of the judgment of agency has several problems.  Let’s consider existing evidence at the neural 
level. The disruption of agency in high-hypnotizable participants may be viewed as a state induced 
by hypnosis or as a trait. Concerning the state perspective, several studies have shown brain 
activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) and DLPFC is increased when cognitive tasks are 
performed under the influence of hypnosis, (Cojan et al., 2013; Cojan et al., 2009) or at least did 
not decrease (Egner et al., 2005). These findings indicate that these brain areas, presumably 
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Concerning the trait perspective, even outside of hypnosis, high-hypnotizables have shown 
higher LPFC activity than low-hypnotizables during flanker tasks (Cojan, Piguet, & Vuilleumier, 
2015), or increased frontal activity (as indicated by a bigger frontocentral P300) during an oddball 
task (Kirenskaya et al., 2019). These findings argue against diminished metacognition in high- 
compared to low-hypnotizables. Furthermore, it has been shown that the LPFC and DLPFC are 
essential regions in the executive functions’ network (Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Niendam et al., 
2012; Rottschy et al., 2012; Wager & Smith, 2003). However, there seems to be no evidence that 
high- and low-hypnotizables perform differently in executive function tasks, neither outside of 
hypnosis (Dienes et al., 2009), nor under the influence of task-irrelevant hypnotic suggestions 
(Egner et al., 2005; Zahedi et al., 2017).  
At the cognitive level, if one assumes that hypnosis induces a state where higher-order 
thoughts are disrupted, and being in this state is a prerequisite for responding to suggestions, there 
should be a great difference between general suggestibility and hypnotic suggestibility, as defined 
by Kirsch (1997). This prediction, however, is refuted by many observations (Braffman & Kirsch, 
1999; Kirsch, 1997; Lush et al., 2020; Lynn et al., 2019; Palfi, Parris, McLatchie, Kekecs, & 
Dienes, 2020; Parris & Dienes, 2013). Alternatively, if proneness to disruption of higher-order 
thoughts is considered as a trait of high-hypnotizables, different wordings of suggestions should 
have no or little effect on the subjective SoA during hypnosis. As discussed above, there is no 
evidence supporting this prediction, as well (Lynn et al., 1987; Matthews et al., 1985; Spanos, 
1971).  
Finally, one of the most robust findings in the hypnosis literature is that task-relevant 
posthypnotic suggestions can enhance the performance of high-hypnotizables in various executive 
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and Cognition. The disruption of higher-order thoughts, the state or trait perspectives alike, cannot 
explain these enhancements. Further, as discussed by Zahedi, Sturmer, et al. (2020) and also below 
(see 3.3. Learning and Other Cognitive Changes), a plausible mechanism underlying the effects 
of posthypnotic suggestions is cognitive-simulation of the task at hand. Cognitive-simulation 
provides a ground for the mental training of a suggested strategy, which usually is the same strategy 
introduced during task instructions. Mental practice may aid hypnotized participants to learn new 
trigger-action contingencies and to implement executive functions more efficiently and fruitfully 
in the targeted task(s). DLPFC and LPC are used extensively for learning new trigger-action 
contingencies (e.g., Gobel et al., 2011; van der Graaf et al., 2006). Hence, if the activity of these 
regions is disrupted in high-hypnotizables, either during hypnosis or in general, task-relevant 
posthypnotic suggestions should have no effect on them. This prediction is refuted by the existing 
evidence (c.f., Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020). Noticeably, newer versions of the metacognitive 
theory (Lush et al., 2020; Palfi et al., 2020) also advocate that the effects of suggestions are 
mediated by top-down cognitive processes, which puts the cold control theory at odds with its own 
basic assumption that the disruption of frontal lobe activity helps or is necessary for responding to 
suggestions and for modulating the SoA. 
2.6. Discrepancy Attribution Theory 
Drawing on the selective construction and preservation of experience theory (SCAPE) and 
its corollary discrepancy attribution hypothesis (Whittlesea, 2002a), Barnier and Mitchell (2005) 
suggested that these principles can explain hypnotic phenomena (Barnier, Dienes, & Mitchell, 
2012). In the SCAPE theory, developed to explain memory processes, Whittlesea (2002a) 
distinguished between the production processes and their evaluation. Production processes refer 
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and perceptual processing at different levels and simultaneously evaluates these processes. The 
results of the evaluation can tag a process as coherent, incongruent, or discrepant. The sensation 
of coherency will arise when all aspects of the current experience are congruent, whereas errors in 
current processes, that is, when one aspect is incongruent with others, would cause the sensation 
of incongruity to emerge that will stop the processing. The sensation of discrepancy rises when 
one aspect of an event is surprisingly fit (or unfit) with other aspects of the event and the source 
of the surprise cannot be attributed to the event itself. The sensation of discrepancy will cause the 
agent to search for a plausible source for it, such as past experiences, the agent’s current state, or 
some characteristics of the event. For instance, when participants encounter nonwords constructed 
by changing one letter of real words, the ease of pronunciation and familiarity of the nonwords is 
discrepant with their meaninglessness. This discrepancy can be resolved by (falsely) attributing 
these words to a list of previously encountered words (Whittlesea, 2002a, 2002b), thus creating a 
false memory. In the false memory literature, the discrepancy hypothesis and SCAPE theory are 
not prominent, mainly due to their assumption that memory is unitary (Whittlesea, 2002a). 
Nevertheless, one needs to examine their relevance in explaining hypnotic phenomena, as 
envisioned by Barnier and Mitchell (2005). 
Barnier and Mitchell (2005) assumed that the cognitive and perceptual processes, used to 
produce responses during hypnosis are the same as those used outside of hypnosis. However, 
production processes are occurring marginally easier during hypnosis. Since this fluency causes a 
surprise in hypnotized participants, based on the discrepancy hypothesis, they will falsely attribute 
this fluency to an implicit characteristic of the event and their own state. In other words, they will 
attribute the experienced fluency to the involuntariness of their response or being controlled by the 




THE SIMULATION-ADAPTION THEORY OF HYPNOSIS  41 
and Mitchell (2005) suggested that this is due to (1) a positive motivation in participants to be a 
good subject, and (2) the special characteristics of hypnotic settings, that is, being relaxing and 
concentration-promoting. Further, the discrepancy attribution theory tries to explain the variance 
in hypnotizability across participants by assuming that some participants may be either more 
capable to focus during hypnosis or more sensitive to discrepancy than others. Both cases would 
promote participants to sense a discrepancy when responding to suggestions and in turn cause them 
to attribute this discrepancy to involuntariness. 
The first question to be asked in evaluating the discrepancy attribution theory is, whether 
responding to suggestions is indeed more fluent or easier during hypnosis than expected. If so, this 
expectation cannot come from a comparison between hypnotic versus normal responses, since 
hypnotic responses are usually characterized by interruption, hesitation, and slowness (e.g., Frith 
et al., 2000; Martin & Pacherie, 2019). Only if participants would expect to produce no response 
during hypnosis, producing even a degraded response might be considered as more fluent than 
expected. However, negative expectations about hypnosis are correlated with lower 
hypnotizability and unresponsiveness to hypnotic suggestions in general (Green & Lynn, 2011; 
Jones & Spanos, 1982; Lynn et al., 2019; Lynn et al., 1984). Accordingly, one would expect low-
hypnotizables to experience a stronger feeling of fluency and to be more hypnotizable, which is 
self-contradictory. Second, does hypnotic induction cause more focused attention or self-
awareness as Barnier and Mitchell (2005) suggested? According to Terhune and Cardeña (2010), 
hypnotic induction does not necessarily increase attention or self-awareness. Further, hypnotic 
suggestions may even trigger contradictory imagination and still bring about the expected 
responses (Zamansky & Clark, 1986). Noteworthy, attention to behavior usually impairs 
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2013; Custers & Aarts, 2010). Finally, high-hypnotizables are no different from low-hypnotizables 
in terms of their attentional capabilities (Dienes et al., 2009) or their sensitivity to discrepancy as 
evident in their judgments of agency (Terhune & Hedman, 2017). Therefore, it seems that the basic 
assumptions of the discrepancy theory are questionable. 
2.7. Summary and Conclusions 
Table 1 presents a summary of the theories reviewed above along with their strengths and 
weaknesses. In critically reviewing existing theories in the field of hypnosis, it has been shown 
that many theories cover a certain range of phenomena in the hypnosis domain but do not or only 
partially account for others. The assumptions of other hypnosis theories, whether borrowed from 
general cognitive theories or original, are at variance with empirical evidence. One of the most 
common problems is the concentration of some theories on subjective experiences to the exclusion 
of observable behavior changes or, conversely, relying exclusively on overt behavior without 
considering the subjective perspective. Another common issue is that the hypnosis literature has 
consistently shown that, regardless of the level of difficulty, there are at least three different 
categories of suggestions (e.g., McConkey et al., 1980; Oakman & Woody, 1996; Piesbergen & 
Peter, 2006; Woody et al., 2005), but none of the reviewed theories presents a plausible account 
for the existence of more than two types of suggestions. Probably the most important shortcoming 
of existing theories, however, is related to their inability to explain performance enhancements in 
cognitive tasks due to task-relevant hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions. 
The shortcomings of the existing theories of hypnosis prompted us to propose a new theory, 
taking into account (a) all of the important hypnotic phenomena, including the objective and 
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theoretical approaches in neuroscience. In other words, instead of trying to stabilize a pyramid on 
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3.   Simulation-Adaptation Theory of Hypnosis (SATH) 
In this section, we propose a new theory of hypnosis that tries to resolve issues and 
shortcomings in existing theories. In short, the simulation-adaptation theory (SATH) claims that 
there are three basic top-down cognitive processes, which can be employed by a cooperative and 
willing participant in order to successfully exert hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestion-induced 
responses. Noteworthy, successful exertion of suggestions-induced responses refers to both 
objective and subjective aspects. These basic top-down processes are (1) cognitive-simulation (for 
review please see Hesslow, 2002): imagining a stimulus, which can lead to perceptual and neural 
responses similar to experiencing the corresponding stimulus in reality; (2) sensory-adaptation 
(for review please see Frank, 2016; Lopresti-Goodman, Turvey, & Frank, 2013): top-down 
downregulation of sensory input, which can cause alterations in perception of stimuli, including 
agnosia; (3) mental practice (cf. Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020): mentally simulating a novel 
situation employed as a practice environment, where new strategies are practiced in order to learn 
new, context-dependent trigger-response contingencies. These three processes can be employed to 
different extents and in different combinations, depending on the individual capabilities of the 
participant. 
In the following four sections, we will address how SATH explains hypnosis-related 
phenomena in three areas. First, we suggest cognitive-simulation and top-down downregulation of 
sensory input as mechanisms underlying suggestion-induced objective changes in perception and 
the sense of conviction accompanying these changes. Second, we address overt behavior triggered 
by motor suggestions and explain them by combining predictive coding with cognitive-simulation 
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Third, we will explain how cognitive-simulation can serve as a sophisticated mental simulator for 
mentally training skills, which can account for the effects of task-relevant suggestions on executive 
functions both inside and outside of hypnosis. Finally, hypnotic suggestibility and its correlates, 
such as social, psychological, and cognitive variables are discussed. At the end of each section, we 
will compare SATH and its conjectures with the theories reviewed in section 2.   Critical Review 
of Prominent Theories. 
3.1. Changes in Perception 
Alterations in perception, induced by suggestions, are commonly called “hallucinations” 
or “agnosia” to emphasize the strong conviction that participants develop about their imaginations 
(see 1.2. Objective Changes in Overt Behavior, Perception, and Cognition).  
3.1.1. Positive Hallucinations are The Direct Result of Imagination 
In the most recent version of their theory, Lynn, Laurence, et al. (2015) proposed that 
hypnosis consists of imaginative suggestions targeting changes in thought, affect, or behavior, a 
proposition echoing those of others (e.g., Kihlstrom, 2008). In this proposition, the most 
conspicuous term is imaginative. Being imaginative is a common characteristic of all types of 
hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions introduced in section 1.2. Objective Changes in Overt 
Behavior, Perception, and Cognition. Even in ideomotor suggestions, where participants shall 
think about a movement until it transpires (e.g., “think of your head falling forward … and you 
feel a tendency to make the movement”; Shor & Orne, 1962), imagining the movement is essential. 
Therefore, there can be little doubt that imagination is, even if not crucial, at least a common 
characteristic of hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions. Among the firmest evidence for this 
proposition is a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies by Landry et al. (2017), showing that 
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hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions. The lingual gyrus is a part of the visual system and 
critically involved in imagery (Jung, Flores, & Hunter, 2016). Therefore, empirical evidence also 
highlights the importance of imagery in responding to suggestions of any kind. 
The cognitive-simulation theory (for review please see Farah, 1988; Hesslow, 2002) 
postulates that imagining a stimulus is essentially the same as perceiving that stimulus, with this 
difference that during imagery, perception is caused by inner thoughts rather than external stimuli 
(Fig. 2A). This claim is supported by studies showing that imagining a stimulus not only activates 
the same brain areas but also causes the same responses as perceiving the corresponding stimulus 
in reality (for review please see Hesslow, 2002). For instance, the imagination of consuming a 
particular food, such as cheese, induces habituation (like its actual consumption), and therefore, 
decreases the tendency of participants to consume this kind of food (Morewedge, Huh, & Vosgerau, 
2010). Further, imagining performing an action will activate the same premotor and supplementary 
motor cortices as executing that action; the only difference is that the imaginary action does not 
activate the primary motor cortex, at least not as strongly as executing the action (for review please 
see Hesslow, 2002). 
What is the relation between cognitive-simulation and the effects of suggestions? As 
discussed above, imagination is an indispensable element of all suggestions. Therefore, when a 
participant is suggested to see, hear, or imagine a stimulus, it essentially induces cognitive-
simulation of that stimulus. Hence, one should expect that suggestions trigger the same (perceptual 
and neural) effects as perceiving the corresponding stimuli. Supporting this claim, when different 
forms of positive hallucinations induced by suggestions are considered, such as auditory (e.g., 
Szechtman, Woody, Bowers, & Nahmias, 1998; Woody & Szechtman, 2000), visual (e.g., Mazzoni 
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cause the activation of the same brain regions as perceiving the corresponding stimuli in reality. 
For instance, in an fMRI study, McGeown et al. (2012) first showed a grey scale and a color scale 
to their participants (Fig. 2B); later, they showed the grey scale and suggested to participants to 
mentally add color to the scale, either inside or outside of hypnosis. Regardless of hypnosis, in 
high-hypnotic-suggestibles, the suggestion induced the imagery of color, which was correlated 
with activity in color-sensitive brain areas (Fig. 2C). Other fMRI recordings by Derbyshire et al. 
(2004) revealed that hypnotic suggestion-induced pain and pain caused by physical stimuli 
activated similar brain areas, including the thalamus, ACC, insula, prefrontal, and parietal cortices 
(Fig. 2D). 
Another argument advocating that positive hallucinations can be explained by cognitive-
simulation is that many studies showed that effects of hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions are 
similar to the same suggestions outside of hypnosis, in terms of both performance and brain activity 
(e.g., Mazzoni et al., 2009; McGeown et al., 2012; Palfi et al., 2020; Parris & Dienes, 2013). This 
finding, besides the fact that suggestions outside of hypnosis closely resemble normal imaginative 
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Figure 2.   A) The schematic representation of Stimulus-Response association during perception of a stimulus in 
(left) the real world and (right) cognitive-simulation of the same stimulus. B) color and grey scales used in the study 
of McGeown et al. (2012). C) (left) the pattern of activation when viewing colors- compared to greyscales; (middle) 
effects of a suggestion inducing positive color hallucination when looking at the grey scale in high-hypnotic-
suggestibles without hypnotic induction, (right) and high-hypnotic-suggestibles with hypnotic induction; Crosshairs: 
the left fusiform region (B and C reproduced with permission from McGeown et al., 2012). D) Brain activity of 
physically induced pain (left, red-yellow scale) and hypnotically induced pain (right, blue-purple scale) (adapted with 
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Nevertheless, two controversial studies should be discussed. First, Szechtman et al. (1998) 
tried to show that hypnotic suggestions and imagination affect hypnotized participants differently. 
They reported that in hypnotized participants, listening to a real sound and the hypnotic suggestion 
that a sound is present (their “hallucination condition”) lead to vivid impressions of hearing a 
sound. However, a hypnotic suggestion to “imagine” the sound did not cause the same report. 
Positron emission tomography (PET) imaging showed that the hallucination and real sound 
condition activated both the auditory temporal cortex and the ACC, whereas the imagination 
suggestion only activated the temporal cortex but not the ACC. Hence, one might question whether 
imagination is really similar to positive hallucinations caused by hypnotic suggestions. One should 
point out that in the study of Szechtman et al. (1998) all three conditions took place inside of 
hypnosis and, hence, were induced by hypnotic suggestions. Therefore, differences between these 
conditions cannot be used to address the differences between imagination (without hypnosis) and 
hypnotic suggestions. In this special study, by contrasting different conditions, participants might 
have developed the hypothesis that the imagination condition should be less severe than the 
hallucination or listening conditions. The same concern may apply to the study of Derbyshire et 
al. (2004), which used the method of Szechtman et al. (1998) and compared the effects of a 
physically painful stimulus, the imagination of pain, and hypnotic suggestion-induced pain.  
In another study, Zamansky and Clark (1986) gave contradictory suggestions (“involved 
imagery”) to participants, while they responded to direct (target) suggestions of the hypnotist. For 
instance, while participants were responding to the (target) suggestion to bend their (right) arm, 
the hypnotist asked them to imagine not being able to bend their arm. Interestingly, contradictory-
to-direct suggestions did not prevent medium- and high-hypnotic-suggestible participants from 
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produced the same response as when receiving only direct suggestions. When considering the 
results of Zamansky and Clark (1986), it should be noticed that contradictory suggestions were 
presented, only if, and immediately after hypnotized participants had successfully responded to 
the only-direct-suggestion condition. Consequently, the participants’ response to the second 
suggestion (with contradiction) may have been based on the hypothesis that these contradictory 
suggestions should be resisted. This idea is supported by studies of Spanos et al. (1985) and Lynn 
et al. (1984), where two groups of high-hypnotizable participants were to resist hypnotic 
suggestions; one group was informed before hypnosis that good subjects cannot resist suggestions 
and the other group was informed to the contrary. Interestingly, the latter but not the former group 
could resist the suggestions. These findings indicate that being able to resist a suggestion greatly 
depends on the expectations of the participants. 
3.1.2 Negative Hallucinations are Related to Sensory-Adaptation 
Cognitive-simulation might explain positive hallucinations, but not negative hallucinations, 
such as pain-reducing suggestions or the “three boxes” suggestion in the Sandford hypnotic 
susceptibility scale, where three boxes are placed in front of participants but the hypnotist informs 
them that there are only two (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962). In this section, we focus on pain-
reducing suggestions, as they are successful in a majority of participants and there is ample 
evidence about their neural underpinnings (for review please see Thompson et al., 2019). 
For understanding negative hallucinations, the concept of negative hysteresis (Frank, 2016) 
and how it relates to top-down processes is of great importance. A good example of negative 
hysteresis is provided by Lopresti-Goodman et al. (2013); they asked two groups of participants 
to judge whether they needed one or two hands to grasp wooden planks of different sizes. 
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merely saw the planks but were not allowed to touch them. Instead, participants in the experimental 
condition verbally reported whether they would need one or two hands. Importantly, planks were 
presented one by one in both ascending and descending size-orders. In the control group the plank 
size, at which participants changed from one to two hands or vice versa was slightly (but non-
significantly) larger for ascending than descending presentation order (positive hysteresis). In 
contrast, in the experimental group without physical contact with the planks, the change point was 
situated at a considerably smaller size in the ascending than in the descending order, that is, 
participants showed negative hysteresis. Frank (2016) explained this phenomenon in the 
framework of a Lotka–Volterra–Haken model for two neural populations representing the 
alternative responses in the task: (A1) a one-hand population and (A2) a two-hand population. In 
the control group, which actually executed the grasps and showed positive hysteresis, the outcome 
was modeled as: 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝐴1 = 𝛼1𝐴1 − 𝐴1
𝑑 − 𝛽 𝐴2
𝑑−1 𝐴1;  
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝐴2 = 𝛼2𝐴2 − 𝐴2
𝑑 − 𝛽 𝐴1
𝑑−1 𝐴2.      (1) 
where, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, and 𝛽 represent synaptic weights of intra- and inter-population connections; 𝛼1 and 
𝛼2 are exponential growth factors describing the increase or decay of the population variables in 
the linear format, and 𝛽 designates the inhibitory interaction between the populations; 𝑑 captures 
nonlinearities in the system.  
To account for negative hysteresis, observed in the experimental group of Lopresti-
Goodman et al. (2013), the activities of the neural populations must be adapted due to the 
prolonged neural activity (Frank, 2016; Lopresti-Goodman et al., 2013). Here, 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 vary 
slowly across each repetition of perception as follows: 
{
𝛼1 = 𝐿1(𝑛) − 𝛾
𝛼2 = 𝐿2(𝑛) + 𝛾
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𝑖 = 1,2, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀ 𝑇 > 1;  𝐿𝑖(𝑛) = 𝐿𝑖(𝑛 − 1) −
1
𝑇
((𝐿𝑖(𝑛 − 1) − (𝐿𝑖,0 − 𝑠𝑖)).    (2) 
where 𝛾 designates the variable of interest in relative format (e.g., relative plank size), 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 
denote the dynamic rest levels of growth parameters 𝛼1 and 𝛼2, respectively. Further, 𝐿1,0, 𝐿2,0, 𝑠1, 
and 𝑠2 define the resting levels after adaptation is completed (𝐿1 and 𝐿2 ), as determined by 
theoretical considerations and experimental observations, respectively. Finally, 𝑇 denotes the time 
scale of adaptation (for further mathematical details please see Lopresti-Goodman et al., 2013). 
By combining Equations 1 and 2, negative hysteresis can be explained in terms of 
downregulation of neural activity of the targeted population due to prolonged neural activity. In 
ascending order, the one-hand population increasingly adapts across repetitions and is dominated 
by the two-hand population at a plank size smaller than in the physical perception condition. 
Conversely, in descending order, the two-hand population adapts across repetitions. This opposite 
shift in the change points yields negative hysteresis. Why is prolonged neural activity relevant only 
for the experimental condition? In the experimental condition, participants form mental 
representations of perceived objects, maintain them in their working memory, and examine 
(manipulate) them to judge how they should be grasped. In contrast, controls respond directly to 
their perceptions, and therefore, perceived stimuli will not be transmitted into working memory. 
Hence, downregulation of the adapting neural population is conceived as a top-down process, as 
it is related to attention allocation rather than to a disturbance in bottom-up processes. The idea 
that top-down processes regulate perception and can directly affect perceptual pathways starting 
from thalamic activities is not restricted to negative hysteresis and has been corroborated by many 
studies (for review please see Saalmann & Kastner, 2009), and even in non-human subjects 




THE SIMULATION-ADAPTION THEORY OF HYPNOSIS  54 
caused by imagination (and not by physical sensation) is integral to understanding the effects of 
suggestions. 
How can sensory-adaptation help us to understand negative hallucinations? Let’s focus on 
pain reduction as a common example of negative hallucinations. There are innumerable pain-
reducing suggestions (for review please see Hammond, 1998) but most ask participants to form a 
mental representation of pain eliciting stimuli and to manipulate this mental representation. For 
instance, participants might be asked to describe pain elicited by noxious stimuli in terms of a 
physical object (e.g., a balloon or bricks), and interact with this object (e.g., crunch it or reduce its 
size). Therefore, in contrast to normal conditions, where participants directly react to stimuli, 
suggestions ask them to form a mental representation of noxious stimuli, similar to the 
experimental group of Lopresti-Goodman et al. (2013).  
Let’s assume that there are two neural populations with growth parameters 𝛼1 and 𝛼2, 
where the activation of one population classifies a stimulus, such as an ice cube on the skin, as 
harmless whereas the other population classifies it as painfully cold. In normal situations with 
direct reactions to pain-evoking stimuli, Equation 1 only explains positive hysteresis. That is, when 
a stimulus is already judged as painful, the stimulus will be judged as non-painful somewhat even 
below the threshold for an isolated stimulus. Conversely, when reacting to the same stimulus after 
a pain-reducing hypnotic suggestion, the fact that participants form a mental representation of the 
stimulus and work on it (e.g., by judging its severity or trying to describe and manipulate it) will 
cause a prolonged neural activity in the pain perception population. Therefore, the growth 
parameter of the pain perception population, 𝛼2, will be downregulated, as described in Equation 
2. Consequently, the critical value, at which participants judge stimuli as non-painful, will be 
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than in normal conditions. In other words, suggestions reduce pain by establishing a mental 
representation of pain, causing a prolonged neural activity, that results in sensory-adaptation. This 
mechanism is not restricted to pain-provoking stimuli, but the perception of any stimulus, such as 
tactile non-pain provoking stimuli, can be affected by sensory downregulation (via top-down 
processes) when participants form a mental representation of the stimulus and engage in 
manipulating this representation (e.g., Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2009). 
The adaptation account of negative hallucinations predicts that brain areas, being activated 
in response to noxious stimuli, will be less activated after receiving pain-reduction suggestions in 
comparison to normal conditions. This prediction is supported by both fMRI and ERP studies. For 
instance, in an fMRI study, Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2009) found that all brain regions activated by 
pain perception, that is, brainstem, right thalamus, bilateral striatum, right primary somatosensory, 
bilateral insula, anterior cingulate cortex, right middle frontal gyrus, and right premotor cortex, 
showed less activation following pain-reducing hypnotic suggestions in comparison to a normal 
condition without hypnosis (Fig, 3A). In an ERP study, Perri et al. (2019) found hypnotic 
suggestions to reduce ERP components correlated with pain perception, such as N20, P100, P150, 
and P250 (Fig. 3B). Therefore, the top-down sensory downregulation of the neural population 
responsible for judging and labeling stimuli as painful may explain pain reduction due to hypnotic 
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Figure 3.   Decrease in brain activity after pain-reducing hypnotic suggestions; A) brain regions showing significant 
(p<0.05) activation during noxious stimulation (upper row) without hypnosis, (middle row) under the influence of 
pain-reducing hypnotic suggestions, and (lower row) the hypnotic condition minus the no-hypnosis condition (adapted 
with permission from Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2009). B) (top) grand-average waveforms of sensory-evoked potentials 
(SEPs) without hypnosis and during hypnosis; shaded areas are representing standard deviations; (bottom) topographic 
maps of the P100, P150, and P250 components in the two conditions (adapted with permission from Perri et al., 2019). 
 
3.1.3. Sense of Conviction 
Why do participants develop a sense of conviction only in response to suggestions but not 
during normal imagination? Ganis and Schendan (2008) compared ERP effects of imagining 
stimuli with perceiving them and showed that imaginations induced the same perceptual processes 
as external stimuli. The authors discussed that mental imagery caused mental representations of 
imagined stimuli to be formed and maintained in working memory. This was in contrast to the 
perception condition, where perceptual representations were quickly discarded through bottom-up 
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(mental vs. perceptual) representations, participants usually do not confuse mental imagery with 
the perception of external stimuli. Let’s consider the effects of suggestions. During positive 
hallucinations, participants are asked to form a stream of mental images (e.g., a developing story 
rather than a single image). Therefore, participants are not forming just a single mental 
representation but a stream of representations, which is subjected to the same normal bottom-up 
decay as external stimuli, as they are not maintained in working memory, but discarded 
immediately (the distinguishing property of perceptual representations). Therefore, these 
representations are easy to be confused with perceived real-life events. During negative 
hallucinations, however, an external stimulus is transformed into a mental representation and 
manipulated repeatedly, causing a prolonged neural activation that can be subjected to top-down 
sensory-adaptation. Therefore, when participants respond successfully to perception-related 
suggestions, the subjective sense of conviction about the mental imagery seems to be a byproduct 
of the underlying cognitive processes rather than related to participants’ expectations or post hoc 
interpretations. 
3.1.4. Comparison with Other Theories 
How does SATH compare with other theories? First, SATH and the response-set theory 
(reviewed in section 2.1. Response-Set Theory and Integrative Model) are similar with regard to 
emphasizing imagination as the underlying mechanism for some of the objective changes in 
perception. However, SATH proposes top-down sensory-adaptation as a second mechanism, in 
order to explain negative hallucinations, which are not accounted for by the response-set theory. 
Further, in contrast to the response-set theory, SATH does not attribute the perceptual effects of 
suggestions to automatic response activation, but to two top-down processes, that is, cognitive-
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likely important for implementing and facilitating suggestions, they are probably insufficient to 
account for the observed effects and must be distinguished from the mechanisms underlying the 
effects of suggestions. 
Second, dissociation theories (reviewed in section 2.2. Dissociation and Decoupling 
Theories) can be easily distinguished from SATH, which assumes several top-down processes as 
mechanisms underlying the perceptual effects of suggestions. In contrast, dissociation theory 
attributes these effects to disruption of some top-down processes, such as error monitoring. The 
advantage of SATH is its capability to understand positive and negative hallucinations at a 
mechanistic level, which is not the case for dissociation theories.  
Third, in contrast to the cold control theory (reviewed in section 2.5. Cold Control Theory), 
SATH does not assume that blocking higher-order thoughts is responsible for objective changes in 
overt behavior and perception. To the contrary, SATH proposes that negative hallucinations are 
caused by forming and maintaining mental representations of external stimuli that results in top-
down-driven downregulation of the external input. Further, in contrast to SATH, the cold control 
theory cannot explain positive hallucinations. 
3.2. Motor Suggestions 
After accounting for perceptual hypnotic phenomena, we now turn to effects of motor 
suggestions (reviewed in section 1.2. Objective Changes in Overt Behavior, Perception, and 
Cognition). Cognitive-simulation and its more specific counterpart for motor responses, the 
ideomotor mechanism, have problems explaining the observed effects of suggestions as stand-
alone mechanisms. The ideomotor theory (for review please see Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010), 
especially the theory of event coding (TEC) (Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001), 
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internalized through repetitions, will induce a tendency to produce that movement. For instance, 
in the study of Elsner and Hommel (2001) participants repeatedly experienced a fixed co-
occurrence between right and left button presses and low- and high-pitched tones during the 
training phase. In the following test phase, low- and high-pitched tones preceded responses. The 
results indicated that the effects of a response (low and high tones) can activate the corresponding 
right and left button presses. Follow-up neuroimaging studies showed that response activations 
were correlated with activation of (predominantly left) premotor and somatosensory cortices (e.g., 
Melcher, Weidema, Eenshuistra, Hommel, & Gruber, 2008; Melcher et al., 2013). However, this 
tendency by itself rarely caused a full-fledged movement, at variance with motor suggestions 
during hypnosis, which in most participants successfully induce complete movements (Shor & 
Orne, 1963; Woody et al., 2005). 
When comparing the cognitive-simulation with the ideomotor theory, one should notice 
that in cognitive-simulation, it is assumed that if an unconditioned stimulus (e.g., the buoyancy of 
a helium-filled balloon) has been repeatedly experienced and caused an unconditioned response 
(e.g., raising hands), the imagination of the stimulus (presumably a conditioned stimulus) can 
induce a tendency to perform a conditioned response similar to the unconditioned response. 
Therefore, 𝐶𝑆 →  𝐶𝑅. Ideomotor theory (Elsner & Hommel, 2001), on the other hand, assumes 
that if an action (e.g. a button press) had been exerted repeatedly and caused an effect (E) (e.g., a 
high-pitched sound), the perception of the effect can induce a tendency to perform the action (e.g. 
pressing a button), therefore, 𝐸 →  𝐶𝑅. However, also in ideomotor theory, it seems that effects of 
actions are becoming conditioned stimuli. Consequently, when we discuss motor suggestions, both 




THE SIMULATION-ADAPTION THEORY OF HYPNOSIS  60 
movement-associated stimulus (𝐶𝑆 →  𝐶𝑅 ), will be treated similarly and are assumed to be 
governed by similar principles.  
Based on the predictive coding model (see section 2.4. Predictive Coding Models), a 
voluntary motor response is initiated by forming a prediction, which is propagated downward in 
cortico-cortical and corticospinal projections till it reaches the targeted muscles. During active 
inference (related to volitional movements) (Fig. 1), somatosensory feedback is used to form 
prediction errors. Even though back-propagation of prediction errors is used to correct movements 
(if they are not aligned with predictions), prediction errors are gradually downregulated in reflex 
arcs and blocked completely beyond thalamic nuclei (Adams et al., 2013; Brown et al., 2013). 
Therefore, during active inference, somatosensory feedback is only used to correct movements but 
not to update predictions. 
SATH combines cognitive-simulation, sensory-adaptation, and predictive coding, in order 
to explain the effects of motor suggestions. Let’s consider a common motor suggestion (Fig. 4A), 
where participants imagine helium-filled balloons attached to their hands, and simultaneously, are 
asked to concentrate on sensations coming from the targeted hand or on changes in these sensations, 
such as, temperature, comfort, and so forth, which commonly facilitates the hypnotic suggestion-
induced action. After receiving this suggestion, according to the cognitive-simulation mechanism 
(section 3.1.1. Positive Hallucinations are The Direct Result of Imagination), a second source of 
input will be generated (i.e., a positive hallucination). Hence, two sources of input are available, 
(I) somatosensory and proprioceptive input from external sources and from the participants’ body, 
and (II) input from conditioned stimuli coming from imagination. According to sensory-adaptation 
(section 3.1.2 Negative Hallucinations are Related to Sensory-Adaptation), if two neural 
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respectively, compete for dominance, they will be governed by the mechanisms described in 
Equations 1 and 2. Therefore, when participants form a mental representation of their hand, 
sensory-adaptation will downregulate the growth factor of the neural population corresponding to 
somatosensory and proprioceptive input. It is plausible that hypnotizable participants will form 
predictions based on their imaginations that an external force (e.g., balloons) buoys their hand 
upward. However, until the somatosensory input is downregulated severely, there would be a 
precise prediction error that will prevent any movement. As soon as 𝛼1 is downregulated enough 
to judge the second source of input (imaginary input) as dominant, the prediction errors vanish, 
and the upward movement will start. Noticeably, as the downregulation of somatosensory input 
transpires through top-down rather than bottom-up processes, somatosensory input will be used in 
reflex arcs for guiding the movement in the predicted direction. 
Five questions remain to be addressed. (1) Can SATH explain why movements occur 
during motor suggestions? Two pillars of predictive coding should be noticed. (I) Down-
propagating signals through cortico-cortical and corticospinal projections are predictions and not 
motor commands (Adams et al., 2013). (II) Two forms of inference exist (Fig. 1A, B), namely 
active and perceptual movement. Active inference brings about the execution of movements and 
perceptual inference results in the perception of stimuli (e.g., externally driven movements). The 
main difference between the two forms of inference is that during active inference predictions are 
more precise (i.e., have higher weights in the system) than prediction errors, since prediction errors 
(sensory feedback) are “attenuated” (used only in reflex arcs for aligning the movement with 
predictions). In contrast, during perceptual inference prediction errors are more precise than 
predictions, causing predictions to be updated according to somatosensory feedback, which results 
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(Brown et al., 2013; Clark, 2013). Therefore, for a movement to occur, two elements are necessary, 
the down-propagation of predictions and the attenuation of sensory feedback. These two elements 
together enforce the predicted movement to occur, instead of updating predictions based on 
sensory feedback (Brown et al., 2013). SATH involves both elements, down-propagating 
predictions based on mental imagery, and down-regulating sensory feedback due to prolonged 
activation through top-down sensory-adaptation. 
(2) What are the differences between normal movements and those induced by hypnotic 
suggestions, and can these differences predict alterations in the subjective SoA? If we consider the 
proposition of SATH for hypnotic-suggestion-induced movements, there are two elements. (I) 
Predictions, generated based on imagined stimuli, are more precise in comparison to 
somatosensory feedback, which is downregulated by sensory-adaptation (imitating active 
inference). However, (II) predictions are less precise in comparison to feedback from imaginations 
and, therefore, predictions are being updated to be congruent with feedback from mental imagery 
(similar to perpetual inference). In this structure, movements occur since predictions are more 
precise than somatosensory feedback. Nevertheless, as predictions are being updated based on 
imaginary somatosensory feedback, participants’ judgment about the movement will be similar to 
perceptual inference. That is, they will not appraise their movements as being goal-directed but 
will develop the conviction that the movements are attributable to external forces rather than to 
themselves. This is in contrast to normal goal-directed, volitional movements (active inference), 
during which predictions are not updated because no significant prediction error is engendered. 
That is, in normal active inference sensory feedback is attenuated before it reaches thalamic gates 
and there is no second source of input, such as imaginary sensory feedback. Therefore, during 
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hypnotic-suggestion-induced responses. This prediction of SATH can interpret the common 
definition of “non-voluntariness” during hypnosis by Lynn et al. (1990) and “sense of conviction” 
discussed by Kihlstrom (2008), which was discussed in section 1.3. Alterations in the Subjective 
Sense of Agency. 
SATH proposes that somatosensory feedback is downregulated due to repeated perception 
(prolonged neural activity), which is a slower process in comparison to sensory attenuation. 
Therefore, cerebral and thalamic activities should be higher under the influence of motor 
suggestions in comparison to normal movements (where somatosensory feedback is attenuated 
from the beginning), as was indeed observed in fMRI recordings by Blakemore et al. (2003) (Fig. 
4B). Also, the brain regions related to imagery, such as the precuneus, extrastriata visual areas 
(Cojan et al., 2009), and frontal regions (especially dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), should be more 
active during suggestion-induced than voluntary movements, which was confirmed by Cojan et al. 
(2009); (Ludwig et al., 2015), and these imagery related areas should have stronger functional 
connectivity with frontal regions, as observed by Pyka et al. (2011). Furthermore, due to the 
postulated downregulation of somatosensory feedback, it is reasonable that during suggestion-
induced movements, the activation of somatosensory cortices was found to be less salient and less 
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Figure 4.   A) The schematic representation of motor suggestions; P: predictions, PE: prediction errors. For a detailed 
explanation of processes please look at the text. B) Cerebellar activations in the Active Movement (blue) and Deluded 
Passive Movement (red) conditions. Activations in the cerebellum are more widespread in the Deluded Passive 
Movement condition compared with the Active Movement condition (adapted with permission from Blakemore et al., 
2003). 
 
(3) Why are hypnotic-suggestion-induced movements typically interrupted, hesitant, and 
slow (e.g., Frith et al., 2000; Martin & Pacherie, 2019)? This can be explained by the processes 
proposed by SATH. Since the initiation of hypnotic-suggestion-induced movements requires the 
downregulation of somatosensory feedback, movement-onset will be delayed until prolonged 
neural activity drives the downregulation of sensory input to the point that predictions are more 
precise than somatosensory signals. Once initiated, a movement accelerates and continues if the 
participant remains concentrated on the process and is not distracted. Based on Equation 2, 
distraction reverses the downregulation of the growth factor 𝛼1 and the participant needs to refocus 
on the sensations coming from the targeted limb for some time until downregulation again reaches 
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(4) Why are some suggestions easier to follow than others? Some motor suggestions, in 
particular, ideomotor suggestions (to be distinguished from the ideomotor theory) are more easily 
responded to than so-called challenge suggestions (McConkey et al., 1980; Woody et al., 2005). A 
typical ideomotor suggestion is the hand lowering suggestion: “stretch your left arm and after a 
while, you feel tiredness in your arm and hand, and they start to lower” (Shor & Orne, 1962). 
Conspicuously, in ideomotor suggestions, somatosensory input and imagery input are congruent, 
and therefore, negative hallucinations are not necessary to start or execute the movement. To the 
contrary, in challenge suggestions, such as hand levitation (discussed above), somatosensory input 
is incongruent with imagery input and, therefore, the movement will start and proceed only if 
negative hallucinations occur first. This also explains why these two forms of motor suggestions 
load on different factors when hypnotizability scales are submitted to factor analysis (McConkey 
et al., 1980; Woody et al., 2005). 
(5) How does SATH explain that participants can use different strategies to implement 
suggestions? In section 2.4.2. New Predictive Coding Model, we discussed the study of Galea et 
al. (2010), which demonstrated that participants can use different strategies to implement the same 
motor suggestion. This observation aligns with SATH. If suggestions are ambiguous about the 
imagery to be used (CS), participants are likely to come up with their own. These imaginations 
may differ, and therefore, have different consequences (CR). For instance, in the study of Galea et 
al. (2010), participants were suggested to imagine being unable to move their arms. If participants 
imagine that their arms are locked, they may activate the targeted muscle group but simultaneously 
block the movement by activating the opponent muscles; but if they imagine that their arms are 
temporarily paralyzed, they may only activate the opponent muscles, or do not activate any muscle 
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They reported that different (precise and elaborated) motor suggestions, focusing on a similar 
movement but consisting of different imaginations (CS), caused different patterns of activation 
and functional brain connectivity (CR). These results show the neural correlates of suggestions 
depend on which mental imagery and strategy they are presenting. Hence, if participants imagine 
different stimuli, their CRs will also differ. 
3.2.1. Comparison with Other Theories 
In contrast to the interoceptive predicting coding theory (reviewed in section 2.4.1. 
Interoceptive Predictive Coding), SATH assumes that the same networks underlying normal 
actions are also driving actions induced by hypnotic suggestions. And in contrast to the new 
predictive coding model (reviewed in section 2.4.2. New Predictive Coding Model), SATH does 
not expect that unresolved prediction errors cause participants to attribute their actions to external 
sources. Instead, SATH assumes that prediction errors are resolved by updating predictions based 
on imaginary somatosensory feedback. That is, on one hand, predictions are more precise (have a 
higher weight in the system) than somatosensory input, causing the overt action to be initiated. On 
the other hand, predictions are less precise than imaginary somatosensory feedback, causing 
predictions to be updated based on the imaginary input. Noteworthy, participants ground their 
judgment of agency on these new predictions, that is, external sources are seen behind their actions. 
Based on the proposed structure SATH, one can explain why participants may use different 
strategies, which cannot be explained by the two alternative theories discussed here. 
Further, in contrast to the discrepancy attribution theory (reviewed in section 2.6. 
Discrepancy Attribution Theory), which assumes that the excessive fluency of actions under the 
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holds that somatosensory adaptation causes disfluency in suggestion-induced behavior. This 
assumption is corroborated by empirical findings (e.g., Frith et al., 2000; Martin & Pacherie, 2019). 
3.3. Learning and Other Cognitive Changes 
3.3.1. Effects of Suggestion on Executive Functions 
An important type of objective changes discussed in section 1.2. Objective Changes in 
Overt Behavior, Perception, and Cognition are related to the suppression of habitual responses or 
to learning new trigger-response contingencies. Here we will first discuss how SATH accounts for 
the effects of task-relevant suggestions on performance in cognitive tasks, followed by the effects 
of neutral hypnosis (i.e., hypnosis without task-relevant suggestion). Briefly, SATH claims that the 
enhancing effects of suggestions on performing cognitive tasks can be attributed to improved 
learning of new trigger-response contingencies and, consequently, more efficient implementation 
of cognitive control processes. 
Many studies using posthypnotic suggestions to manipulate cognitive processes have 
focused on the inhibition function as required, for example, in the Stroop (Raz et al., 2006; Zahedi 
et al., 2019), Erikson (Iani et al., 2006), Simon (Iani et al., 2009), and Go-NoGo task (Zahedi, 
Luczak, et al., 2020). In these tasks, performance enhancements can be attributed to both bottom-
up or top-down processes (cf. Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020). For instance, in the Stroop task, color 
words, written in different ink colors, are presented and participants are required to respond to the 
ink colors while ignoring word meaning. Here, a habitual response, that is, reading the word, has 
to be suppressed in order to avoid conflicts with naming the ink color. Consequently, one can infer 
that better Stroop task performance is related to (1) alterations in bottom-up processes, for instance, 
blocking interfering semantic input to prevent conflicts. To understand the bottom-up account in 
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reading, which is caused by damage to the occipitotemporal region of the left hemisphere through 
which visual word-forms are attained (Warrington & Shallice, 1980). In the same manner, if 
posthypnotic suggestions in the Stroop task can affect bottom-up processes, for instance, by 
decoupling or impairing the word-form system, task performance will be enhanced without 
employing cognitive control. Alternatively, (2) participants may deploy additional top-down 
cognitive control to detect and suppress interfering information more efficiently, which, in turn, 
facilitates conflict resolution.  
Recent findings show that posthypnotic suggestions can also enhance performance in 
working memory updating tasks (Lindelov et al., 2017; Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020), where 
changes in bottom-up processes cannot contribute significantly to task performance enhancements 
(cf. Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020). Therefore, the effects of hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions 
may be specifically related to alterations in top-down processes (Terhune et al., 2017). But, which 
specific top-down processes can be affected by posthypnotic suggestions, is a more contentious 
issue. 
Usually, hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions, which are used to improve performance 
in cognitive tasks, are merely elaborated rephrasings of task instructions, and therefore, their 
effects cannot be attributed to the implementation of a different strategy (Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 
2020). However, when one considers cognitive tasks in general, they obviously engage participants 
in novel situations requiring the development of new responses. These new responses may consist 
of, (I) substituting habitual, prepotent responses with a novel trigger-response contingency (e.g., 
in inhibition tasks) or (II) developing a new response, as in updating tasks. Also, in many of these 
studies hypnotized participants are asked to imagine the targeted task and implement suggestions 
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simulation (see 3.1.1. Positive Hallucinations are The Direct Result of Imagination) provides a 
ground for mental training, during which an appropriate, novel response based on the presented 
cognitive strategy will be mentally practiced. In case that no strategy has been given, an additional 
step is required, that is, finding an applicable cognitive strategy. Mental practice makes participants 
capable to learn trigger-action contingencies and to reinforce them until they can be efficiently 
used. Noticeably, it has been shown that independent of hypnotic suggestions, the application of 
mental practice can enhance physical or cognitive skill-learning-procedures (e.g., Frank, Land, & 
Schack, 2015; Stefanidis et al., 2017). Further, refuting the claim that only hypnotic and 
posthypnotic suggestions can affect performance, it has been shown that task-relevant suggestions 
can enhance cognitive performance also outside of hypnosis (e.g., Palfi et al., 2020; Parris & 
Dienes, 2013). 
Can the learning of a new trigger-response contingency boost performance in both 
inhibition and updating tasks? In inhibition tasks, a second well-learned trigger-action association, 
which can compete with the automatic but inappropriate response, makes participants capable to 
exert inhibition more efficiently and, therefore, enhances performance (e.g., Dulaney & Rogers, 
1994; Protopapas, Vlahou, Moirou, & Ziaka, 2014). For example, Stroop effects are resilient to 
practice but not immune, and can be significantly reduced by extensive practice in participants of 
almost every age (e.g., Dulaney & Rogers, 1994; Protopapas et al., 2014). Interestingly, it has been 
argued that the mechanism underlying changes in Stroop effects due to extensive practice is related 
to developing a new semi-automatic response of color detection, which can compete with the 
previously established automatic response of word reading. Similarly, it has been shown that 
extensive training can enhance performance in updating tasks but will not actually increase WM 
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utilize their cognitive control processes in a more efficient manner. To summarize, it has not only 
been shown that practice can enhance performance in inhibition and updating tasks but also that 
the mechanisms underlying these enhancements are the same as those mechanisms that are 
proposed by SATH for explaining the effects of task-relevant posthypnotic suggestions (Zahedi, 
Sturmer, et al., 2020). 
Two aspects of the effects of hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions need further 
consideration. First, posthypnotic suggestions can be turned on and off, by presenting a cue that 
had been mentioned in the suggestions (a process called anchoring) (e.g, Iani et al., 2006; Raz et 
al., 2003; Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020). If learning a new trigger-response contingency is the 
mechanism underlying performance enhancements, should not these improvements be resilient, 
that is, be present even after posthypnotic suggestions have been deactivated? It has been 
repeatedly shown that learning can be context-dependent, especially if learned responses are not 
extensively practiced (overlearned). For instance, Abrahamse and Verwey (2008) have shown that 
changing the context causes participants to inhibit learned responses. In addition, Ruitenberg, De 
Kleine, Van der Lubbe, Verwey, and Abrahamse (2012) showed that changing contextual cues can 
be detrimental to learned responses, especially if the duration of practice is limited. The same may 
be true for the effects of posthypnotic suggestions. Especially if one considers that posthypnotic 
suggestions do not cause an automatic-response to be formed (Tobis & Kihlstrom, 2010), 
contextual dependencies can explain why the effects of posthypnotic suggestions vanish when they 
are deactivated. 
Second, what are the benefits of hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions if their effects can 
be understood in terms of practice? One should notice that practice-related enhancements in 
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the trained cognitive skill (Diamond & Ling, 2016; Melby-Lervag, Redick, & Hulme, 2016). This 
is in contrast to suggestions, which can affect performance after a relatively short mental practice 
(Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020) and can target cognitive functions rather than specific tasks 
(Lindelov et al., 2017). Therefore, as discussed in several studies, suggestions can be used to 
improve the efficacy and efficiency of cognitive training in both normal participants (Zahedi, 
Sturmer, et al., 2020) and brain-damaged patients (Lindelov et al., 2017). 
Do observations corroborate the postulations of SATH about task-relevant suggestions? If 
the effects of hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions are related to mental practice, performance 
enhancements in updating and inhibition tasks should be related to enhanced utilization of 
proactive control and decreased utilization of reactive control. Proactive control is a form of 
control, recruited in advance of a situation, where executive control might be necessary, without 
consideration of its actual necessity. In contrast, reactive control is employed only when the need 
for cognitive control, such as conflict resolution, has been detected (Braver, 2012). Consequently, 
during task completion under the influence of suggestions (1) frontal theta and beta activity, 
possibly indicating increased utilization of executive functions (Reinhart & Nguyen, 2019), should 
be increased, as observed by Zahedi et al. (2017) (Fig. 5A). (2) P3 amplitude, highlighting 
incorporation of top-down processes and attentional resources (Fonken, Kam, & Knight, 2020; 
Polich, 2007) should be increased, as has been repeatedly reported (e.g., Zahedi et al., 2019; Zahedi, 
Luczak, et al., 2020; Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020) (Fig. 5B). And finally, (3) task load effects 
should decrease in both inhibition and updating tasks. For instance, in inhibition tasks, conflict 
resolution should improve, resulting in decreased brain activity in regions related to conflict 
detection, such as the ACC, which has been observed, for example, by e.g., Raz et al. (2005) (Fig 
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but task-irrelevant responses should decrease, such as semantic activation caused by automatic 
word reading in the Stroop and similar tasks, which has been revealed by (I) decreased N400 
amplitudes (Zahedi et al., 2019) and (II) decreased activity in brain regions related to semantic 
activation, such as fusiform gyrus, superior and middle temporal gyri, pre- and postcentral gyri, 
and supplementary motor area (Ulrich, Kiefer, Bongartz, Gron, & Hoenig, 2015). Also in updating 
tasks, task-load on working memory buffers should decrease as the result of enhancements caused 
by suggestions, as observed by Zahedi, Sturmer, et al. (2020). 
 
 
Figure 5.   A) Activation of the ACC (marked by the blue crosshair) in high-hypnotizables during the completion of 
the Stroop task (left) in no-hypnosis condition and (right) under effects of posthypnotic suggestions (adapted with 
permission from Raz et al., 2005). B) (top) Theta and (bottom) beta activation during the completion of the Stroop 
task (adapted with permission from Zahedi et al., 2017). C) P3 amplitude during the completion of the tone-tracking 
task (measuring updating in working memory) (adapted with permission from Zahedi, Sturmer, et al., 2020). 
 
As reviewed in section 1.2. Objective Changes in Overt Behavior, Perception, and 
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SATH, it is conceivable that only task-relevant suggestions, which can provide a ground for mental 
practice, may affect performance, and task-irrelevant suggestions, such as relaxation-inducing 
ones, presented during neutral hypnosis, will not affect performance in any systematic way. This 
conclusion aligns with published findings (e.g., Egner et al., 2005; Zahedi et al., 2017). 
Considering alterations in the subjective SoA under the influence of hypnotic and 
posthypnotic suggestions targeting performance in cognitive tasks, it seems that developing a 
subjective sense of conviction, that is, the feeling that suggestions caused better performance, is 
more relevant rather than the experience of involuntariness, that is, conducting an action without 
attributing it to direct exertion of volitional effort. In other words, under the influence of 
suggestions, on one hand, participants may perform a cognitive task with less reactive cognitive 
control, and consequently less expenditure of effort, as they already had practiced the strategy and 
can implement it proactively and more efficiently. On the other hand, since participation in a 
cognitive task needs goal-directed effort, even if one is already well-equipped with appropriate 
responses, participants cannot sense involuntariness. This situation is similar to suggestion-
induced changes in perception and can be contrasted with motor suggestions. 
3.3.2. Effects of Suggestions on Memory 
The last form of cognitive suggestions that needs to be discussed is related to memory and 
amnesia. As discussed in section 1.2. Objective Changes in Overt Behavior, Perception, and 
Cognition, there is no reliable evidence that suggestions can enhance memory performance. 
Negative effects of posthypnotic suggestions on memory are related to explicit memory and not 
implicit memory (Kihlstrom, 2014). Therefore, it seems that the negative effects of posthypnotic 
suggestions on memory resemble the production of false memories, which can be easily explained 
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memory two separate sets of information are stored, namely, verbatim and gist traces. Verbatim 
traces contain precise information of the event, for instance, the exact words heard, or objects seen, 
and therefore, only one set of verbatim traces is stored for each event. In contrast, gist traces are 
related to the meaning of the event for the person, such as its emotional meaning, and consequently, 
several gist traces may be stored for a given event. Even though both gist and verbatim traces are 
stored in parallel, verbatim traces are more prone to become inaccessible. During remembering, 
both verbatim and gist traces can cause vivid remembering experiences.  If we consider amnesia 
suggestions, it is evident that such suggestions are creating a new gist trace. For instance, 
participants are asked to imagine that a specific incident did not take place, or after showing them 
some words they are asked to imagine not to have seen any words. It is obvious that these 
suggestions are not targeting verbatim traces but creating a new gist trace. The new gist can lead 
to the formation of false memories (e.g., they had not seen words during hypnosis). But as verbatim 
traces are not affected, memory performance in implicit memory tasks, which is dependent on the 
precise information of events, must be intact. This suggestion is in line with observation in the 
literature (for review please see Kihlstrom, 2014). 
3.3.3. Comparison with Other Theories 
The only other theory that tries to explain the enhancing effects of suggestions on 
performance in cognitive tasks is the decoupling account, presented by Egner et al. (2005) 
(reviewed in section 2.2.3. Decoupling Theory). This account assumes that performance 
enhancements are caused by the disconnection of cognitive monitoring from cognitive control 
processes. In contrast, SATH assumes that top-down processes, and especially mental practice, 
may cause participants to learn new trigger-response contingencies, which helps them to perform 
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also explain enhancements in tasks that can be only improved by top-down cognitive processes, 
such as updating tasks, which the decoupling account cannot explain. 
3.4. Hypnotizability and its Determinants 
Throughout the presentation of SATH, we did not discuss the important question of why 
not all participants respond to suggestions. SATH embraces the discussion of Kirsch (1997) and, 
hence, it distinguishes between general suggestibility, that is, the capability of a person to respond 
to suggestions regardless of hypnosis, and hypnotizability, that is, the increase in suggestibility due 
to the reception of hypnotic induction.  
The top-down mechanisms discussed above are related to general suggestibility and not to 
hypnotizability. Considering SATH’s proposition that there are several top-down processes 
involved in responding to suggestions, no single cognitive capability, such as the capability to 
fantasize, suppress irrelevant information, inhibit prepotent responses, or the ability to form new 
trigger-response contingencies, will suffice to respond to all kinds of suggestions. Even when 
considering a single hypnotic or posthypnotic suggestion, participants might use different 
mechanisms to different extents to comply with it. As an example, let’s consider the hand levitation 
suggestion, discussed in section 3.2. Motor Suggestion. A participant, who is well capable to 
vividly imagine suggested stimuli (using cognitive-simulation) but less capable to maintain a focus 
on sensory input (causing sensory-adaptation), may rely more strongly on imagination while 
responding to the levitation suggestion, in order to render input from mental imagery more precise 
than predictions. Conversely, a person with the opposite distribution of capabilities, ceteris paribus, 
may rely more on sensory-adaptation, in order to decrease the precision of somatosensory input. 
However, one should notice that even though there is interpersonal variability in these cognitive 
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shown that cognitive control, imagination, and openness are correlated, and their underlying neural 
systems overlap (e.g., Beaty et al., 2018).  
Together, three predictions can be made about hypnotizability determinants and sub-groups 
of hypnotic-suggestibles by considering SATH. (1) The correlation between any single cognitive 
capability and general suggestibility should be moderate at best, and the results of different studies 
may be conflicting, especially if sample sizes are small. This is aligned with existing reports, for 
instance, about the correlation between general hypnotic-suggestibility (as measured by 
standardized scales such as HGSHS) and cognitive capabilities. Several well-conducted recent 
studies, using relatively small sample sizes (  36 ≤ 𝑁 ≤  40 ), showed that in no-hypnosis 
conditions, high-hypnotic-suggestibles were better in cognitive tasks than low-hypnotic-
suggestibles, inferred from psychometric measures and neural correlates (Kirenskaya et al., 2019; 
Srzich et al., 2019). Also, Cojan et al. (2015) showed that during a flanker task, high-hypnotic-
suggestibles were more accurate but slower and low-hypnotizables were faster but less accurate. 
In addition, high-hypnotic-suggestibles showed greater activity in DLPFC but less activity in the 
ACC and parietal cortices. Hence, high-hypnotic-suggestibles appear to be better able to resolve 
conflicts whereas low-hypnotic-suggestibles may be better in detecting them. However, the sample 
of Cojan et al. (2015) was relatively small (𝑁 = 32 ) for investigating individual differences, 
limiting the interpretability of their results. In contrast to the reports above about the superiority 
of high-hypnotic-suggestibles, investigating several updating (working memory) tasks in a 
relatively small sample (𝑁 = 36), Khodaverdi-Khani and Laurence (2016) showed that digit span 
performance in high-hypnotic-suggestibles is inferior to low-hypnotizables. However, in their 
second sample (𝑁 = 20), there was no significant difference in an N-back task, rendering their 
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size increases, these correlations seem to disappear. In a sample of (𝑁 =  180 ), Dienes et al. 
(2009) found no significant correlation between inhibition and dissociation (closely related to 
sensory-adaptation) with hypnotizability. 
(2) More importantly, SATH predicts that there are different groups of high-suggestibles, 
who use different capabilities in responding to suggestions. Intriguingly, the results of Terhune et 
al. (2011) confirm that there are at least two sub-groups of high-suggestibles, one relying more 
heavily on dissociation (closely related to sensory-adaptation) and the other on imaginations 
(closely related to cognitive-simulation).  
(3) SATH predicts that there are several categories of suggestions, each relying more 
specifically on one of the proposed top-down cognitive processes, that is, cognitive-simulation, 
sensory-adaptation, and problem-solving and mental practice. Several studies (e.g., McConkey et 
al., 1980; Woody et al., 2005) have already shown that standardized scales of hypnotic 
suggestibility contain at least three clusters of suggestions, namely, ideomotor, challenge, and 
cognitive suggestions. As discussed in section 3.2. Motor Suggestion, ideomotor suggestions can 
be exerted by using only cognitive-simulation, whereas challenge suggestions require sensory-
adaption in addition. Finally, cognitive suggestions in these standardized scales are non-elaborated 
suggestions, which require finding an appropriate strategy for responding to these suggestions, and 
therefore, they must rely on problem-solving, as well, for finding an appropriate strategy. To 
summarize, SATH explains why there are multiple suggestibilities (McConkey et al., 1980; Woody 
et al., 2005) and heterogeneity within high-hypnotic-suggestibles (Terhune et al., 2011). 
But what about the relationship between suggestibility and psychosocial factors? SATH 
assumes that similar to the cognitive capabilities, psychosocial factors affect suggestibility. 
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is, the increase in suggestibility due to hypnotic induction. In line with this claim, it has been 
shown that when measuring hypnotic suggestibility – the combined effect of suggestibility and 
hypnotizability – psychosocial factors such as willingness to be hypnotized and openness of 
participants (Green & Lynn, 2011; Lynn, Laurence, et al., 2015), expectations about hypnosis 
(Kirsch & Lynn, 1997), rapport with the hypnotist (Lynn et al., 2019), and motivation to respond 
to suggestions (Jones & Spanos, 1982) are relevant. Even considering suggestibility, it should be 
noted that cognitive-simulation and sensory-adaptation are not complicated and special cognitive 
processes. For instance, top-down downregulation of sensory input can be observed also in non-
human species (e.g., Manita et al., 2015; Saalmann & Kastner, 2009). In other words, regardless 
of baseline cognitive capabilities, to some extent, all participants can exert top-down control over 
perception. For example, in two previous studies with healthy participants, all of them showed top-
down downregulation of neural activity, regardless of their performance in other tasks (Fazeli et 
al., 2014; Lopresti-Goodman et al., 2013). Therefore, even though baseline cognitive capabilities 
can be essential to predict participants’ responses to suggestions, psychosocial factors contribute 
as well. In other words, even though top-down processes are fundamental in responding to 
suggestions, for responding to suggestions participants should nevertheless be willing and open, 
have a good rapport with the person presenting the suggestions, and so forth. 
The last issue to be addressed is whether hypnosis causes an altered state of consciousness 
and whether hypnotizability is related to the capability of experiencing this special state. This 
“state of consciousness”, however, is not defined clearly (Lynn, Green, et al., 2015; Lynn et al., 
2019). In the hypnosis literature, states like being absorbed in reading a book or watching TV to 
the extent that one becomes dissociated from the environment, are used to describe “hypnotic-like” 
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possible conclusions can be drawn. Either, states of consciousness are separate entities, similar to 
the energy state of an electron, which can only be changed discretely (the quantum definition). 
Alternatively, there is an infinite number of states of consciousness that cannot be distinguished 
from each other, like the position of an electron in an electron cloud (the cloud definition). 
Nonetheless, in both cases, it may be counterproductive to define hypnosis based on states of 
consciousness. As for using the quantum definition, there is no empirical evidence - to this day - 
showing states of consciousness can be distinguished (Koch & Hepp, 2006). And if one takes the 
second definition for granted, then hypnosis cannot be a state, but a group of states, which are 
delineated from other states arbitrarily and called hypnosis. Consequently, any change in the state 
of consciousness as a result of hypnosis might be considered as a byproduct of the cognitive 
mechanisms employed in hypnosis and hypnotic suggestions, rather than as a defining feature of 
hypnosis. 
3.4.1. Comparison with Other Theories 
Concerning hypnotizability and its determinants, SATH should be distinguished from the 
unified cognitive theory (reviewed in section 2.3. Unified Cognitive Model) and cold-control 
theory (reviewed in section 2.5. Cold Control Theory). The unified cognitive model assumes two 
mutually-exclusive styles of responding to hypnosis, one related to responding to suggestions in 
or out of hypnosis (constructive style) and one restricted to hypnotic conditions (concentrative 
style). In contrast, SATH proposes that there are several basic mechanisms underlying the effects 
of suggestions, all of which are necessary for responding to different suggestions. The advantage 
of SATH is that it can consistently explain both multiple hypnotizability and multiple groups of 




THE SIMULATION-ADAPTION THEORY OF HYPNOSIS  80 
Further, in order to explain multiple hypnotizability, the cold-control theory assumes that 
for responding to some suggestions more severe blocking of higher-order thoughts (i.e., blocking 
third and second-order thoughts rather than second-order thoughts only), is required. In contrast, 
SATH does not attribute all variance in responding to hypnotic suggestions to the difficulty of 
items, but assumes that, besides psychosocial variables, multiple cognitive capabilities are 
involved in responding to suggestions. As reviewed above, the proposition of SATH appears to be 
more aligned with empirical evidence. 
3.4. Towards a New Definition of Hypnosis 
Even though APA division 30 has recently offered a new definition of hypnosis (Elkins et 
al., 2015), many researchers had complained about the evident inclination of this definition 
towards the state approach (Lynn, Green, et al., 2015; Lynn et al., 2019). Considering the 
discussion about the state approach in section 3.4. Hypnotizability and its Determinants, we also 
think that defining a phenomenon based on one of its possible byproducts is not satisfactory. One 
of the reasons that were mentioned for substituting the previous procedure-oriented definition of 
hypnosis (Green, Barabasz, Barrett, & Montgomery, 2005) with this new version is that the 
previous version was long and vague regarding the underlying mechanisms of the effects of 
suggestions (Elkins et al., 2015). Therefore, here we presented a very short, concrete, and 
procedure-oriented definition of hypnosis based on SATH.  
SATH defines hypnosis as a situation, in which a cooperative and willing participant will 
receive and respond to certain suggestions provided by another person, designated the hypnotist. 
Three top-down processes are employed to different degrees and based on participant’s capabilities 
in order to respond to different suggestions. (a) Cognitive-simulation results in imagination and 
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downregulation of sensory input, especially in case that sensory input is incongruent with mentally 
perceived stimuli. (c) Mental practice enables the participant to learn new trigger-response 
contingencies. Noteworthy, these mechanisms can also occur without the hypnosis induction but 
may be enhanced in participants who have positive expectations about the hypnotic procedure. 
3.5. Conclusions 
In conclusion, we proposed the simulation-adaptation theory of hypnosis (SATH) and 
evaluated it based on the same criteria that we applied to other theories. SATH (I) can explain 
changes in objectively measured perceptions, that is, positive and negative hallucinations, and in 
the subjective sense of conviction accompanying these changes by proposing cognitive-simulation 
and sensory-adaption as underlying mechanisms. (II) Effects of motor suggestions and the 
sensation of involuntariness, that is, alterations in the subjective SoA during hypnotic-suggestion-
induced overt responses, are explained by combining the above-mentioned mechanisms in 
conjunction with predictive coding. (III) Performance enhancements in executive function tasks 
are accounted for by proposing mental practice as the fundamental mechanism underlying these 
effects. (IV) SATH relates posthypnotic amnesia to the formation of new gist traces, which lead to 
increased false-memory generation. Finally (V) based on SATH, the existence of different groups 
of suggestions and different sub-groups of high-suggestibles are related to more salient reliance of 
different forms of suggestions on different basic mechanisms, and the possibility of responding to 
the same suggestion by using different combinations of basic capabilities. Even though 
theoretically complex, SATH can explain a broader range of hypnotic phenomena than any other 
existing theory of hypnosis and makes many testable (falsifiable) predictions, including 
hypotheses about the neural correlates of these phenomena. Hence, the proposed theory may 
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Abstract 
Undisputedly, individuals differ substantially in their responsiveness to hypnotic and 
posthypnotic suggestions. However, defining and measuring hypnotizability is contentious. 
Standardized measures of “hypnotic susceptibility” do not measure hypnotizability per se, but 
instead, a mixture of general suggestibility (i.e., the ability to respond to suggestions independent 
of hypnosis) and hypnotizability (i.e., the increase of suggestibility due to hypnotic induction). 
This mixture can be called hypnotic-suggestibility. Indeed, exploratory factor analyses (EFA) of 
standardized scales found them to be heterogeneous. However, the number and nature of the latent 
factors are a matter of debate. Here, we applied confirmatory factor analysis to the scores of the 
Harvard group scale of hypnotic susceptibility (HGSHS) obtained from 477 volunteers. Several 
theory-driven models were tested, most notably a three-factor model, corresponding to previous 
results from EFA, and a bifactor model. HGSHS scores were best explained by the bifactor model 
consisting of a G-factor tapping into hypnotizability and three specific grouping factors measuring 
different suggestibilities, each requiring a unique combination of three top-down cognitive 
functions: cognitive-simulation, sensory-adaptation, and problem-solving. Further, structural 
equation modeling of causal pathways between latent factors revealed that the outcome of the 
suggestions, requiring a combination of cognitive-simulation and sensory-adaptation, can predict 
responses to other suggestions. The present results indicate the complex, multifaceted structure of 
hypnotic suggestibility and underscore the need for developing a new scale of hypnotic-
suggestibility, focused on simulation-adaptation suggestions for clinical and research purposes, 
and revisiting applications of traditional standardized scales. 
Keywords:  Confirmatory factor analyses, Structural equation modeling (SEM), 
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Is there a G-factor in Hypnotic Suggestibility? Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Harvard 
Group Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility 
1.   Introduction 
Historically, hypnosis has been explained by two main alternative accounts. The state 
approach defines hypnosis as an altered state of consciousness similar to yoga or meditation 
(Elkins, Barabasz, Council, & Spiegel, 2015). In contrast, the socio-cognitive account (Kirsch & 
Lynn, 1998; Lynn & Green, 2011; Lynn, Rhue, & Weekes, 1990) emphasizes cognitive, social, and 
psychological variables involved in responding to hypnotic suggestions (Spanos, 1971; Spanos, 
Cobb, & Gorassini, 1985). As discussed by Jensen et al. (2015) and Lynn and Green (2011), 
contemporary theories of hypnosis only partially align with these traditional alternative views (for 
review, see Zahedi & Sommer, 2021) and no consensus has been reached. Independent of ongoing 
disputes, theories of hypnosis agree on the existence of substantial within- and between-subject 
variability in responding to hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions (Shor & Orne, 1963). However, 
defining and measuring hypnotizability is a more contentious issue. Two approaches can be 
distinguished.  
First, based on studies (e.g., Braffman & Kirsch, 1999; e.g., Mazzoni et al., 2009; 
McGeown et al., 2012; Palfi, Parris, McLatchie, Kekecs, & Dienes, 2020; Parris & Dienes, 2013) 
that have shown strong correlations between responding to suggestions inside and outside of 
hypnosis (r = .67 for behavioral scores; r = .82 for subjective scores; Braffman & Kirsch, 1999), 
Kirsch (1997) concluded that suggestibility and hypnotizability should be separated. He 
distinguished (I) suggestibility as the capability to respond to suggestions regardless of hypnosis, 
(II) hypnotic-suggestibility as the capability to respond to suggestions under the influence of 
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hypnosis (i.e., the difference between hypnotic-suggestibility and suggestibility). Unfortunately, 
as yet, this sophisticated definition of hypnotizability has not been translated into a reliable and 
valid hypnotizability scale. 
Alternatively, one might define hypnotizability as what standardized scales of 
hypnotizability are measuring. Noteworthy, in this definition, hypnotizability is equated with 
hypnotic-suggestibility in terms of Kirsch’s (1997) description of hypnotizability. Two of the most 
commonly employed hypnotic-suggestibility scales are the Sandford scale of hypnotic 
susceptibility (SSHS; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962) and the Harvard group scale of hypnotic 
susceptibility (HGSHS; Shor & Orne, 1962; Shor & Orne, 1963). These two scales are similar in 
nature, except that the HGSHS is designed for group administration, whereas the SHSS is designed 
for individual-participant administration. In both scales, a range of suggestions is presented 
consecutively, and in the end, either participants themselves (in the HGSHS) or administrators (in 
the SHSS) determine how many of the suggestions had been executed. Hence, participants can 
receive a score between 0-12 in the HGSHS and 0-11 in the SHSS. Based on their hypnotic-
suggestibility scores, participants are conventionally categorized as high-, medium-, and low-
suggestibles. For instance, in the HGSHS, participants with 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠  9 , 8  𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠  5 , and 
4  𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠  are considered high-, medium-, and low-hypnotic-suggestible, respectively. Both 
scales are very stable over time; for instance, for the HGSHS scores, stability coefficients of 
. 82 (15 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) 𝑎𝑛𝑑  .71 (25 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) have been reported (Piccione, Hilgard, & 
Zimbardo, 1989).  
However, these scales are not flawless. The internal consistency of the HGSHS is at best 
just acceptable (e.g., Bongartz, 1985; Peter et al., 2014; Robin, Kumar, & Pekala, 2005; Varga, 




CAN HYPNOTIZABILITY BE MODELED AS A G-FACTOR? 5 
measure hypnotic-suggestibility. For instance, several previous studies scrutinized the structure of 
HGSHS scores (e.g., McConkey, Sheehan, & Law, 1980; Oakman & Woody, 1996; Piesbergen & 
Peter, 2006; Woody, Barnier, & McConkey, 2005) and SSHS scores (e.g., Woody et al., 2005) by 
conducting exploratory factor analyses (EFA). Based on these studies, a strong consensus has been 
reached that the HGSHS items do not represent only a single factor. However, there is less 
consensus about the number and nature of latent factors involved. There is a tentative consensus 
that the HGSHS items are measuring at least three latent factors (Tab. 1). The first latent factor is 
characterized by ideomotor suggestions, such as “soon after thinking of your head falling forward, 
you feel a tendency to make the movement.” The second factor consists of so-called challenge 
suggestions, such as “your hands feel heavy… too heavy to be lifted”. And the third factor is related 
to cognitive suggestions such as “you will be increasingly aware of a fly that is going round and 
round about your head.” However, the third factor is very loosely defined, and in EFA, sometimes 
only one suggestion is loading on this factor (e.g., McConkey et al., 1980). 
Why is there only a weak consensus about the number and nature of latent factors in the 
HGSHS? All previous studies investigating the structure of hypnotizability scales have utilized 
EFA (e.g., McConkey et al., 1980; Oakman & Woody, 1996; Piesbergen & Peter, 2006). Even 
though EFA is an essential and necessary step, it has limitations. These limitations can be overcome 
by confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation modeling (SEM) (Coulacoglou & 
Saklofske, 2017). (1) In EFA, no explicit theory-driven hypotheses are formulated and tested. 
Therefore, the interpretation of the derived factors are post hoc and may vary across studies 
(Coulacoglou & Saklofske, 2017; Harrington, 2009). In contrast, CFA is theory-driven, and factors 
are defined a priori. Therefore, we hold that the data-driven nature of EFA is the main reason why 




CAN HYPNOTIZABILITY BE MODELED AS A G-FACTOR? 6 
Consequently, the present study will apply CFA and SEM for investigating the homogeneity and 
structure of the HGSHS (Coulacoglou & Saklofske, 2017; Harrington, 2009) as a canonical 
example of hypnotic-suggestibility scales. (2) Even though EFAs have shown that variance in the 
items of the HGSHS must be explained by more than one factor, it is unclear whether a model, 
which, in addition to specific grouping factors, also assumes a general factor (G-factor) of 
hypnotizability, will explain the data better than a simple multifactor model. Of particular interest 
for addressing this question is bifactor modeling (Reise, 2012), which can be implemented only in 
CFA but not EFA. Bifactor models have addressed long-standing questions, from personality 
psychology (Musek, 2017) to neuroimaging of individual differences (Cooper, Jackson, Barch, & 
Braver, 2019) and probably most noticeably in psychometric and intelligence research (Eid, 
Krumm, Koch, & Schulze, 2018). (3) Finally, SEM allows us to explore causal relationships 
between latent variables. Thus, SEM of HGSHS factors can address whether there is a special 
grouping factor to which other grouping factors regress. Using SEM, we will test whether 
responsiveness to a certain group of suggestions (as a latent variable) can predict how participants 
respond to other suggestions at the level of latent factors. Causality pathway testing is only 
interpretable when hypotheses are theory-driven and formulated a priori and, therefore, only 
applicable in conjunction with CFA. Summarizing, several important questions, namely, the 
number and nature of factors, the existence of a G-factor, and causal pathways between latent 
factors, can be addressed best by conducting CFA and SEM, which is the general aim of the present 
paper. 
A vital prerequisite to formulating relevant hypotheses for CFA is an appropriate theory.  
Based on the separable categories of suggestions found by EFAs, Woody et al. (2005) concluded 
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multiple hypnotizabilities is to assume distinguishable cognitive mechanisms underlying the 
different categories of suggestions. However, only three hypnosis theories make such assumptions 
(for review, see Zahedi & Sommer, 2021) 
The first theory is the unified cognitive theory (Brown & Oakley, 2004), which is grounded 
on the concept of contention scheduling (Norman & Shallice, 1986). Norman and Shallice (1986) 
assume two separable control systems to be involved in action production, that is, the supervisory 
attentional system (SAS) and contention scheduling (CS). The SAS will interfere when the existing 
response repertoire is not sufficient for handling a situation or task. In these cases, either a new 
schema (i.e., a stimulus-response contingency) must be created, or a well-established (prepotent) 
schema should be inhibited in favor of a less-established schema. In situations that need less 
cognitive control and can be handled by existing response repertoire, different sets of potential 
“source schemata” may compete with each other, and the schema that first exceeds a certain 
activation threshold will be selected by CS (Norman & Shallice, 1986). Brown and Oakley (2004) 
defined two mutually exclusive styles of responding to hypnotic suggestions, namely, constructive 
and concentrative. In the concentrative style, the SAS will be disabled or decoupled, and therefore, 
cannot be used for responding to suggestions. Hence, CS will be the only system in charge of 
action control. In contrast, in the constructive style, goal-directed imagination, requiring the SAS, 
will be used for responding to hypnotic suggestions. Even though the unified cognitive theory and 
its two response styles can be used to understand between-subject differences in responding to 
suggestions, it does not explain within-subject variance. Therefore, one cannot employ the unified 
cognitive theory for interpreting the existence of multiple hypnotizabilities within individuals. 
The second theory is the cold control theory (Dienes et al., 2009; Dienes & Perner, 2007). 




CAN HYPNOTIZABILITY BE MODELED AS A G-FACTOR? 8 
2008), the cold control theory delineates perception and awareness of perception by being 
attributed to different levels of higher-order thoughts. First-order thoughts, such as “I see a cat,” 
are related to perception. Second-order thoughts, however, refer to being aware of perception, that 
is, “I am aware that I see a cat.” Finally, third-order thoughts designate consciousness of being 
aware of perception, that is, “I know that I am aware of seeing a cat.” In their cold control theory, 
Dienes and Perner (2007) proposed that the underlying mechanism of responding to suggestions 
is the distortion of higher-order thoughts. More specifically, medium-hypnotizable participants are 
capable of blocking third-order thoughts, whereas high-hypnotizables can inhibit both second- and 
third-order thoughts. The main prediction of the cold control theory is that the decoupling or 
disabling of brain areas related to ascriptive metacognition, that is, (left) dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) (Miele, Wager, Mitchell, & Metcalfe, 2011), is necessary for responding to 
hypnotic and posthypnotic suggestions. Although higher responsiveness to suggestions - based on 
subjective reports – could be induced by the disabling of DLPFC by alcohol consumption 
(Semmens-Wheeler, Dienes, & Duka, 2013) or transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (Dienes 
& Hutton, 2013), there was no such effect in objective scores. Many other studies show that 
responding to suggestions is related to (I) increased DLPFC activation (e.g., Cojan, Archimi, 
Cheseaux, Waber, & Vuilleumier, 2013; Cojan et al., 2009; Ludwig et al., 2015; Pyka et al., 2011), 
(II) the implementation of cognitive functions, such as executive functions, that require activation 
of DLPFC (Palfi et al., 2020; Zahedi, Abdel Rahman, Sturmer, & Sommer, 2019; Zahedi, Sturmer, 
& Sommer, 2020), or (III) is unrelated to changes in DLPFC activation (e.g., Egner & Raz, 2007; 
Landry, Lifshitz, & Raz, 2017). Therefore, the observed results do not support the prediction that 
suggestibility is related to the disruption of DLPFC activity. A second tenet of the cold control 
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and suggestions that require blockage of both third- and second-order thoughts. However, as 
discussed above, there are at least three categories of suggestions, which can be robustly separated 
by EFAs (McConkey et al., 1980; Woody et al., 2005). Furthermore, challenge and cognitive 
suggestions cannot be distinguished on the basis of the cold control theory. Because, for 
successfully responding to both kinds of suggestions, that is, exerting the suggested action and 
simultaneously not attributing it to direct volitional effort (Kihlstrom, 2008; Lynn et al., 1990), one 
reasonably needs to block both second- and third-order thoughts.  
The third hypnosis theory is the simulation-adaptation theory of hypnosis (SATH; Zahedi 
& Sommer, 2021) which incorporates three concepts.  The first concept is cognitive-simulation, 
suggesting that imagining a stimulus has the same effects as perceiving that stimulus (Farah, 1988). 
The main difference between imagining and perceiving is that the former, in contrast to the latter, 
is caused by inner thoughts rather than external stimuli (Hesslow, 2002). For instance, imagining 
a stimulus not only activates the same brain areas but also causes the same responses as perceiving 
the corresponding stimulus (for review, see Hesslow, 2002). The second concept is top-down 
regulation of sensory input (Frank, 2016; Lopresti-Goodman, Turvey, & Frank, 2013), suggesting 
if mental representations of stimuli are generated and cognitively manipulated, the perception of 
such stimuli is subjected to top-down adaptation. In other words, forming mental representations 
of stimuli, between perceiving and responding to them, allows for top-down downregulation of 
sensory input. For example, if participants are asked to judge whether they need one or two hands 
for lifting planks of different sizes while they either grasp them or only look at them, the latter 
condition but not the former will be subjected to top-down sensory-adaptation (Lopresti-Goodman 
et al., 2013). The third concept is predictive coding (Friston, 2010), which suggests that any action, 
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motor and/or sensory apparatus (Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013; Clark, 2013). Next, predictions 
are propagated downward through cortico-cortical and corticospinal projections to the relevant 
muscles and sensory units. Notably, down propagating signals are always predictions and not 
motor commands (for the treatment of neuromuscular mechanisms, see Adams et al., 2013). If 
there will be a difference between the state of the system and the prediction, a prediction error is 
formed (i.e., being in the surprise state). Any self-organizing system aims to reside in the lowest 
possible energy state. Therefore, in the surprised-state, such systems attempt to minimize 
prediction errors (Friston, 2010). During volitional movements, predictions have a higher weight 
in comparison to prediction errors. Consequently, to leave the surprise-state, prediction errors are 
used in reflex arcs to correct the movement and align it with predictions. Hence, prediction errors 
are gradually downregulated in reflex arcs during backpropagation and are diminished sufficiently 
to be not propagated beyond thalamic nuclei (Adams et al., 2013; Brown, Adams, Parees, Edwards, 
& Friston, 2013). During perception, on the other hand, prediction errors are given a higher weight 
compared to predictions. Hence, this time, predictions are updated based on prediction errors for 
coming out of the surprised-state. In predictive coding theory, these two processes are called active 
and perceptual inference, respectively. Despite its popularity and success in explaining normal 
perception and action, predictive coding cannot explain, why during hypnosis, participants can 
execute actions described by suggestions but attribute the action to external sources, that is, 
perceive them to be caused externally rather than by their own volition (Lynn et al., 1990). In terms 
of the predictive coding model, to start a movement, predictions must be given a higher weight 
than sensory feedback from the external world (i.e., active inference); however, participants will 
only perceive their response as externally originated if prediction errors have a higher weight than 
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SATH employs three top-down cognitive processes to explain hypnotic and posthypnotic 
suggestion-induced responses; these processes are used to different extents and in various 
combinations, depending on the individual’s capabilities. (1) Cognitive-simulation (Farah, 1988; 
Hesslow, 2002). During hypnosis, participants have two sources of input, imagination and the 
external world. In other words, besides perceptual input from the external world, stimuli described 
by suggestions that are imagined by participants provide “perceptual” input from mental imagery. 
(2) Sensory-adaptation (Frank, 2016; Lopresti-Goodman et al., 2013). When sensory input from 
external stimuli is not aligned with imaginations and suggestions, sensory-adaption may 
downregulate perceptual input from the external world. Together with predictive coding, 
cognitive-simulation and sensory-adaptation can explain why hypnotized participants execute 
responses and attribute them to external sources. During hypnosis, imaginations are given higher 
weight in comparison to predictions. Hence, predictions are updated based on perceptual input 
from imaginations (perceptual inference). Simultaneously, predictions are given a higher weight 
in comparison to sensory input. Therefore, sensory input from the external world is used in reflex 
arcs to align movements with predictions (active inference) and simultaneously downregulated by 
top-down sensory-adaptation preventing it from passing beyond thalamic nuclei. Consequently, 
hypnotized participants exert a suggested motion and simultaneously attribute it to the suggestions 
(or external sources) rather than to themselves. (3) Mental practice and problem-solving (Zahedi, 
Sturmer, et al., 2020). There are two situations that cannot be explained with cognitive-simulation 
and sensory-adaption and, as a result, require a further cognitive top-down process. (I) When 
suggestions do not provide imagery-provoking descriptions of stimuli, hypnotized participants 
need to fill in the gap and find an appropriate imagination (i.e., strategy) for cognitive-simulation. 
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can provide an (imagined) exercise environment, where new strategies, either outlined by 
suggestions or developed by participants themselves, are mentally practiced.  
According to SATH, besides the aforementioned top-down cognitive processes, social and 
psychological factors may also be of great importance. As all the top-down processes above are 
volitional and goal-directed, participants’ expectations, openness, and willingness will determine 
whether they will be motivated to engage in the responses described in the suggestions. 
1.1. Theory-driven Hypotheses for CFA and SEM 
In the present study, we used SATH as a framework to formulate theory-driven hypotheses 
to be tested by CFA and SEM. Based on SATH, a bifactor model should best explain the variance 
in HGSHS scores. The proposed bifactor model consists of a G-factor and three grouping factors, 
as will be justified next and illustrated in Figure 1.  
The first grouping factor covers simulation suggestions, where sensory information is 
congruent with the portrayed response (Fig. 1A). For instance, consider the suggestion: “stretch 
your arm and keep it in the air, after a while your hand starts to feel fatigued and it starts to move 
downward. It is as if a heavyweight has been put on your arm” (Shor & Orne, 1962). Here, sensory 
input is aligned with the suggestion; if participants stretch their arms, they will feel fatigued after 
a while. Therefore, the suggestion predicts a sensation that will indeed occur. Nonetheless, if the 
suggestion is successful, the fatigue will not be attributed to body-internal processes (Kihlstrom, 
2008; Lynn et al., 1990) but to the hypnotic condition. This will only happen if participants imagine 
what is described by simulation suggestions (i.e., a heavyweight is put on their arm). Hence, 
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The second group of suggestions can be described as simulation-adaptation suggestions 
(Fig. 1B). In these suggestions, sensory information is incongruent or conflicting with the 
suggested information. For instance, consider the hand levitation suggestion: your hand feels 
lighter “as if there's a large helium balloon under [your] palm, or attached with strings to each [one 
of your] fingertip and [your] wrist … [your] hand and arm will begin to float up” (Hammond, 1998, 
pp. 43-44). As explained by SATH, when sensory input is not aligned with imagination, it is 
downregulated through the top-down mechanism of sensory-adaptation. Together, cognitive-
simulation and sensory-adaptation can explain why the motion described in the suggestion is 
executed by the hypnotized participant, but nevertheless, attributed to an external cause. Let’s 
consider the hand levitation suggestion. Here, predictions are generated based on cognitive-
simulation of the suggestions’ description (i.e., helium balloons are attached to the fingers). Since 
the predictions (i.e., the hand and arm will be levitated) will receive a lower weight than the 
imaginary input, they are updated based on prediction errors formed from the comparison of 
predictions with cognitive-simulation feedback. This explains why the motion is attributed to an 
external source or cause (i.e., helium balloons). At the same time, predictions will be given a higher 
weight compared to sensory feedback, which is downregulated by top-down sensory-adaptation. 
Consequently, the targeted motion is executed, and sensory feedback will be used for adapting the 
movement with predictions. Evidently, in simulation-adaptation suggestions, besides cognitive-
simulation, sensory-adaptation must be incorporated. This fact distinguishes this category from 
mere simulation suggestions, where only cognitive-simulation is necessary. 
The third grouping factor relates to suggestions that require executive functions, for 
example, in order to find appropriate imagery for cognitive-simulation, forming a new trigger-
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cases, an executive function suggestion will only describe a goal but no concrete strategy for 
accomplishing the goal, and participants are responsible for filling the gap. That is, participants 
have to find an appropriate cognitive strategy and then implement the necessary mechanisms for 
executing this strategy. Importantly, after finding a suitable strategy for complying with a 
suggestion, the suggestion will turn into a simulation or simulation-adaptation suggestion (Fig. 
1C). Consider, for example, the posthypnotic suggestion item of HGSHS: after the termination of 
hypnosis, “when you hear a tapping noise, you will reach down and touch your ankle” (Shor & 
Orne, 1962). The suggestion has clearly defined the goal but no strategy for implementing it. If 
participants merely reach down and touch their ankle while believing that they are doing this 
because the suggestion instructed or commanded them to do so, the action will be attributed to the 
exertion of direct volitional effort. However, in an alternative scenario, if participants imagine the 
sound and repeatedly connect it to itching or burning in their ankle, they will exert the portrayed 
action after hearing the sound but will not attribute it to any volitional effort of their own. Any 
suggestion can be an executive function suggestion if it fails to imply an applicable strategy for 
the suggested action. This notion has been confirmed by Galea, Woody, Szechtman, and 
Pierrynowski (2010). In their study, first, high-hypnotic-suggestible participants were given a 
suggestion, aiming to induce rigidity and stiffness in their arms. Afterward, participates were asked 
to move their arms with the implication that they cannot do it. The authors intentionally did not 
present a relevant strategy, for instance, believing to be paralyzed. As inferred by 
electromyography, the participants of Galea et al. (2010) came up with different strategies, such as 
simultaneously activating agonist and antagonist muscles (biceps and triceps), only activating the 
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Another form of executive function suggestion covers situations where participants are 
directly asked to mentally practice a strategy until it becomes semi-automatic. This form of 
suggestions has been repeatedly employed in studies that sought to enhance performance in 
different cognitive tasks (e.g., Iani, Ricci, Baroni, & Rubichi, 2009; Iani, Ricci, Gherri, & Rubichi, 
2006; Raz, Fan, & Posner, 2005; Raz, Kirsch, Pollard, & Nitkin-Kaner, 2006; Zahedi et al., 2019; 
Zahedi, Luczak, & Sommer, 2020; Zahedi, Stuermer, Hatami, Rostami, & Sommer, 2017; Zahedi, 
Sturmer, et al., 2020). However, as no relevant suggestion is included in the HGSHS or SSHS, we 
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Figure 1.   Schematic representation of different kinds of hypnotic and post-hypnotic suggestions 
and the hypothetical underlying processes; A) simulation, B) simulation-adaptation, and C) executive 
function suggestions. For details, please see text. 
 
Based on SATH (c.f., Zahedi & Sommer, 2021), we assume that simple multifactor models 
are not adequate for explaining the variance in hypnotic-suggestibility scales. Instead, two 
alternatives to the multifactor model presented in Table 1 can be proposed. First, in contrast to 
other top-down cognitive processes required for responding to suggestions, SATH assumes that 
cognitive-simulation is needed to successfully execute all types of suggestions presented in the 
HGSHS. This proposition is corroborated by the meta-analysis of Landry et al. (2017), which 
showed that imagination is the shared characteristic of many different forms of suggestions. Hence, 
one might expect, treating the cognitive-simulation factor (i.e., a grouping factor) as a G-factor 
should improve the multifactor model. 
The second model focuses on SATH’s hypothesis that there are two sources of variability 
in hypnotic-suggestibility, echoing the proposition of Kirsch (1997), asserting that hypnotic-
suggestibility can be decomposed into general suggestibility (capability of responding to 
suggestions regardless of hypnosis) and hypnotizability (increase in suggestibility due to hypnotic 
induction). Hence, besides the specific correlated grouping factors, capturing the different 
suggestibilities described above (related to different top-down cognitive processes), one may 
expect that the addition of a general factor to which all HGSHS items contribute will improve the 
model. Evidently, two G-factors are included in this model. That is, the suggestibility G-factor, 
measured by the correlated grouping factors, and the G-factor of hypnotizability, capturing the 
psychosocial variables involved in responding to hypnotic suggestions (i.e., hypnotizability). 
Notably, the G-factor of hypnotizability is unrelated to cognitive processes involved in responding 
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Table 1. Categorization of the suggestions in HGSHS-A into three proposed specific factors and the 




1.   HEAD FALLING S 2.Ideomotor 
2.   EYE CLOSURE S 2.Ideomotor 
3.   HAND LOWERING (LEFT HAND) S 2.Ideomotor 
4.   ARM IMMOBILIZATION (RIGHT ARM) SA 1.Challenge 
5.   FINGER LOCK SA 1.Challenge 
6.   ARM RIGIDITY (LEFT) SA 1.Challenge 
7.   MOVING HANDS TOGETHER S 2.Ideomotor 
8.   COMMUNICATION INHIBITION SA 1.Challenge 
9.   EXPERIENCING OF A FLY EF 3.Cognitive 
10. EYE CATALEPSY SA 1.Challenge 
11. POST-HYPNOTIC SUGGESTION EF 3.Cognitive 
12. HYPNOTIC AMNESIA EF 3.Cognitive 
Note: S: simulation; SA: simulation-adaptation; EF: executive function.  
 
Finally, an important question regarding the HGSHS is whether the outcome of one 
category of suggestions predicts the outcomes of other categories. Based on SATH, the simulation-
adaptation category encompasses items that require a combination of essential underlying 
mechanisms (i.e., cognitive-simulation and sensory-adaptation) necessary to comply with 
suggestions. Consequently, the outcome of simulation-adaptation suggestions might predict 
success in the simulation category and, to a lesser extent, also in the executive function category. 
Together, in the current study, for solving several issues related to EFA, we used CFA and 
SEM to investigate the structural construct of HGSHS-A scores. Since CFA needs a theory, from 
which relevant hypotheses can be derived, after scrutinizing possible candidates, we chose the 
SATH and used it as the basis for our CFA and SEM. Based on this theory, a bifactor model was 
postulated, consisting of three specific grouping factors and a G-factor measured by all items. 
Further, the internal construct of grouping factors was investigated to establish a causal pathway 
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2.  Methods 
2.1. Participants 
A sample of 477 participants (𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑒 =  28.7 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠, 𝑆𝐷 = 12.6 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) was recruited. 
Several different methods have been used for finding prospective participants; besides inviting 
local Psychology students, the study was advertised on eBay Kleinanzeigen (https://www.ebay-
kleinanzeigen.de) and local radio stations. The study had been approved by the ethics committee 
of the Institut für Psychologie of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Prior to the experiment, 
signed consents were obtained. Participation was compensated by free assessment of hypnotic-
suggestibility or course credits. 
Based on the most conservative estimation, the sample size of a CFA should be 𝑁 = 20 ∗
 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 (Tanaka, 1987). In our study, the number of free parameters in the basic model 
was 24, which shows our sample was big enough, 𝑁 ≈ 20 ∗ 24. Further, based on 1 − 𝛽 > 0.9, 
𝐻0 < 0.05, and 𝐻1 > 0.1 (Cohen, 2016), we calculated the required sample size for Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) (Preacher & Coffman, 2006), which yielded a minimum 
required sample size of, 𝑁 = 120, which again confirms that the analyses conducted here have 
sufficient power to test presented hypotheses. 
2.2. Measurements and Procedure 
The HGSHS-A (Shor & Orne, 1962) has 12 suggestions (Table 1) and is designed for 
administration in group sessions. In the present study, we screened groups of 2-15 volunteers per 
session. At the beginning of the session, a short description of hypnosis and hypnotizability was 
given by a certified hypnotizer (A.Z.), as advised in the HGSHS-A manual (Shor & Orne, 1962). 
Afterward, a recorded German version of HGSHS-A (Bongartz, 1985) was administered while 
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participants completed a questionnaire regarding their experience, consisting of two sections. (1) 
An objective section inquired whether the participant had complied with each of the suggestions, 
and (2) a subjective section asked how strongly they had experienced the effect of each suggestion. 
In the objective section, compliance or non-compliance was scored as 1 or 0, respectively, for the 
first 11 suggestions; the 12th suggestion (i.e., hypnotic amnesia) was scored as 0, if less than 4 
items could be remembered, and otherwise as 1. Hence, participants could receive a total score of  
0 =< ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =<  12.  
2.3. Data analyses 
All data analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team, 2013); for CFA and SEM, the lavaan 
package was used (Rosseel, 2012). As the objective scores of HGSHS-A are binary, the diagonally 
weighted least squares (DWLS) was used to estimate model parameters, and the full weight matrix 
(WLSMV) was utilized to compute robust standard errors and mean- and variance-adjusted test 
statistics. Since the study benefitted from a large sample, WLSMV was preferred for ordinal data 
in comparison to maximum likelihood (ML) or robust maximum likelihood (MLR) (Li, 2016). 
Distributions were fitted with VGAM (Yee, 2010; Yee, 2015) and fitdistrplus (Delignette-Muller 
& Dutang, 2015). 
3.  Results and Discussion 
3.1. Descriptive results 
Figure 2 presents the distribution of HGSHS-A scores; since these parameters are ordinal, 
they cannot be expected to have a normal distribution. However, the methods used for both CFA 
and SEM analyses and calculation of estimated loadings in CFA and SEM are robust and 
insensitive to deviations from normality. Regarding the distribution of HGSHS-A scores, three 
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 0.52 and 𝜌 = 0.099 1 (the distribution fit indices are presented in Table 4). Second, it could be 
argued, as in our study, participants were volunteers, the sampling procedure might have been 
biased toward more hypnotic-suggestible participants. However, the distribution is not biased 
(skewed) toward low- or high-hypnotic-suggestibles. Third, the bimodal shape of the distribution 
is of great interest and will be discussed in section 3.4. 
 
Figure 2.   Left: Histogram and density estimation distribution of HGSHS-A scores. Right: 
Cumulative distribution of HGSHS-A scores. 
 
3.2. Confirmatory Factor Analyses  
For testing the hypotheses outlined in section 1.1, we fitted four models to the data (Fig. 
3). First, we tested a single-factor model, with the hypothesis that there might be a single G-factor, 
which can account for all the variance in the data. Model 2 (i.e., the three-factor model) represents 
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the basic multifactor model introduced in Table 1, where each suggestion is related to only one of 
the three grouping factors. 
Models 3 and 4 represent two bifactor models that were proposed in section 1.1. to enhance 
the basic multifactor model. In conventional bifactor models, it is necessary to assume 
orthogonality between latent factors. That is, the correlation between latent factors are constrained 
to zero (Reise, 2012). Otherwise, interpretation may be complicated (Musek, 2017; Reise, 2012), 
and models may be unidentifiable (i.e., common anomalies of bifactor models) (Eid, Geiser, Koch, 
& Heene, 2017; Eid et al., 2018). Anomalies in conventional bifactor models may arise if data 
were not obtained in a two-level sampling procedure (Eid et al., 2017); that is, if not both, 
participants, as well as items to participants, have been randomly assigned. Such a two-level 
sampling is not possible for HGSHS-A since items are fixed. Therefore, based on the suggestions 
of Eid et al. (2017), we computed bifactor- (𝑆 − 1) and bifactor- (𝑆. 𝐼 − 1) models instead of 
conventional bifactor models. In the bifactor- (𝑆 − 1 ) model (Model 3), one of the grouping 
factors, the simulation factor, was conceptualized as a G-factor measured by all HGSHS-A items. 
The reason for choosing the simulation factor as the reference domain was that cognitive-
simulation is a top-down process required for responding to different forms of suggestions. 
Sensory-adaptation and executive functions, in contrast, are necessary only for a special group of 
suggestions.   In the bifactor- (𝑆. 𝐼 − 1) model (Model 4), in addition to three correlated grouping 
factors, a G-factor measured by all HGSHS-A items was assumed. In this model, one item is 
reserved only for the G-factor. This indicator serves to distinguish the G-factor from the grouping 
factors. Item 3 of HGSHS-A (Hand Lowering) was chosen as the reference indicator since it is a 
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Table 2. Fit Indices for the Full Confirmatory Factor Analysis Model and Reduced Models 
Model df χ2 a RMSEA [90% CI] b SPMR c CFI d TLI d 
G-factor model 54 142.6 *** 0.059 [0.047-0.079] 0.105 0.934 0.919 
Three-factor model 51 80.5 ** 0.035 [0.019-0.049] 0.079 0.978 0.972 
Bifactor- (𝑆 − 1) model 45 61.2  0.028 [0.000-0.044] 0.068 0.988 0.982 
Bifactor- (𝑺. 𝑰 − 𝟏) 
model 
40 33.7 0.000 [0.000-0.024] 0.048 1 1.008 
Note: The endorsed model is indicated in bold. SPMR: standardized root-mean-squared residual; 
RMSEA: Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; CFI: Bentler’s Comparative Fit Index; TLI: 
Tucker-Lewis Index. 
a When χ2 test is not significant the model fits the data. However, as the 𝑁 = 477 was very large, 
it is expected that H0 would be over-rejected. 
b Lower values of RMSEA indicate better fit, with values < .05 indicating a close fit to the data 
(Xia & Yang, 2019). For 1 − 𝛽 > 0.9, 𝐻0 < 0.05, and 𝐻1 > 0.1 the required sample size is 𝑁 >
120. 
c
 Lower values of SRMR indicate better fit, with SRMR < .08 indicating a close 
fit to the data. 
d Values > .95 for CFI and TLI indicate a good fit (Xia & Yang, 2019). TLI is not normalized and 
may have values > 1. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
Table 2 summarizes the fit indices for all four models, graphically presented in Figure 3. 
Based on the results shown in Table 2, and considering adjusted thresholds, the G-factor model 
(Model 1) showed a poor fit to the data. The three-factor model fared better and had a lower 
standardized root-mean-squared residual (RMSEA) compared to Model 1; however, it still showed 
only a modest fit. In contrast, both the bifactor- (𝑆 − 1) (# 3) and bifactor- (𝑆. 𝐼 − 1) models (# 4) 
showed exact fits to the data. The bifactor- (𝑆. 𝐼 − 1) model has the lowest χ2, and standardized 
root mean squared residual (SPMR), indicating a better fit in comparison to other models, which 
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Figure 3.   Estimated loadings of the CFA models. (A) G-factor model, (B) three-factor model, (C) 
bifactor- ( 𝑆 − 1 ) model, and (D) bifactor- ( 𝑆. 𝐼 − 1 ) model. On the single-headed arrows, 
standardized factor loadings are given. All loadings in the G-factor and three-factor models are 
significant, 𝑝 <  .05. In the bifactor- (𝑆 −  1) model, the loadings of EF factors and HO12 on GF 
are not significant; however, other loadings are significant, 𝑝 <  .05. In the bifactor- (𝑆𝐼. − 1) 
model, the loadings of HO2, HO4, HO6, HO8, HO10, and HO12 on the G-factor are not 
significant; however, other loadings are significant, 𝑝 <  .05 . Loadings are equivalent to 
standardized regression coefficients (beta weights), and they are estimated with diagonally 
weighted least squares. The self-loops show error terms. Squaring these terms gives an estimate of 
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headed arrows indicating correlation coefficients between latent variables, all of which, except the 
correlation between EF and S in bifactor- (𝑆 −  1) model, are significant, 𝑝 <  .05.  
Note: S: simulation; SA: simulation-adaptation; EF: executive function. 
 
Even though only the bifactor- (𝑆 −  1) and bifactor- (𝑆𝐼. − 1) models closely fit the data, 
we compared all four models using the likelihood ratio test (Tab. 3). We reasoned that, since we 
had a large number of participants, χ2 might over-reject null hypotheses (H0: a given model does 
not fit the data). All of our models can be tested using the likelihood ratio test, as suggested by 
Reise (2012). The likelihood ratio tests were conducted hierarchically; that is, a model was only 
compared to the next simpler model. The results of these tests (Table 3) confirm that the G-factor 
model (Model 1) is least capable of capturing the variance in the data. Hence, the HGSHS-A is 
definitely not a homogenous scale as it was initially assumed. Second, the bifactor- (𝑆 −  1)  
model (Model 3) fits the data significantly better compared to the three-factor model, corroborating 
our theoretically derived hypothesis that cognitive-simulation is the shared top-down cognitive 
process employed in all forms of suggestions. Finally, the bifactor- (𝑆. 𝐼 − 1) model (Model 4) is 
significantly better in comparison to the bifactor- (𝑆 −  1) model, supporting our hypothesis that 
hypnotizability and suggestibility can be distinguished. 
Table 3. Results of likelihood ratio tests comparing the four models 
Competing models df χ2 a 
Three-factor model  G-factor model 3 47.9 *** 
Bifactor- (𝑆 − 1) Three-factor model 6 18.9 ** 
Bifactor- (𝑆. 𝐼 − 1) Bifactor- (𝑆 − 1) 5 22.2 *** 
Note:  a If the χ2 test is significant the more complex model will be endorsed, if not, the simpler 
model is endorsed. 
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With regard to the bifactor- (𝑆. 𝐼 − 1) model, one should consider that a model with three 
correlated first-order factors without a G-factor is equivalent to a second-order G-factor model; 
that is, a model in which, besides three specific uncorrelated factors, a second-order G-factor is 
assumed (Eid et al., 2017). Hence, in our bifactor- (𝑆. 𝐼 − 1) model, two G-factors, one hidden 
and one explicit, are assumed, which capture variance from two different sources. In the 
introduction, we argued that based on a proposal by Kirsch (1997), which is also incorporated in 
SATH (Zahedi & Sommer, 2021), hypnotic-suggestibility, as measured by HGSHS-A, can be 
decomposed into suggestibilities (capability of responding to different types of suggestions in 
general) and hypnotizability (the increase in suggestibilities due to the hypnotic condition). 
Consequently, in our bifactor- ( 𝑆. 𝐼 − 1 ) model, the correlated grouping factors measure 
suggestibilities, and the G-factor measures hypnotizability. Although suggestibility and its 
components can be clearly defined by SATH, hypnotizability is less identifiable and can be related 
to various psychosocial variables, including willingness and openness (Green & Lynn, 2011; Lynn, 
Laurence, & Kirsch, 2015), the prior expectations about hypnosis (Kirsch & Lynn, 1997; Terhune, 
Cleeremans, Raz, & Lynn, 2017), expectations induced by the wordings of suggestions (Lynn, 
Neufeld, & Matyi, 1987; Matthews, Bennett, Bean, & Gallagher, 1985; Spanos, 1971), rapport 
with the hypnotist (Lynn et al., 2019), and motivation to respond to suggestions (Jones & Spanos, 
1982). 
Two critical points related to the loadings in the bifactor- (𝑆 −  1) and (𝑆𝐼. − 1) models 
should be discussed here. Firstly, in the bifactor- (𝑆 −  1) model, executive function indicators 
loaded significantly on the G-factor but not on the executive function factor. This result could be 
predicted as in section 1.1., we argued that for executive function suggestions, participants need 
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simulation-adaptation suggestions. As each of these suggestions poses a unique problem, it seems 
that cognitive-simulation (the G-factor) is more salient than problem-solving (the executive 
function factor) in responding to these suggestions. Secondly, in the bifactor- (𝑆𝐼. − 1) model 
(Model 4), simulation-adaptation indicators loaded strongly on the simulation-adaption factor but 
very weakly on the G-factor, indicating that participants responded to simulation-adaptation 
suggestions less than expected considering their motivations and expectations. This result could 
also be anticipated as simulation-adaption suggestions require two essential top-down cognitive 
processes, which makes motivations, expectations, and other psychosocial variables less relevant 
or irrelevant in responding to them. 
3.3. Structural Equation Modeling  
Next, we tested our hypotheses that the specific grouping factor, which is parceling the 
suggestions with all the essential top-down processes required for different suggestibilities, can 
predict the outcome of the other grouping factors. In other words, we expected that the simulation-
adaptation factor can predict the simulation and executive function factors, but not vice versa. We 
tested this hypothesis in the models with three grouping factors (Models 2 and 4; Fig. 4). Both the 
executive function factor, as well as the simulation factor, regressed significantly to the simulation-
adaption factor, 𝑃𝑠 < .05 , but in none of these models, did simulation-adaptation regress 
significantly to executive function and simulation factors, 𝑃𝑠 > .1 . Further, in the bifactor- 
(𝑆𝐼. − 1) model, the correlation between the executive-function and simulation factors became 
insignificant when they regressed to the simulation-adaption factor, indicating that relationships 
between these factors can be reduced to regression of the executive function and simulation factors 
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These results corroborate SATH’s claim that simulation-adaptation suggestions encompass 
the essential components of suggestibility. In other words, simulation-adaptation suggestions need 
a balanced interaction between vital top-down cognitive processes employed for responding to 
different forms of suggestions. That is, imagination (i.e., cognitive-simulation) and top-down 
downregulation of sensory information (i.e., sensory-adaption) are both required for responding to 
simulation-adaptation suggestions, distinguishing them from other forms of suggestions. This 
conclusion has a notable implication for using standardized scales of hypnotic susceptibility in 
clinical and experimental usage, as will be discussed below. 
 
Figure 4.   The structural segment of (A) the three-factor, and (B) bifactor- (𝑆𝐼. − 1) models. All 
correlation and regression coefficients, except the correlation between 𝐸𝐹 ~~ 𝑆 in the bifactor- 
(𝑆𝐼. − 1) model, are significant, 𝑝 <  .05.  
Note: Adding regressions did not change the models, as previously we had assumed correlations 
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Figure 5.   Distributions of the (A) Simulation, (B) Simulation-Adaptation, and (C) Executive 
Function factor scores. Left: Histograms of distributions. Right: Cumulative distributions of the 
empirical and estimated data, based on a beta-binomial distribution by the given 𝜇 and 𝜌. 
 
Figure 5 shows the distributions of factors’ scores (for details, see Table 1). As shown in 
Table 4, all three distributions are beta-binomial. However, only the simulation-adaptation factor 
showed estimated 𝛼 < 1  and 𝛽 < 1 , indicating a U-shape distribution. By considering the 
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we can finally discuss the observed bimodal distribution of HGSHS-A scores (see Fig. 1). 
Importantly, this bimodality was also observed in many other studies (for review, see Balthazard 
& Woody, 1989). Three possible explanations may be offered for this distribution. (1) The 
bimodality in HGSHS-A total scores may be the consequence of overdispersion of a beta-binomial 
distribution. In other words, the bimodality may be caused by smearing of the peak of the 
distribution and can be considered as noise. (2) If we consider that the simulation-adaptation factor 
has a U-shaped beta-binomial distribution and that the simulation-adaptation factor predicts both 
executive function and simulation factors, we may also suggest that the bimodality in HGSHS-A 
is forced by the simulation-adaptation distribution. Therefore, hypnotic-suggestibility may be 
related to a trait with a U-shape distribution in the population, and assuming a normal distribution 
does not represent this facet. In other words, there is a higher chance that a person would be either 
fully capable or entirely incapable of responding to simulation-adaption suggestions rather than in 
between. Based on the discussion regarding the processes involved in simulation-adaptation 
suggestions, one may conclude that in a given participant, the interaction between cognitive-
simulation (i.e., factor S) and sensory-adaptation (i.e., factor SA) either succeeds in making 
imaginations dominant over sensory inputs, rendering this participant high-hypnotic-suggestible, 
or otherwise the participant will be low-hypnotic-suggestible. Importantly, this conclusion does 
not mean that all hypnotic-suggestible participants are the same. That is, a given participant might 
have a powerful imagination (i.e., cognitive-simulation) and therefore needs less sensory-
adaptation (i.e., top-down downregulation of sensory input), and another might be very talented in 
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Finally, (3) the observed bimodality might be due to the superimposition of two unimodal 
distributions. Especially, given that the bifactor- (𝑆𝐼. −1) model was the best fit for the data, one 
may assume that hypnotizability is related to two underlying mechanisms, namely, suggestibility 
and hypnotizability, both of which have a normal distribution in the general population. However, 
as they might have positive versus negative skewness, when they are added together under the 
general concept of hypnotic-susceptibility, they may cause HGSHS-A scores to have a bimodal 
distribution. It must be noted that these interpretations need to be experimentally investigated 
before one can draw any firm conclusion. 
 
Table 4. Fit indices for the distributions of the HGSHS-A scores and grouping factors 
Distribution Fitted Distribution ∆𝐴𝐼𝐶 a ∆𝐵𝐼𝐶 a 
Estimated 
𝛼 and 𝛽 
HGSHS-A scores 
Beta-Binomial 0 0 4.81 - 4.28 
Poisson 45 42 - 
Negative Binomial 47 48 - 
SA scores 
Beta-Binomial 0 0 .99 - .79 
Poisson 204 200 - 
Negative Binomial 199 199 - 
S scores 
Beta-Binomial 0 0 4.46 – 1.52 
Poisson 328 324 - 
Negative Binomial 326 330 - 
EF scores 
Beta-Binomial 0 0 8.14 – 26.63 
Poisson 11 7 - 
Negative Binomial 13 13 - 
Note: The endorsed distribution is highlighted in bold. 
S: simulation; SA: simulation-adaptation; EF: executive function. 
a When ∆𝐴𝐼𝐶 > 10, the model with minimum AIC will be endorsed (Burnham & Anderson, 2016). 
∆𝐴𝐼𝐶 =  𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑖  −  𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚, and ∆𝐵𝐼𝐶 =  𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑖  −  𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚. The AIC are corrected for the 
finite sampling (𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑐). 
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4. General Discussion 
Our results attest to the advantages of CFA and SEM over EFA. First, since CFA is theory-
driven, the results can be interpreted with greater confidence and are not subjected to post hoc 
interpretations. For instance, the bifactor- (𝑆𝐼. −1) model consists of two parts, a G-factor and the 
basic three-factor model. Regarding the basic three-factor part, there is an exact correspondence 
between the theory-driven basic three-factor model and the dominant solution of previous EFAs 
(e.g., McConkey et al., 1980) (see Tab. 1). However, in previous EFA (e.g., McConkey et al., 1980; 
Oakman & Woody, 1996; Piesbergen & Peter, 2006), grouping factors and their indicators were 
data-driven and explained post hoc, distinguishing them from theory-driven (a priori) hypotheses 
needed for CFA. This issue hindered previous EFAs in agreeing on the most relevant model since 
several statistically-indistinguishable models fitted the data similarly well. In the current study, on 
the other hand, the latent factors and their indicators were derived from SATH (Zahedi & Sommer, 
2021), and therefore, the uncertainty about the number and nature of latent factors were minimized.  
Second, even though multiple studies showed that HGSHS scores are best explained by 
more than one latent factor (McConkey et al., 1980; Woody et al., 2005), to the best of our 
knowledge, no previous study has applied bifactor modeling to data from HGSHS or any other 
standardized hypnotic susceptibility scale. However, bifactor modeling is of great relevance for 
analyzing hypnotic-suggestibility according to the proposition of Kirsch (1997) and SATH. In 
these accounts, standardized scales such as the SSHS or HGSHS measure hypnotic-suggestibility, 
consisting of two components, namely, suggestibility and hypnotizability. Our results show that 
adding a G-factor, measuring the common variance of all items of the HGSHS, to the basic 
multifactor model significantly enhanced model fit. This G-factor possibly measures global 
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grouping factors, tapping into different suggestibilities, a G-factor, measuring hypnotizability is 
necessary to fully explain the variance of HGSHS scores.  
Third, previous studies (McConkey et al., 1980; Woody et al., 2005) have demonstrated 
multiple hypnotic-suggestibilities but did not investigate the relations or pathways between these 
latent factors. Our SEM results showed that the outcome of the simulation-adaptation factor, which 
requires a combination of the two critical top-down processes involved in suggestibility, can 
predict the outcomes of both the simulation and executive function factors but not vice versa.  
Our results regarding the causal pathways have notable implications for the future 
applications of standardized tests in clinical and experimental settings. Usually, hypnotic 
suggestions in clinical situations benefit from several properties that are not covered by the 
HGSHS. (1) In clinical applications, there is a cohesive story connecting different suggestions. (2) 
Clinical suggestions present perspicuous and elaborate strategies, and (3) involve a flexible 
procedure that can be adapted to client’s preferred speed. Because of these differences with clinical 
applications, the HGSHS is not an optimal or even useful predictor of suggestibility outside of 
screening sessions. This fact is reflected in the problems of standardized hypnotic-suggestibility 
scales in predicting outcomes of hypnotherapy (e.g., Alladin & Alibhai, 2007; Golden, 2012; 
Schoenberger, 2000), interventions for pain reduction  (e.g., Perri, Rossani, & Di Russo, 2019) or 
interventions targeting modification of food preferences (e.g., Zahedi, Luczak, et al., 2020). A 
suitable hypnotic-suggestibility scale for clinical purposes might focus on simulation-adaptation 
suggestions as (a) these suggestions measure the interaction between cognitive-simulation (i.e., 
imagination) and sensory-adaptation (i.e., top-down driven downregulation of sensory input), 
which are the essential elements of suggestibility. (b) In contrast to executive function suggestions, 
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they do not rely on participants’ problem-solving capabilities to compensate for vague suggestions. 
(c) In contrast to simulation suggestions, sensory-adaptation suggestions require more than only 
subjective re-coding of a phenomenon. Therefore, these suggestions should be closer to what 
participants usually experience outside of screening sessions and better for predicting hypnotic-
suggestibility in applied settings. 
With regard to experimental applications, standardized hypnotic-suggestibility scales 
might also not be as useful as deemed. Basic research in hypnosis frequently poses two types of 
questions. (1) How is hypnotic-suggestibility as a trait related to other traits and/or cognitive 
functions? This type of experimental research, designated intrinsic (Cox & Bryant, 2008; Wagstaff, 
1996), asks, for example, whether hypnotic-suggestibility is related to the capability of 
concentration, fantasy, or daydreaming (for review, see Lynn et al., 2019). (2) Do (posy)hypnotic 
suggestions affect perception or performance in specific tasks, such as those measuring cognitive 
functions (for review, see Kihlstrom, 2013; Kihlstrom, 2014)? Such studies, sometimes referred to 
as instrumental (Cox & Bryant, 2008; Wagstaff, 1996), ask, for instance, whether (post)hypnotic 
suggestions can subdue pain perception (e.g., Perri et al., 2019) or facilitate inhibition of irrelevant 
but intrusive information (e.g., Zahedi et al., 2019). 
When questions regarding the influence of hypnosis on any dependent variable are 
addressed, it is a common practice to use standardized hypnotic-suggestibility scales to categorize 
participants as low- versus high-hypnotic-suggestibles (for review, see Lifshitz, Aubert Bonn, 
Fischer, Kashem, & Raz, 2013). Then, for curbing the effects of confounding variables, low- and 
high-hypnotic-suggestibles are compared, effectively using the former group as controls for the 
latter (Cox & Bryant, 2008; Wagstaff, 1996). Jensen et al. (2017) discussed why the utilization of 
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results support the caveats of Jensen et al. (2017) concerning current screening tools. The variance 
in hypnotic-suggestibility scores appears to originate from two sources, differences in 
suggestibility and hypnotizability. Differences in suggestibility are caused by individual 
differences in the employment of several top-down processes and their interaction, including 
cognitive-simulation, sensory-adaptation, and problem-solving (Zahedi & Sommer, 2021). Further, 
differences in hypnotizability are likely influenced by multiple psychosocial factors, which are 
already discussed in section 3.2. Confirmatory Factor Analyses. Consequently, low-hypnotic-
suggestible participants are distinguishable from high-hypnotic-suggestibles due to a combination 
of cognitive and psychosocial factors. Due to this uncertainty, the utilization of low- hypnotic-
suggestibles as controls violates the basic assumption of a control condition. That is, participants 
in the control and experimental conditions must be identical in possible aspect except for one 
measurable property. When this assumption does not hold, no conclusion can be drawn from 
observed differences between the control and experimental groups. Noticeably, the HGSHS is not 
a homogenous instrument as a single G-factor model cannot reasonably fit the data, which 
underscores our concerns that a given HGSHS total score is appropriate for predicting participants’ 
responses to an experimental suggestion. 
For intrinsic hypnosis studies, employing available standardized suggestibility scales may 
be misleading, too. For instance, let’s consider the inconsistent relationship between hypnotic-
suggestibility and cognitive control. Several well-conducted studies using both psychometric and 
neural measures have recently shown that without hypnosis, high-hypnotic-suggestibles performed 
better than low-hypnotic-suggestibles in cognitive tasks (Kirenskaya, Storozheva, Solntseva, 
Novototsky-Vlasov, & Gordeev, 2019; Srzich et al., 2019). In contrast, Khodaverdi-Khani and 
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to low-hypnotic-suggestibles, but there was no significant difference in an N-back task, revealing 
inconclusive findings with regard to WM performance. Furthermore, in a large sample (𝑁 = 180), 
Dienes et al. (2009) found no correlation between hypnotic-suggestibility and cognitive 
capabilities. The present study indicates why the findings of studies investigating the relation 
between hypnotic-suggestibility and cognitive control are inconclusive (Parris, 2017; Terhune et 
al., 2017). Studies investigating the relation between hypnotizability and other processes must take 
into account the bifactorial nature of the scales employed. Hypnotic-suggestibility scales involve 
two sources of variance, suggestibility and hypnotizability, which should be considered separately. 
Our concerns about current scales of hypnotic-suggestibility are shared by many other researchers 
in the field of hypnosis, questioning the applicability and usefulness of existing scales (Acunzo & 
Terhune, 2021; Jensen et al., 2017). 
Several limitations of our study must be discussed. First, non-significant loadings on some 
factors are a common anomaly in bifactor modeling (Eid et al., 2017). We also observed this issue 
in a conventional bifactor model of HGSHS scores (see supplementary materials). Therefore, 
based on the suggestions of Eid et al. (2018) and Eid et al. (2017), we used the bifactor- (𝑆 −
1) and (𝑆𝐼. −1) models instead of the conventional bifactor model. Even though the anomalies 
were better controlled in these models, some of the indicators still had nonsignificant loadings (see 
Fig. 3). Even though these anomalies were interpreted post hoc (see section 3.2. Confirmatory 
Factor Analyses), they were not expected at the time of postulating these models. However, these 
anomalies do not call into question our interpretations or conclusions regarding our theory-driven 
hypotheses. 
Further, in our study, we only employed the HGSHS for modeling hypnotic-suggestibility 
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functions, such as top-down sensory-adaptation and cognitive-simulation, postulated by SATH to 
be important in responding to suggestions. However, one should notice that for measuring some 
of these top-down cognitive functions, such as sensory-adaptation, there is no standardized test 
available, and therefore, novel instruments have to be developed first. 
In conclusion, in the current study, we conducted a CFA of HGSHS-A based on SATH 
(Zahedi & Sommer, 2021). Going beyond the results of previous EFAs (e.g., McConkey et al., 
1980; Woody et al., 2005), our results showed that (1) the HGSHS-A is best explained by a bifactor 
model, in which a G-factor tapping into hypnotizability is assumed beside three specific grouping 
factors measuring different components of suggestibility, namely, simulation, simulation-
adaptation, and executive function factors. (2) SEM of causal pathways between latent factors 
revealed that the outcome of simulation-adaptation suggestions, which require a combination of 
cognitive-simulation and sensory-adaptation, can predict the outcome of other suggestions. this 
finding corroborates SATH’s claim that these two top-down processes are the essential elements 
of suggestibility. (3) Finally, our results have several important implications for future applications 
of the existing standardized scales of hypnotic susceptibility. First, in line with the conclusions of 
Acunzo and Terhune (2021), the current study shows the need for developing a new scale of 
hypnotic-suggestibility focused on simulation-adaptation suggestions for clinical and experimental 
applications. Second, in line with the proposition of Jensen et al. (2017), the current results show 
the importance of using control groups consisting of participants with similar rather than different 
hypnotic-suggestibility scores to experimental groups, and a desideratum for revisiting 
applications of standardized scales in studies investigating the relation between hypnotizability 
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Abstract 
In the Stroop task color words are shown in various print colors. When print colors are named or 
classified with button presses, interference occurs if word meaning is color-incongruent and 
facilitation if it is congruent. Although the Stroop effects in vocal and manual task versions are 
similar, it is unclear whether the underlying mechanisms are equivalent. We addressed this 
question by (1) recording event-related brain potentials (ERPs), (2) manipulating the lexicality of 
neutral stimuli, and (3) giving post-hypnotic suggestions (PHS) that written words would lose 
their meaning. The Stroop effect in the vocal version was twice its manual counterpart. PHS 
strongly reduced both effects by a similar amount, supporting a common semantic locus during 
reading. Task- and hypnosis-invariant lexicality effects for neutral words ruled out pre-semantic 
reading loci. Articulation-artifact corrected ERPs showed task-invariant Stroop effects in N400 
amplitudes, supporting similar semantic loci. However, in the vocal task response-locked ERPs 
indicated a task-specific Stroop effect over left-inferior frontal and parietal scalp sites, 
suggesting interference during word production. Interestingly, PHS increased the N1 and 
decreased the N2 components in ERPs, regardless of congruency, indicating enhanced proactive 
executive control and diminished demands on conflict-monitoring, respectively. Stroop effects in 
the N400 were reduced by PHS, confirming their semantic locus. In conclusion, vocal and 
manual Stroop versions seem to share semantic loci of conflict. The bigger vocal Stroop effect 
may be due to additional loci during word production lexicon. Apparently, PHS diminish Stroop 
effects by enhancing proactive executive control over lexico-semantic conflicts. 
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Common and Specific Loci of Stroop Effects in Vocal and Manual Tasks, Revealed by Event-
Related Brain Potentials and Post-Hypnotic Suggestions  
Whenever we enter a situation, which requires a set of new responses to successfully 
solve tasks posed by the environment, executive functions are required. A typical example is 
first-time switching to left-side traffic for experienced right-side drivers, which requires the 
inhibition of prepotent responses and replacing them with the appropriate ones. Or, for example, 
for the most part of human history, it was appropriate to give high priority to the consumption of 
high-calorie food, a behavior that, considering the dangers of obesity and the ubiquitous 
availability of rich food and snacks, must be inhibited by most members of modern affluent 
societies (e.g. Dohle et al., 2018; Guerrieri et al., 2008; Nederkoorn et al., 2009; Nederkoorn et 
al., 2010).  From a scientific point of view, executive functions as a psychological structure were 
initially conceptualized to bridge the gap between short-term memory, as an inactive deposit 
(Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968) and the central executive (Baddeley, 1996, 2003; Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974), a homunculus supposed to actively process the material in working memory. An 
important point about executive functions is the question of their unity or diversity (Miyake et 
al., 2000), which has been studied extensively with many tools, ranging from performance 
measures (for review see Diamond, 2013; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al., 2000) to 
brain imaging (for review see Collette et al., 2005; Niendam et al., 2012; Yuan & Raz, 2014). 
Although the question of how many executive functions have to be distinguished, is still to be 
resolved, there is some agreement that next to inhibition, major executive functions are the 
updating of short-term memory and shifting between task sets (Diamond, 2013; Miyake & 
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A central idea about executive functions is the necessity for the de-automatization of 
behavior, that is, the inhibition of existing and prepotent responses (Diamond, 2013) before they 
can be substituted by more appropriate actions. Due to its importance in quotidian circumstances, 
many efforts have been made to enhance the inhibition of prepotent responses. For instance, 
physical exercise has had limited success in the enhancement of executive functions (Diamond & 
Ling, 2016); and although training of inhibition tasks had led to some enhancement, success was 
mostly limited to the trained task and did not transfer to other inhibition tasks (Thorell et al., 
2009).  
Recently, hypnosis or posthypnotic suggestions (PHS) have been proposed as a technique 
to overcome prepotent responses (Lifshitz et al., 2013). Thus, PHS have been shown to strongly 
diminish the Stroop interference effect. The classic Stroop effect – the impairment of 
performance in naming the print color of a word denoting a different color (e.g. Red printed in 
blue) – is seen to tap into the inhibition function. The Stroop effect is very persistent and hard to 
diminish, even by extensive exercise (MacLeod, 1991). The Stroop task is a paragon, where an 
extensively trained function (reading words), is prepotent but irrelevant and must be suppressed 
in order to replace it with the task-appropriate action (color naming).  
The Stroop task is an  important tool in different fields of cognitive psychology, 
including but not restricted to the study of cognitive control (Coderre & van Heuven, 2014; 
Hanslmayr et al., 2008; Ilan & Polich, 1999; Langenecker et al., 2004), and its development 
(Bub et al., 2006), impulsivity (Dickman, 1990), and Psycholinguistics (Dhooge & Hartsuiker, 
2010, 2011; Geng et al., 2013; Shitova et al., 2016, 2017). In the present paper, we will 




LOCI OF STROOP EFFECTS 5 
In the Stroop task, two kinds of information are simultaneously presented, task-irrelevant 
color words and the colors that the words are written in and that have to be responded to. If the 
word meaning is incongruent with the print color, for example, green written in red, reaction 
times (RT) to the print color are longer than when both are congruent, for example, red written in 
red (MacLeod, 1991). The difference in performance between incongruent and congruent trials is 
the Stroop effect. It is commonly accounted for by the automatic activation of the task-irrelevant 
meaning of the word, which is hard to suppress. In contrast, extracting the color information and 
executing an appropriate response appears to be more controlled and effortful (Kornblum, 1994; 
MacLeod, 1991). One important aspect of the Stroop task is the response task version, that is, 
whether the color is named (vocal task modality) or identified by pressing color-coded buttons 
(manual task modality) (MacLeod, 1991). Previously it has been shown that manual and vocal 
versions cause similar but somewhat disparate results. Thus, vocal Stroop effects are typically 
larger than manual effects (Liotti et al., 2000; Redding & Gerjets, 1977). More subtle differences 
are observable when different categories of neutral trials are used, such as strings of letters or 
characters (e.g. LLLL or GGGG or %&*@), general words (e.g. while written in blue), 
semantically associated words (e.g., blood, or sky, which are associated with the colors red and 
blue, respectively), and words that are semantically related to other colors which are not included 
in response set (e.g., purple when this color is not part of the response set). RTs for these neutral 
categories have been reported to differ only in vocal but not in manual Stroop task versions 
(Liotti et al., 2000; Redding & Gerjets, 1977; Sharma & McKenna, 1998).  
It is our primary aim to understand the differences between vocal and manual Stroop task 
versions. To this aim, it is helpful to consider the three main accounts for the vocal Stroop effect. 
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reading, which is highly automatized; therefore, interference may occur at the perceptual level 
(Hock & Egeth, 1970). However, this account cannot explain the facilitation commonly observed 
in congruent relative to neutral words in the Stroop task. 
The second account is based on language production theory (e.g., Dell, 1986; Levelt et 
al., 1999; Shitova et al., 2017). It postulates interference at the lexico-semantic level (Glaser & 
Glaser, 1989; Sharma & McKenna, 1998; Sugg & McDonald, 1994), integrating Stroop and 
Stroop-like effects in related paradigms. A prominent example of such a task is picture-word 
interference (PWI), where to-be-named pictures are shown together with words (Shitova et al., 
2016; van Maanen et al., 2009). According to this account, both print color and word meaning 
activate corresponding lexical and semantic nodes; when two different but connected lexico-
semantic nodes are activated, they compete for the selection of the appropriate lexical entry, 
causing a delay in processing.  
Supporting evidence for this theory is obtained from recordings of the N400 component 
in event-related potentials (ERP). The N400 is a negative-going parieto-central deflection, which 
is typically larger in response to incongruent than congruent Stroop words. The N400 is 
considered as a cue for semantic processing (Hanslmayr et al., 2008; Liotti et al., 2000; West & 
Alain, 1999) and may be related to conflict detection but not conflict resolution (Coderre et al., 
2011). Lexical competition in various tasks has also been associated with posterior ERP effects, 
starting already between 150 and 250 ms (e.g. Costa et al., 2009; Dell'acqua et al., 2010; Maess 
et al., 2002; Rose & Abdel Rahman, 2016; Strijkers et al., 2010).  
As an alternative explanation, the response exclusion theory suggests that Stroop effects 
are located in the articulatory output buffer (Mahon et al., 2007). Because words have privileged 
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and removal takes longer for related (incongruent) compared to unrelated or neutral trials. This 
theory predicts interference effects only when articulation is involved, that is, in the vocal task, 
but not in the manual task where articulators are supposedly not involved. However, in PWI 
tasks that have been frequently employed in research on language production, and considered as 
Stroop-like tasks (MacLeod, 1991; van Maanen et al., 2009), manual and vocal versions show 
highly similar interference effects in performance (Abdel Rahman & Aristei, 2010; Hutson et al., 
2013). Supporting data for the response exclusion theory come from ERP studies of the Stroop 
task (Badzakova-Trajkov et al., 2009; Hanslmayr et al., 2008; Liotti et al., 2000; West & Alain, 
1999), which have revealed not only larger N400 amplitudes in incongruent as compared to 
congruent conditions but also a larger late positive complex (LPC) at 600-800 ms after stimulus 
onset. In contrast to these relatively late effects there is no evidence for congruency effects in 
earlier components such as the N200 or P300 (Ilan & Polich, 1999) reflecting perceptual and 
classification processes, or in posterior modulation related to lexical selection. In addition, 
analyses of EEG in the Stroop task have shown that phase coupling lasts longer for incongruent 
trials in a late interval, possibly indicating conflict resolution at the response level (Hanslmayr et 
al., 2008).  
The final account of Stroop effects is the response conflict theory (Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Cohen et al., 1990), suggesting that words and colors are perceived and processed in different 
systems and activate corresponding responses. In the Stroop task, only the response activated by 
the print color is appropriate. When response activations are congruent, there is mutual 
facilitation and the response is executed faster than when responses exclude each other in 
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activation threshold, which takes longer for incongruent than congruent trials, yielding the 
Stroop effect (Botvinick et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 1990). 
Further clues how vocal and manual Stroop versions differ come from neuroimaging 
studies. These studies have shown disparities between incongruent and congruent trials that are 
widely distributed over the brain. These areas include dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (Banich et 
al., 2000; Milham et al., 2003), precuneus (Banich et al., 2000), inferior frontal gyrus 
(Langenecker et al., 2004), anterior cingulate cortex, and posterior lateral prefrontal cortex 
(Milham et al., 2003). Beyond the prefrontal cortex Stroop trials differentially activate the left 
premotor cortex, left postcentral cortex, left putamen, supplementary motor area, right superior 
temporal gyrus, and bilateral peristriate cortices (Langenecker et al., 2004; Milham et al., 2003; 
Pardo et al., 1990; Peterson et al., 1999), indicating the involvement of multiple brain systems.  
Figure 1 presents a heuristic model, summarizing the accounts of Stroop effects reviewed 
above, suggesting several loci of conflict that partially overlap and partially differ between vocal 
and manual Stroop tasks versions. It is plausible to assume that the words presented in both task 
versions – although by themselves task-irrelevant - are automatically processed in word 
recognition segments. However, only the vocal but not the manual version should contain a word 




LOCI OF STROOP EFFECTS 9 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of cognitive processes and their interaction (red arrows) in 
Stroop tasks as suggested by different accounts. (a) In the manual Stroop task, interference and 
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Stroop task, interference and facilitation may occur at the semantic, lexical, word form, or 
articulation level.  
 
The heuristic model suggests that color-based information will activate a semantic node 
in both task versions; simultaneously, the written word will activate a lexical representation, 
which in turn will activate both semantic representations as well as word form representations. 
In the manual task version, the response consists in pressing a button associated with the 
perceived print color. Therefore, the response should be based on the activated node in the 
semantic representation layer. Interference and facilitation in the manual version can arise both 
at the semantic and the response level. In the vocal version the response consists in naming 
(articulating) the print color. This response should be based on the activated node at the word 
form level. Hence, the semantic node corresponding to the print color should activate a 
lexical/semantic node and then the corresponding word form. This activation flow in the vocal 
version provides additional potential loci of interference between the activation based on word 
meaning and color processing in comparison to the manual version within the word production 
system. 
One of the most salient aspects of the Stroop effect is its consistency and persistence even 
after large amounts of practice (MacLeod, 1991). Given the robustness and automaticity of the 
Stroop effect it is striking that it can be strongly diminished or even eliminated under the impact 
of post-hypnotic suggestions (PHS) inducing “hypnotic agnosia” in hypnotizable participants 
(Lifshitz et al., 2013; Raz et al., 2003; Raz et al., 2007; Raz & Shapiro, 2002; Zahedi et al., 
2017). Zahedi et al. (2017) have provided EEG evidence that the impact of PHS may relate to 
enhanced cognitive control. More specifically, the effect of PHS, which induces hypnotic 
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representation layer and/or 4) response production - although it may seem far-fetched that 
participants would access the meaning of the words but not show the Stroop effect. Presumably, 
the impact of PHS would propagate through the cognitive system, that is, an impact at a low 
level would preclude or attenuate interference or facilitation at higher levels.  
The primary aims of the present study were to functionally localize the Stroop effects in 
vocal and manual task versions and the mechanisms underlying their modulations by post-
hypnotic suggestions. In pursuing these aims, we used a counterbalanced design including vocal 
and manual Stroop task versions, with and without PHS. In both task versions we used several 
categories of stimuli. Beside congruent and incongruent trials, different neutral conditions were 
employed: non-words, produced by scrambling real German words (e.g. Tasdt or Hcbu), high- 
and low-frequency color-unrelated words (e.g. Buch or Karte vs. Seide or Kurve). The recoding 
of event-related brain potentials (ERPs) provided insight into effects on specific neurocognitive 
processes with high time resolution.  
Based on the previous findings, integrated in the heuristic model (Fig. 1), we expected for 
the manual Stroop task version both facilitation (differences between congruent and non-words), 
and interference (differences between incongruent and non-words) located in semantic 
representations. In contrast, we did not expect performance differences between the different 
neutral conditions (non-words, low- and high-frequency words), aimed at manipulating lexical 
representations of word processing. In the vocal Stroop task version, we expected not only 
facilitation and interference at the semantic level but also lexicality effects. Lexicality effects are 
due to activation of competing nodes at the lexical representation layer, which have to be 
overcome before planning the overt response. In comparison to the manual task version both 
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because of, first, additional possible loci of interactions between the color-perception and word 
recognition pathways, for instance, in the lexical and articulatory stages of word production, and 
second, because of possible backpropagations, for example, from word form and lexical layer to 
semantic and lexical layers. Such backpropagations might lead to qualitatively different, but also 
stronger interactions between two pathways. 
In ERPs studies, the investigation of vocal Stroop tasks is problematic because of the 
strong articulation artifacts superimposing late cognitive ERP components such as the N400. 
However, recent methodological advances allow overcoming this problem. Thus, Ouyang et al. 
(2016) have developed a method that separates brain-derived ERPs from overlapping articulation 
artifacts. Applying this method, we expected larger N400 amplitudes for incongruent than 
congruent trials in both task versions because of the presumed impediment of lexico-semantic 
access in the former. 
In addition, we analyzed conflict-related components, in particular the N1 (or N100) 
(Zinchenko et al., 2017), and the N2 (or N200) (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008; Yeung et al., 
2004). As N1 and N2 are conflict-related components (Yeung et al., 2004), one might expect that 
they will be affected by congruency in the Stroop task. However, previous ERP studies of Stroop 
effects did not detect any congruency effects in these early components (Badzakova-Trajkov et 
al., 2009; Coderre et al., 2011; Coderre & van Heuven, 2014; Hanslmayr et al., 2008; Ilan & 
Polich, 1999; Liotti et al., 2000; West & Alain, 1999). PHS were expected to change tasks 
performance, in other words, the amount of conflict and the resolution of this conflict. Given that 
PHS effects may be due to proactive control, one may expect similar changes due to PHS in 
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uncertainty about the nature of these two components, it is hard to suggest a specific direction of 
amplitude (or latency) changes. 
Based on mentioned studies, the P3 is usually divided to subcomponents, the P3a with a 
frontal distribution and the P3b with a central-posterior distribution. Although the P3a has been 
related to stimulus processing, and especially novelty detecting, the P3b has been related to 
attentional allocation and context updating operations (Polich, 2007). If we consider P3b as a 
component related to attentional allocation (or stimulus relevance), there are two possible effects 
of PHS on this component. First, if participants cannot read the words at all, congruency effects 
might be extinguished under the effects of PHS, greatly diminishing the P3b amplitude in all 
conditions. However, if participants allocate their cognitive resources more efficiently under the 
influence of PHS, allocating attention to specific stimulus categories may ensue, possibly 
increasing any congruency effects in the P3b component. 
Response-locked ERPs are synchronized to the time of response onset, instead of 
stimulus onset (Ouyang, Schacht, Zhou, & Sommer, 2013; Zhang, 1998). Response-locked ERPs 
enable focusing on response production-related processes, which in stimulus-locked ERPs tend 
to be smeared and reduced in size because of their latency variability. Especially, when 
comparing two tasks with different output modalities, it is of great interest to distinguish their 
response-production processes. By and large, the manual and vocal versions of the Stroop task, 
can be considered as different tasks largely because they differ in output modalities.  However, it 
is a matter of debate whether the different Stroop task versions are similar (Dhooge & 
Hartsuiker, 2010, 2011; Geng et al., 2013) or different (Liotti et al., 2000; Redding & Gerjets, 
1977; Sharma & McKenna, 1998). Hitherto this question was hard to address with ERPs because 
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the current study by applying the RIDE method (Ouyang et al., 2016). Please note that we 
refrained from calculating the lateralized readiness potential (Coles, 1989) because we did not 
have enough trials and in the vocal task the response is not lateralized, as required for calculating 
this component. 
Post-hypnotic suggestions aimed at disabling participants to understand or, more 
generally, read the task-irrelevant words. Therefore, PHS should affect the word recognition 
pathways (see Fig. 1) and we conceived of four plausible scenarios in this condition.  
(1) If cognitive control invested under the impact of the PHS, prevents or impedes letter 
perception, any performance differences within both manual and vocal version, for example, 
between word categories, including the different neutral categories, or between the congruent 
and incongruent trials should be diminished relative to the standard condition or even abolished.  
(2) If PHS still allow the activation of lexical word representations but excessive 
utilization of cognitive control inhibits or blocks the competition between the activated nodes, at 
least in the vocal task version, RTs to non-words should be shorter than for both high- and low-
frequency neutral word. Since in the manual version there should be no performance differences 
between non-words, and high- and low-frequency neutral words, as there is no interaction 
between these two pathways at the lexical level, PHS should have no impact. However, any 
N400 differences between these conditions seen without PHS should be attenuated or eliminated 
by PHS. 
(3) If cognitive control induced by PHS is directed only to the semantic or later levels, 
one would expect the effects at the pre-semantic levels in the vocal version to be preserved. 
Specifically, in neutral trials RTs should not only show a lexicality effect (i.e., shorter RTs to 
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frequency word trials). Please note, however that word frequency effects in PWI task is usually 
reversed (e.g., Burt & Tate, 2002; Catling et al., 2010; Dhooge & Hartsuiker, 2010; Miozzo & 
Caramazza, 2003). In addition, the N400 component should differ between these neutral word 
categories.  
Moreover, in this scenario of semantic or post-semantic effects of PHS the vocal version 
should show some residual facilitation and interference effects that should not be observed in the 
manual version, mainly due to the existence of lexical and word form layers. Overall, however, 
facilitation and interference effects should decrease after PHS in comparison to the no-hypnosis 
condition both in ERPs and RTs. 
(4) In case that PHS impact the response level, that is, hand selection in the manual 
version and word production in the vocal version, we expect that performance in both vocal and 
manual versions will be enhanced, which might be reflected in late ERP components preceding 
the response. In addition, if PHS would exclusively affect the response level, we would expect 
that all differences in pre-response ERPs – especially in the N400 component – would be 
indifferent to PHS.  
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of highly hypnotizable participants, selected by screening with the 
Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility- Form A (HGSHS-A) (Shor & Orne, 1962) 
translated into German (Bongartz, 1985). Each screening session included up to 10 volunteers. 
Of 122 screened volunteers (M = 28.7 years; range = 18-76, SD = 12.9), 24 were highly 
hypnotizable (> 8/12 points) (M = 30.2 years; range = 18-63, SD = 13.8); of these persons, 16 




LOCI OF STROOP EFFECTS 16 
None of these participants had color vision impairments (Ishihara, 1996) or a history of 
diagnosed dyslexia. Participation was compensated either with course credits or 8 € per hour. 
The study had been approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology at the 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and written informed consent was obtained prior to both the 
screening session and the main experiment. 
Materials and Instructions 
Stroop task. The Stroop task was programmed in Presentation® software (Version 18.0, 
Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, www.neurobs.com). It consisted of five different 
categories of trials, including congruent (e.g. Red written in red) and incongruent (e.g. Red 
written in blue) trials for four different color words (red, green, blue, and yellow), 32 non-words 
(scrambled words, e.g. Tatge, Uglpf, Khcle), 32 high-frequency German words (e.g. Gott, Recht, 
Frau, Kurs, mean word form frequency = 0.3 ± 1.0 per mio; (Geyken, 2007)), and 32 low-
frequency German words (e.g. Trank, Backe, Basar, Halm; mean word form frequency = 3.5 ± 
1.1). Non-words were actual words scrambled and checked to be non-pronounceable. Non-color 
materials were matched in length to the color words. Non-color words were unrelated to color 
names of any kind (even if not included in the response set). The first letters of the neutral words 
differed from the first letters of the target responses (color names) in order to avoid phonological 
facilitation (Levelt, 1999; Levelt et al., 1999; Levelt et al., 1991). Each category contained 64 
trials obtained by repeating each high- and low-frequency word and non-word once, and each 
color word 16 times in the congruent and incongruent condition, yielding 320 trials in total.  
At a viewing distance of 70-80 cm, visual angle of the words was ±1.5 degrees; 
luminance of the stimuli was set to 30-35 cd/m2. The words were presented on the screen in red 
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240, 40]. Each of the four colors was used 80 times distributed equally across all stimulus 
categories. The background screen was gray [RGB:100, 100, 100]. 
The task was administered with two different response modalities. In the manual Stroop 
version, each of the four colors was associated with one of four response keys in a fixed way 
across all participants. This association was to be memorized at the beginning of the experiment 
but could be refreshed if needed by looking at the response keys, which were placed on the table 
in front of the participant. The keys were operated with the index and middle fingers of both 
hands. In the vocal Stroop version participants named the print color of the stimuli. To identify 
the spoken response we used the voice recognition plug-in of Presentation® software (Version 
18.0, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, www.neurobs.com), and the dictionary of 
the four color words used was set to a certainty level of 95%. If the software could not recognize 
the spoken word the corresponding trial was classified as missing. Voice onset was used as 
reaction time (RT) in the vocal version. 
At the beginning of a trial a fixation cross was shown for 500 ms; the maximum duration 
of a trial was 2000 ms, after which the trial was considered as an error and the next trial started. 
Performance in the two tasks was measured as follows. For the manual task, RTs were defined as 
interval between stimulus onset and the onset of the button press. Pressing a wrong button or not 
responding before the 2-s deadline, was scored as an error. For the vocal task, the interval 
between stimulus onset and onset of voice detection was calculated as RTs. Wrong answers or 
answers after 2 s were coded as incorrect. In both task versions, trials with errors were excluded 




LOCI OF STROOP EFFECTS 18 
At the beginning of each Stroop task version, 30 to 45 practice trials were conducted, 
providing feedback about response correctness. Each task took approximately 30 min, including 
three equally spaced breaks. 
Hypnosis and Post-Hypnotic Suggestions. The hypnotic state is characterized by three 
distinct properties, concentration, dissociation, and suggestibility (Elkins et al., 2015; Jensen et 
al., 2017; Nash, 2005). In the current study Hypnosis and PHS were similar to our previous study 
(Zahedi et al., 2017). The hypnosis procedure, composed of induction, deepening, suggestions, 
and termination phases (Hammond, 1990, 1998), included PHS (given here in translation) as 
follows:  
" After termination of hypnosis, you will participate one more time in the task, which you 
have done before. After I clap my hands, although you will see the words crisp, sharp and 
brilliant, their meaning will drown or burn, and they will seem to be meaningless nonsense, 
looking like words from a foreign language. Then, you can choose the color in which the words 
have been written as fast as possible. After I clap my hands a second time everything will come 
back to normal, as it was before."   (Zahedi et al., 2017).  
The PHS employed in the current study induces agnosia of the words while participants 
are awake, without requiring any hypnosis-like trance state. It is noteworthy, that in the present 
study, instead of hand clapping, we used a bell ring, providing a more constant sound. 
Accordingly, we instructed participants that they would hear a bell ring, and afterwards, the PHS 
were activated with a bell ringing. Here, hypnosis differed from commonly used procedures in 
two ways. First, suggestions were presented as audio-recording, except when it was absolutely 
necessary for the experimenter to intervene and present further suggestions; these interventions 
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two different versions of the imaginary condition during the hypnosis narration – either a beach 
or a forest scenario – which each participant could select at the beginning of the experiment. 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment consisted of two sessions, counterbalanced in order. One of the sessions 
entailed hypnosis (PH session), during which the PHS were given; the other session was without 
hypnosis (NH session). Within each session, both manual and vocal Stroop tasks were 
administered also in counterbalanced order. During hypnosis participants were seated in a 
reclining chair outside of the electrically shielded and sound-attenuated experimental chamber in 
which the tasks including EEG recordings were performed. 
In the PH session, participants were first prepared for EEG recordings (see below) and 
then went through hypnosis, including PHS. Subsequently, they completed both versions of the 
Stroop task. Finally, a calibration phase recorded examples of eye-movement artifacts to be used 
in offline corrections. The PH session took approximately 3 hours. In the NH session – taking 
about two hours – everything was the same as in the PH session, except that there was no 
hypnosis. For each participant, the order of tasks was the same in both sessions. 
Mean RTs were calculated for each participant and each condition, excluding incorrect 
responses, RTs < 150 and > 2000 ms, and RTs > 3 SDs per condition and participants. Less than 
five percent of the performance data had to be discarded. 
EEG Recording 
EEG was recorded from 60 Ag/AgCl electrodes, mounted in an elastic cap (Easy Cap, 
FMS GmbH, München, Germany), according to the 10-20 international system. The vertical 
electrooculogram was measured from two electrodes attached below each eye and the horizontal 
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the mastoids, served as reference. The recording was conducted with Brainamps DC amplifiers 
(Brain Products GmbH, München, Germany), at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz; no additional filters 
were used during the recordings. Impedances of all electrodes were kept below 5 kΩ. Triggers 
for stimuli and responses were inserted online into the EEG data by synchronization between 
Presentation® software (Version 18.0, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, 
www.neurobs.com) and BrainVision Recorder (Brain Products GmbH, München, Germany). 
Offline, EEG data were recalculated to average reference. Eye movement artifact 
correction was based on the recorded examples of horizontal and vertical eye-movements and 
blinks and calculated in BESA Research 6.0 program. The rectifier matrixes were produced for 
each participant separately and applied to their EEG recordings by linear derivation method. The 
data were band pass filtered with 0.05-40 Hz and inspected for any remaining sections with 
observable artifacts; these sections were excluded from further analyses. Data were segmented, 
averaged and analyzed with EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). During averaging, speech 
artifacts in the vocal Stroop task were corrected by using the RIDE plug-in (Ouyang et al., 2013; 
Ouyang et al., 2016). All segments with other artifacts, and/or incorrect or missing responses 
were eliminated, resulting in a loss of less than 10% of all trials. 
For ERP components N1, N2, and P3, in the averaged signals per condition, were 
calculated after down-sampling to 250 Hz, as average amplitudes during specific time-windows 
(for exact time-windows of each component please see the corresponding section in the results). 
For the N400 component, which is a difference-component, the averaged-reference signals of 
two conditions were subtracted point-by-point, and then averaged to calculate the component as 
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Data Analyses 
For statistical analyses, repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used, 
including the factors task version (vocal vs. manual task version), suggestion (with or without 
hypnosis), and either congruency (congruent, incongruent and average of all neutral conditions), 
or lexicality (letter strings, low- and high-frequency words). For ANOVAs of ERP data the 
additional factor electrode was applied. Whenever sphericity assumptions (tested with Mauchly’s 
sphericity test) was violated, the Huynh-Feldt correction for degrees of freedom was used and 
indicated by the correction factor 𝜀. For posthoc comparisons, we used Bonferroni-corrected 
contrasts unless stated otherwise. 
Results 
Behavioral Performance  
Stroop effects. Table 1 present mean RTs. There were strong Stroop effects (incongruent 
vs. congruent), interference (incongruent vs. neutral), and facilitation (congruent vs. neutral) in 
the NH sessions; these effects were substantially reduced in the presence of PHS. This was 
confirmed by repeated measure ANOVA with factors task version, suggestion, and congruency. 
The main effects of congruency was highly significant, F(2, 30) = 130.7, p < .000, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .89, as 
was its reduction by PHS, F(2, 30) = 37.9, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .71. There was also a main effect of 
suggestion, F(1, 15) = 5.6, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .27, probably due to the massive reduction of RTs for 
incongruent trials in the PHS condition. The Stroop effect was larger in the vocal than in the 
manual task, reflected in the interaction between congruency and task version, F(2, 30) = 10.9, p 
< .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .42. Finally, a three-way interaction between task version, suggestion and 
congruency, F(2, 30) = 3.99, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
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the PHS condition was more pronounced in the vocal task version. Interestingly, the main effect 
of task version was not significant, despite reflecting manual and vocal reaction times. 
 
Table 1 
Mean reaction times as a function of suggestion and congruency in manual and vocal Stroop task 
versions (SDs in parentheses) 

































































NH = no hypnosis; PHS = post-hypnotic suggestions 
 
 
In order to follow up the interactions above, we calculated a repeated measures ANOVA 
just for the Stroop effects, that is, for the difference between congruent and incongruent 
conditions, with two levels of task version and two levels of suggestion. Again, task version, F(1, 
15) = 15.9, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .51, and suggestion, F(1, 15) = 55.9, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .78, yielded main 
effects and interacted, F(1, 15) = 4.5, p = .05, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .23. Elucidating the interaction between 
suggestion and task version with congruency, we analyzed the task version-dependency of the 
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the vocal and manual task versions, both in the NH session, F(1, 15) = 14.3, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .49, as 
well as in the PHS session, F(1, 15) = 9.6, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .32 (Table 2).  
Next, we separately analyzed the components of the Stroop effect, that is, facilitation (the 
difference between congruent and neutral trials) and interference (the difference between 
incongruent and neutral trials). As to be expected interference was affected by task version, F(1, 
15) = 7.4, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .33, suggestion, F(1, 15) = 27.5, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .64, and by the 
interaction of both factors, F(1, 15) = 4.7, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .23. Further, whereas task version 
affected interference in the NH session, F(1, 15) = 8.2, p = .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .35, it dropped to a trend in 
the PHS session, F(1, 15) = 3.6, p = .075, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .19.  
Similar to interference, the facilitation component of the Stroop effect was stronger in the 
vocal than in the manual task version, F(1, 15) = 5.6, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .27, and was diminished by 
PHS, F(1, 15) = 14.3, p < .005, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .48. Importantly, in contrast to interference, facilitation was 
not differentially affected by hypnosis in the two task versions (F < 1). 
 
Table 2 
Mean Stroop effects as a function of Suggestion condition and Congruency in Stroop task and 
difference of Stroop effect as a function of task version (SDs in parentheses). 








NH 106.3 (56) 
60.6 (49) 
70.7 (54) 35.5 (27) 
PHS 45.6 (30) 30.0 (26) 15.5 (25) 
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PHS 88.1 (40) 54.1 (31) 33.9 (38) 
NH = no hypnosis; PHS = post-hypnotic suggestions 
Note 1. Stroop effect: Mean RTs for incongruent minus congruent conditions. 
Note 2. Difference of Stroop effect: Stroop effect of NH minus Stroop effect of PHS. 
 
Finally, we separately tested mean RTs within the incongruent, congruent, and neutral 
trials for a more detailed understanding of the effects reported above. In the NH session mean 
RTs for incongruent trials differed significantly between vocal and manual task versions, F(1, 
15) = 4.3, p = .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .22, but in the PHS session they did not, F(1, 15) = 1.4, p > .1, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .08. 
Mean RTs of congruent and all neutral conditions were not significantly different between 
manual and vocal version (always F < 1). Hence, the observed interactions effects above seemed 
to be strongly driven by the very long RTs in the incongruent condition of the vocal task.  
Lexicality effect. In order to assess whether the access to the lexicon is differentially 
involved in the two Stroop task versions and constitutes a locus of PHS effects we conducted 
repeated-measure ANOVAs for the factors lexicality (letter strings, high- and low-frequency 
words), task version, and suggestion. Although the main effect of lexicality in these neutral 
conditions was significant, F(2, 30) = 3.3, p < .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .17, there were no main effects of task 
version (F < 1), suggestion, F(1, 15) = 1.8, p > .1, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .11, or any interactions. In pairwise post-
hoc comparisons, only the difference between low-frequency neutral words and letter strings was 
a strong trend, F(1, 15) = 4.1, p = .06, 𝜂𝑝
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Error rates. Error rates are presented in Table 3. ANOVA with factors suggestion, task 
version and congruency (incongruent, congruent, sum of neutrals) revealed a main effect of 
congruency, F(2, 30) = 13.7, p < .000, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .47, but neither main effects of suggestion, F(1, 15) 
= 1.7, p > .1, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .10, task version, F < 1, nor any interactions. Finally, we tested the error rates 
in the three neutral conditions (factor lexicality) with the additional factors task version and 
suggestion. Similar to the RT results, lexicality yielded a main effect, F(2, 30) = 7.7, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .34, but no other effects were significant. 
 
Table 3 
Error rates as a function of Suggestion and Congruency in Stroop task (SDs in parentheses) 












NH 3.2 (3.4) 4.2 (2.8) 5.5 (3.5) 6.7 (5.7) 5.9 (3.9) 3.9 (3.1) 
PHS 5.1 (6.0) 6.7 (7.8) 6.6 (5.5) 6.0 (4.7) 5.9 (5.7) 7.8 (8.2) 
Vocal 
NH 2.0 (3.4) 5.3 (4.2) 5.2 (4.6) 8.7 (8.6) 3.9 (4.0) 3.1 (3.2) 
PHS 1.5 (3.4) 7.6 (9.5) 5.9 (6.8) 8.5 (10.3) 4.6 (6.2) 4.6 (5.0) 
NH = no hypnosis; PHS = post-hypnotic suggestions 
 
Event-related Potentials 
In order to functionally localize the Stroop effects, their constituents and modulation by 
PHS, ERP components were analyzed. First, we assessed the N400, which has been frequently 
reported to be modulated by Stroop conditions, as reviewed in the Introduction. Next, we 
analyzed the amplitudes of the preceding N1 and N2 components. The N2 has been related to the 
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by Stroop task conflicts. Based on visual inspection of the ERPs we also analyzed the P300 
component. Finally, in order to check for response-related loci, we evaluated response-locked 
ERPs. As none of the differences between different neutral categories were significant, we 
refrained from treating them as separate categories. 
N1 and N2 components. Based on our hypothesis and observations of hypnosis effects 
in the ERPs, we analyzed the amplitudes of the N1 (first negative peak at Fz electrode around 
120 ms; Fig. 2a) and the N2 (second negative peak in Cz electrode about 250 ms; Fig. 2b). An 
ANOVA of N1 amplitudes for the 120-160 ms time-window at Fz including the factors task 
version, suggestion and congruency (incongruent, congruent, neutral), revealed significantly 
smaller amplitudes in the NH than in the PHS (M = -.14 vs. -.59 µV) session, F(1, 15) = 4.7, p 
< .05 , 𝜂𝑝
2 = .24. The N2 amplitude was calculated as average voltage of the signal between 200-
300 ms at Cz, with the same ANOVA as above. There was a main effect of suggestion with a 
larger amplitude during NH than PHS (M = -1.58 vs. -0.98 µV), F(1, 15) = 5.1, p < .05 , 𝜂𝑝
2 
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Figure 2. Grand average ERPs. (a) Fz electrode, where the N1 component (shaded area) is 
significantly larger in the PHS than NH session; (b) Cz electrode, where the N2 component 
(shaded area) is significantly smaller in the PHS than NH session. 
 
P3 component. Figure 2b shows a conspicuous difference between neutral and both 
congruent and incongruent trials, between about 300 and 400 ms, with a larger parietal positivity 
relative to the neutral condition. We calculated the average voltage of the signal in the 340-440 
ms window at CPz (Fig. 3a), an electrode which represents the center of the posterior P3b 
component (Polich, 2007). With the same ANOVA, as used for the N1 and N2, we found strong 
main effects of task version, F(1, 15) = 14.6, p < .005, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .49, and congruency, F(2, 30) = 
15.4, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .50. Post-hoc contrasts confirmed that the congruency effect stemmed from 
smaller P3 amplitudes in the neutral relative to both congruent, F(1, 15) = 46.3, p < .001 , 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .75, as well as incongruent conditions, F(1, 15) = 14.6, p < .005 , 𝜂𝑝
2 = .49, whereas congruent 
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Figure 3. (a) Grand average ERPs at the CPz electrode; the shaded area marks the P3 
component. Topographies of difference-waves (b) congruent - neutral trials and (c) incongruent - 
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Based on topographies of difference-wave (Fig. 3b), we also used a ROI (P3, P1, Pz, P2, 
P4, CP3, CP1, CPz, CP2 and CP4) and calculated the difference between congruent and neutral 
trials in the 360-440 ms time-window. ANOVA with factors task version, suggestion, and 
electrode revealed main effects of electrode, F(9, 135) = 3.7, p < .005, 𝜀 = .41, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .17, and 
suggestion, F(1, 15) = 4.6, p < .05 , 𝜂𝑝
2  = .23, due to a larger congruency effect (the bigger 
differences between congruent-neutral and incongruent-neutral) under PHS compared to NH. 
N400 component. Previous research found a centrally distributed N400 component 
around 450 ms elicited by incongruent relative to congruent Stroop task conditions (Liotti et al., 
2000). As can be seen in the grand average ERPs in Figure 2.b and 3a, and the difference 
topographies between incongruent and congruent conditions (Fig. 4), similar effects were also 
present around 450 ms in both task modalities. But with deliberations into the same figures (Fig. 
2b, 3a) it is obvious that the previously discussed P3 effect in the neutral condition extends also 
into the 420-500 ms time-window, rendering any results or interpretations of the effects in the 
N400 segment, which includes the neutral condition problematic. Therefore, for the sake of a 
clear interpretation, we omitted the neutral condition for the N400 analyses and also for the 
response-locked ERPs. This observation was verified in average ERP amplitudes between 420 to 
500 ms for a central region of interest (ROI; electrodes FC1, FCz, FC2, C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CPz, 
and CP2), submitted to an ANOVA with repeated measures on factors electrode (9 levels), 
congruency (congruent, incongruent), task version, and suggestion. There were main effects of 
congruency, F(1, 15) = 10.4, p < .01, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .41, and electrode, F(8, 120) = 6.7, p < .005, 𝜀 = .32, 
𝜂𝑝
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= .30. In addition, task version yielded a strong trend, F(1, 15) = 4.5, p = .05, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .23. 
Importantly, the congruency effect was not modulated by task version (F < 1).  
Because the interaction between suggestion and congruency was significant, we analyzed 
the difference-waves between incongruent and congruent trials in the same time window and 
ROI and with the same factors (except for congruency). Results revealed a main effect of 
suggestion (M = -0.15 in NH, vs M = -0.20 in PHS), F(1, 15) = 6.4, p < .05 , 𝜂𝑝
2 = .30, but no 
effect of task version (F < 1). 
 
Figure 4. Left: Grand average ERPs at selected midline electrode (within the N400 time-window 
the differences between congruent and incongruent are highlighted by green shading). Right: 
Topographies of the difference between ERPs to incongruent and congruent conditions within 
the N400 time window of 420-500 ms (µV). 
 
Response-locked ERPs. Finally, we calculated response-locked ERPs in order to check 
for conflicts in late response-related processes (Fig. 5). Mean amplitudes during the -200 to -50 
ms pre-response interval were submitted to ANOVA with factors suggestion, task version, 
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and 10 electrodes in a posterior ROI (P5, P3, P1, Pz, P2, 
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= .35, which interacted with task version, F(1, 15) = 6.7, p < .05 ,  = .31, and with both 
suggestion and congruency, F(9, 135) = 2.6, p < .05 ,  .75,  = .15. As can be seen in Figure 
5a and 5b, the difference between congruent and incongruent trials is bigger for the vocal than 
for the manual task (M = -.28 vs. -.10 μV). When we separately checked the different task 
versions, the congruency effect failed significance in the manual task, F(1, 15) = 2.4, p > .1 ,  
= .13, but was highly significant in the vocal task, F(1, 15) = 11.3, p < .01 ,  = .43. 
In addition to a posterior focus, the left inferior frontal region in the vocal condition 
showed a congruency effect (Fig. 5b, bottom). ANOVA of mean amplitudes at electrodes F7, 
FT9, and T7 during a -220 to -120 pre-response time-window showed an interaction between 
task version and congruency, F(1, 15) = 6.8, p < .05 ,  = .31. Separate post-hoc analyses at 
each task version revealed a main effect of congruency in the vocal task, F(1, 15) = 5.3, p < .05 , 
 = .26, but not in the manual task, F(1, 15) = 1.6, p > .1 ,  = .09. Furthermore, in the vocal 
task, the interaction between congruency and suggestion was a strong trend, F(1, 15) = 4.2, p 
= .05 ,  = .21. 
 
Figure 5. (a) Grand average response-locked ERPs over all electrodes in posterior ROI (the 
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topographies, are highlighted by green shading). (b) Topographies of difference-waves 
(incongruent minus congruent trials) for the -200 to -50 ms pre-response time-window. 
Discussion 
The main goal of the current study was to understand the nature of conflicts in two 
different, often-used versions of the Stroop task, the classic color naming task and the manual 
version, pressing buttons assigned to the print colors. We approached these aims by (1) 
manipulating the lexicality of the neutral trials, (2) impairing the processes of word reading by 
means of post-hypnotic suggestions (PHS), and (3) recording event-related potentials.  
Comparing manual and vocal Stroop task versions 
Not only the Stroop effect as a whole, but also its interference and facilitation 
components were appreciably and significantly bigger - almost double in size - in the vocal than 
in the manual Stroop task. This is in line with previous studies applying these versions of the 
Stroop task (Liotti et al., 2000; Redding & Gerjets, 1977). Also, in line with previous findings 
(e.g. Raz et al., 2006; Raz & Shapiro, 2002; Zahedi et al., 2017) PHS strongly diminished the 
Stroop effects in both task versions. 
In order to explain the differential Stroop effects in the two task modalities, we may rule 
out - for a start - a locus at the lexical level, during reading. The lexicality variable employed for 
the neutral trials – albeit significant as a main effect – was comparable for the manual and vocal 
Stroop tasks (for similar findings in PWI suggesting that word frequency influences non-lexical 
stages, see Hutson et al., 2013). Therefore, there is no evidence for different loci of reading-
related effects in the vocal and manual Stroop versions at the lexical level – in other words, the 
big difference in the Stroop effect between both task versions is unlikely to be due to differences 
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affected by PHS, which strongly attenuated both Stroop effects, indicating that the PHS effect 
does not originate from any lexical or pre-lexical source.  
The absence of a differential lexicality effect for the two task versions is opposite to our 
hypothesis, that a major contributor to the differences between task versions would be lexicality 
effects. It should be noted that the (significant) nominal effect of lexicality was between 8 and 13 
ms and, hence, does not seem to substantially contribute to the sizeable differences in the 
congruency effects of different task versions or PHS. In the section “Comparing Stroop and 
Picture Word Interference Tasks” we will further discuss why some other task formats, for 
example, PWI might yield larger lexicality effects; thus, the non-significant trend between 
strings of letters and low-frequency words that emerged in our results, might be stronger in the 
PWI than in the verbal Stroop task. 
In order to explain the larger Stroop effect in the vocal as compared to the manual task 
version at least two suggestions can be made on the basis of the heuristic model presented in 
Figure 1. First, the semantic interaction in the vocal Stroop version may be more elaborated in 
both qualitative and quantitative terms than in the manual version. However, analysis of the 
N400 reflecting semantic effects did not reveal a clear dominance of the vocal over the manual 
version apart from a trend for a main effect of task version. Alternatively, the larger Stroop effect 
in the vocal version may be due to additional loci of interference and conflict between the two 
sources of information, that is, color processing and word recognition. In line with this idea, the 
response-locked ERPs revealed a discrepancy between the two task versions, indicating towards 
response-related conflicts in the vocal but not in the manual version. These additional loci of 
interference can be localized either in post-semantic layers, including the lexical and word form 
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Interestingly, the left inferior-frontal and parietal scalp regions at which these conflicts 
were present (Fig. 5b bottom) include Broca’s and Wernicke's areas, that have been related to 
phonological retrieval and syllabification (Indefrey, 2011). Intriguingly, the conflict component 
with parietal ERP distribution did not reveal any modulation by post-hypnotic suggestions, 
whereas the conflict with left inferior-frontal manifestation showed a strong trend towards a 
mitigation by hypnosis. This might indicate that PHS reduce conflicts in the language production 
layer in the vocal Stroop task version. Hence, these results are in line with the idea that as 
compared to the manual task there is at least one additional locus of conflict in the vocal task 
during word production, enhancing the Stroop effect.  
Post-hypnotic suggestions aiming at “agnosia” (words losing their meaning) decreased 
the interference component in RTs by about 60 ms in the vocal and by 40 ms in the manual 
version; in contrast, the facilitation component was reduced to a similar extent in both task 
versions (24 vs. 20 ms). Hence, PHS modulated the interference and facilitation effects 
differently in the two task versions. These results allow a more specific interpretation of the 
differential loci.  
The heuristic model in Figure 1 suggests a common locus of interaction between the 
information derived from print color and word meaning at the semantic representation layer for 
both task versions, where both facilitation and interference should occur. For the vocal task the 
model also suggests a locus of interaction at the response production layer (articulatory buffer), 
which consists of interference between competing responses but does not involve facilitation, as 
the buffer must be cleared out from the occupying word before the next word can enter. The 
model suggests also a response-related locus of the interaction in the manual task, which should 




LOCI OF STROOP EFFECTS 36 
word meaning. Importantly, the response-related interactions should differ between vocal and 
manual Stroop versions.  
We argue that besides the shared loci (see discussion below) there are also differential 
loci involved in vocal and manual task versions because (1) PHS diminish the interference 
component in RT more strongly in the vocal than in the manual task. This is in line with the idea 
that “agnosia” for word meaning will reduce conflicts not only at the semantic but also on the 
articulatory level. (2) In response-locked ERPs we found a significant Stroop effect only for the 
vocal condition, which in turn was diminished by post-hypnotic suggestions. Hence the results 
support a locus of interference that is specific for the vocal task version and resides at the 
response level (Mahon et al., 2007). In contrast to these findings, when manual tasks involve 
lexical access (e.g., attributes of the names are classified manually), semantic interference effects 
have been reported that are indistinguishable from those observed in tasks that include overt 
speech production, suggesting similar lexico-semantic loci that do not depend on the 
involvement of an articulatory stage (Abdel Rahman & Aristei, 2012).  
However, at least one of our findings requires a further clarification or modification of 
the suggested models. The facilitation component in RTs is much stronger in the vocal than in 
the manual task. Based on our previous interpretation that greater interference in the vocal 
Stroop version is due to an additional locus of interference in the articulatory layer, the 
interaction between two pathways in this layer cannot be facilitatory, because the output buffer is 
a single channel and can only accept one response as final output: in short, we cannot articulate 
two words at the same time. Therefore, based on the proposed model, the facilitation should be 
caused by something else than additional loci of interference. One may argue that the greater 
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the N400 is not different between tasks. If anything, it tends to be a bit weaker in the vocal 
version, arguing for similar semantic conflicts in both tasks. There are at least two accounts for 
these findings: (1) the semantic conflict in the vocal version might be larger than in the manual 
version and we should discard the N400 effects, for example, because of their somewhat non-
standard scalp distribution. This would beg the question what the N400 effects would signify. (2) 
The stronger facilitation in the vocal task might be due to an additional conflict in one of the 
shared loci of interaction between two tasks, but with a different time-course from what we 
expect from N400. Assuming that lexical and word form layers will be activated first during 
reading, and then additionally during word production, there will be repeated or cumulative 
activation in these layers, which may result in additional semantic-lexical and/or word form 
effects during word production. Consequently, we suggest that backpropagation of activation 
from the semantic to the lexical or from the lexical to the word form layer may cause this greater 
facilitation (and, where applicable, additional interference as well), rather than forward 
propagation from the letter perception to the lexical layer or from the lexical to the semantic 
layer. These effects would follow the first pass processing and might, therefore, be too late to 
affect the N400 component. It is conceivable that the parietal components in the response-
synchronized ERP for the vocal task reflects this renewed congruency effect due to the 
backpropagations. This late (parietal) congruency effect was not affected by PHS, which may 
suggest that as processing had moved on to the next layer these interferences and facilitation 
could not be reduced with employing additional executive resources. 
Additionally, one may assert that the stronger effects in the vocal Stroop version are due 
to a longer word production segment as compared to the manual version. However, the fact that 
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trials in the manual task, is not in line with this hypothesis, and indicates that in both versions 
default RTs in response to neutral categories are comparable. 
Taken together, we argue that the differences in the Stroop effects in the vocal and 
manual versions are not related to the differential employment of lexical or pre-lexical levels 
during word reading. We suggest that at a semantic level first pass congruency effects are similar. 
The stronger behavioral Stroop effect in the vocal version seems to be due to two specific 
sources: (1) additional interference in the articulatory layer and (2) stronger lexical and post-
lexical activation during language production. In addition, back propagation from lexical and 
post-lexical layers activated during word production to the semantic layer might cause further 
semantic interference. Also, the idea that Stroop effects in both the manual and the vocal version 
involve semantic-lexical interference conforms with a recent computational model by 
Kalanthroff et al. (2018). 
Effects of Post-Hypnotic Suggestions 
In the analysis discussed above, PHS have shown to be a useful tool to interpret the 
differences between the vocal and manual Stroop effect. However, the present study also offers 
the chance to elucidate the locus of PHS of “agnosia” on Stroop interference. To this aim, let’s 
first consider the lexicality effect in the neutral trials. Although the Stroop effect was diminished 
strongly in the presence of the post-hypnotic suggestion that words “had lost their meaning”, the 
lexicality effects in RTs did not significantly change. Although the lexicality effect was small, it 
was numerically somewhat bigger after PHS. Hence, the absence of a significant PHS effect is 
not due to insufficient power. This is an indication that the present PHS do not affect lexical or 
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With respect to ERPs and PHS three points shall be discussed. First, in presence of PHS 
there was a condition-general increase in an early frontally distributed N1 component, followed 
by a general reduction in the N2 component with a central-posterior maximum. These findings 
are in line with our previous report on changes in increased theta power in EEG induced by PHS 
(Zahedi et al., 2017) indicating that cognitive control is proactively recruited in all trial types to a 
similar extent. According to the increased N1 amplitude, initial deployment of cognitive control 
acts very fast and may have decreases the load on later processes, for example, as reflected in the 
N2 component, often seen as related to performance monitoring and conflict control. 
Intriguingly, our results are comparable to those of Coderre and van Heuven (2014), who 
explored differences between bilingual and monolingual participants in regard to Stroop 
performance, and found similar differences in similar time window as in our analysis. Coderre et 
al. (2011) suggested that enhanced executive functions in bilingual participants allow better 
inhibition of irrelevant word meaning. Recently, Lehtonen et al. (2018) argued that the 
differences between bilingual and monolingual participants in cognitive tasks involving language 
production pathways may be due to differential language exposure rather than advantages in 
cognitive control. Therefore, the resemblance between our results and effects of bilingualism 
may also indicate a decrease in the prepotency of reading habits due to PHS. Further, Scharinger 
et al. (2017) found a modulation of the N1 by congruency in the Stroop task in older but not 
younger participants; importantly, performance quality was positively related with bigger N1 
amplitudes. 
Second, we investigated differences in P3 amplitudes. It is important to consider that the 
P3 was the earliest component showing congruency effects, but only as a difference between 
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interference or facilitation. As the P3 effects in the present data concern a P3b-like component 
with parietal topography, they may reflect the allocation of motivated attention (Polich, 2007; 
van Dinteren et al., 2014). From this perspective, the recruitment of executive functions helps to 
steer cognitive and attentional resources more diligently and meticulously in response to both 
congruent and incongruent trials (i.e. color words), where the possibility of interaction is greater. 
Coherently, we have found a bigger difference between neutral and congruent trials in presence 
of PHS, indicating that the PHS enhance executive functions, and as a consequence improve 
performance.  
Third, in the absence of PHS, we found an N400 effect between incongruent and 
congruent conditions, similar as in previous studies both with respect to topographies, amplitude 
and latency (Hanslmayr et al., 2008; Ilan & Polich, 1999; Liotti et al., 2000; West & Alain, 
1999). However, after PHS, the N400 effect was attenuated. Given the fact that this component is 
related to semantic-processing, this was expected and shows that semantic word processing is 
diminished by PHS. 
To summarize, ERP findings related to PHS suggest an early recruitment of cognitive 
control, in all conditions (as the increase in N1 suggests), resulting in the reduced necessity for 
conflict detection (as the decrease in N2 indicates). Further, enhanced attentional allocation to 
both congruent and incongruent color words but not to neutral non-color words reflected in the 
P3 is followed by a smaller N400 effects of compatibility, an interference-related component. 
Therefore, PHS act on a cascade of processes all directed on enhancing cognitive control and 
diminishing interference.  
In regards to our interpretation of N1 and N2, we suggest that PHS enhanced proactive 
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conflict. Actually, proactive control is recruited in situations where there might be conflict, 
whether or not a given trial actually does involve any conflict (Belanger et al., 2010; Braver, 
2012; Braver & West, 2008). This allocation of control was supposedly reflected in bigger N1 
amplitudes but smaller N2, regardless of congruency. Therefore, the recruitment of more 
proactive control in advance of the trial helps to deal with conflicts, in case that they arise. 
However, handling of the actual conflict is reflected only in later components and not in these 
earlier components. If PHS had indeed affected reactive control instead, where the nature of the 
trial determines the amount of invested control, we should have observed an interaction of 
congruency and PHS, which was not the case.  
However, one might ask about the bigger congruency effects in P3 component under 
influence of PHS versus no-hypnosis? It is remarkable that in the P3 component as well, the 
congruent and incongruent trials did not differ, and the preexisting difference between neutral 
and congruent-incongruent categories were amplified under effects of PHS versus NH condition. 
Consequently, still the recruited additional cognitive control under PHS, in our interpretation, is 
closer to proactive rather than reactive control. 
Comparing Stroop and Picture Word Interference Tasks 
The Stroop task and Stroop-like tasks such as PWI can be viewed as variants of the same 
or at least strongly related tasks (MacLeod, 1991; Starreveld & La Heij, 2017; van Maanen et al., 
2009). Overall, Stroop effects were bigger in the vocal compared to the manual task. However, 
there was no difference in the lexicality effect between the two versions. It has to be considered, 
however, that the frequency and lexicality effects observed in our study were small as compared 
to what usually has been observed in PWI (Dhooge & Hartsuiker, 2010, 2011; Geng et al., 2013; 
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information (objects or colors) and simultaneously presented words are shown; while the word is 
to be ignored, a response to the visual information is to be given. One of the differences between 
the Stroop and PWI tasks relates to the comparisons between congruent, incongruent and neutral 
conditions, another, presumably more crucial, difference relates to the number of different 
stimuli and categories used. In the classic Stroop task, only a few color words are repeatedly 
presented, whereas in the PWI task many different objects from different categories are 
presented, and may be presented only once. When these differences are minimized, both tasks 
are associated with similar effects, suggesting shared or overlapping mechanisms (e.g. Shitova et 
al., 2016). The study by Geng et al. (2013) shows that the inherent differences between Stroop 
and PWI tasks affect the speed of processing the targets. This, in turn, has an impact on word 
frequency effects. Geng et al. (2013) suggested that the faster processing of targets in Stroop task 
renders the distractor words ineffective, as they are processed only after the targets. 
Revisiting the Stroop Model 
In accordance to the model, we found first, stronger effects in RT performance – almost 
double in size in vocal task in comparison to the manual task – revealing at least a quantitative 
difference between task versions. Second, the difference between incongruent and congruent 
trials in response-locked ERPs was significant in the vocal, but not in manual task, and these 
differences were recorded over Broca's and Wernicke's area, relating to language production and 
word form retrieval. Finally, the fact that Stroop effects and their interference components, but 
not their facilitation components, were differently reduced in the vocal version by PHS, further 
corroborate to existence of different loci of interaction in two task modalities. 
One may argue that the effects were exclusively due to the interaction between two paths 
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the effects were present in the manual version, too, and highly similar to the vocal task. In that 
sense, we argue, this theory in itself cannot predict or explain these similarities (because, 
although the response production segments are different between two tasks, but there are 
appreciable similarities between their effects in regard to N1, N2, P3 and N400).  
Limitations and Perspectives 
It is important to consider that in the present experiment the Stroop effects after the PHS 
were reduced only moderately as compared to our own previous study (Zahedi et al., 2017), and 
some others (Raz et al., 2005; Raz et al., 2003; Raz & Shapiro, 2002). Raz et al. (2007) tested a 
larger participant sample than the previously mentioned studies (e.g. Raz et al., 2005; Raz et al., 
2003; Raz & Shapiro, 2002; Zahedi et al., 2017) and showed a similarly moderate reduction of 
the Stroop effect as in the present study. Further, it has to be considered that we used a longer-
version of the Stroop task with 640 trials, which lasted about an hour to be administrated 
completely. Zahedi et al. (2017) ascribed the effects of post-hypnotic suggestions to be based on 
executive functions. Following this argument, the moderate reduction of the Stroop effect in the 
present study can be attributed to lassitude and fatigue, that is, PHS may wear down over a 
longer period of time. This idea, however, needs further study. 
Also it is noticeable, the induction of hypnosis in the PHS session increased the duration 
of the latter as compared to the no-hypnosis session by one hour. However, based on our 
previous study (Zahedi, Stuermer, Hatami, Rostami, & Sommer, 2017), where the effect of 
hypnosis alone and hypnosis plus PHS were compared with a no-hypnosis condition, we do not 
think that this delay has affected the results to a great extent because in that study we did not find 
any difference between hypnosis alone and no-hypnosis in regards to EEG oscillations nor 
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Despite some theoretically important differences both stimulus- and response-locked 
ERPs recorded in the manual and vocal Stroop task versions were surprisingly similar in terms of 
waveforms, topographies and statistical analyses. We consider this result as a further validation 
of the applied articulation artifact rejection method (Ouyang et al., 2016). This is encouraging for 
applying RIDE in further studies with overt articulation. 
We would like to point out that we did not include strings of letters in our neutral 
categories (e.g. LLLL or XXXX), but instead used pseudo-words (scrambled words). The reasons 
were two-fold. First, because in our experiment, we wanted to focus on the interactions of the 
word reading pathway with the color perception pathway, and to assess the effects of PHSs on 
these pathways, we preferred pseudo-words over strings of letters or color patches. And second, 
based on a debate in the literature about the importance of integrating two pathways involved in 
Stroop tasks, for example, color perception and word reading (for review see MacLeod, 1991), 
strings of letters would not constitute an appropriate neutral baseline for comparing different task 
versions. Neither letter strings nor color patches would involve the word processing pathway as 
words or pseudo-words do and, because of their distinctiveness from words and pseudo-words, 
they would be unlikely to enter the word processing pathway. Consequently, also any conflicts 
between strings of letters and congruent trials, “task conflicts” as termed by some authors 
(Goldfarb & Henik, 2007; Kalanthroff et al., 2018), were not addressed in our study. 
It is noteworthy, that in the current study, 192 of the 320 trials in total (i.e., 60%), were 
neutral. This scarcity of target words might have increased the congruency effect, relative to a 
more common situation with a higher proportion of target words (Tzelgov et al., 1992). In our 
previous study (Zahedi et al., 2017), in a manual Stroop task, with 33 % neutral trials, we found 
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These smaller effects in comparison to the 70 ms interference in the manual version of the 
present study, can be interpreted as a trend in the predicted direction. However, let us point out, 
that effects are comparable in size and if anything, more pronounced in the present study. Most 
importantly, we do not see any reason, why the higher proportion of neutral trials in both task 
versions should have affected their specific mechanisms.  
Finally, in the analysis of the N400 component, we were not able to include the neutral 
categories, mainly due to the big residual of the P3 component overlapping with the N400 (see 
Figs. 2b and 3a). This differential overlap of the late positivity in the time-window of the N400 
component, i.e. 420 to 500 ms, renders any interpretation of the difference of the neutral and the 
target conditions highly ambiguous. However, the N400 component, that is the difference on 
congruent versus incongruent conditions (e.g. Hirschfeld et al., 2008; Liotti et al., 2000), remains 
interpretable because these conditions maximize effects of semantic/lexical processing, 
unconfounded by stimulus probability. 
Conclusions 
The present study focused on cognitive control, a set of multi-purpose functions invoked 
when prepotent behavior is insufficient to handle a situation. Cognitive control is directly or 
indirectly relevant for many areas of experimental psychology, for example, memory, especially 
short-term memory, executive functions, self- regulation (such as food intake or impulsivity 
control) and its development, and decision making. Here we employed the Stroop task as a 
frequently used experimental paradigm challenging the inhibition function. Most importantly, we 
addressed the long-standing question how the classic vocal version of the Stroop task, requiring 
color naming, and its manual version, requiring pressing color-labeled buttons, differ in terms of 
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post-hypnotic suggestions aiming at the likely source of interference, that is word reading. 
Hypnosis, which has gained scientific momentum in recent years, strongly diminished the Stroop 
effect in both task versions to a similar degree. Our second tool was the analysis of specific ERP 
components that allow time-resolved insights into the cognitive sub-processes employed in a 
task. Hitherto, the investigation of ERPs in the vocal Stroop task has been hampered by the 
massive articulation artifact occluding the late ERP components. Here we employed a new 
technique for ERP analysis that allows eliminating these artifacts to uncover both common and 
specific loci of interference in the two Stroop task versions. The ERP technique revealed that the 
control over the Stroop interference by PHS is largely proactive by allocating relevant resources 
as early as 100 ms after stimulus presentation.  
Together, our behavioral and ERPs findings indicate that the manual and vocal Stroop 
task versions share a common locus of interaction during semantic activation. However, for the 
vocal task, a further locus of interaction close to articulation exists, which is absent in the manual 
version. Our findings revealed a post-lexical locus of the effects of post-hypnotic suggestions 
that can be attributed to a cascade of enhanced proactive control processes. 
The present study has therefore contributed to specific questions about the Stroop effect 
that are of interest for the study of executive control in general and also language research. 
Moreover, the present study may serve as an example of how the combination of PHS and the 
employment of advanced methods in ERP analysis may aid in resolving open questions of 
cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics.  
Context of the Research 
This study as a part of the doctoral thesis of Anoushiravan Zahedi, the first author of the 
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instructions”, conducted at the University of Tehran under the supervision of Javad Hatami and 
Werner Sommer (Zahedi et al., 2017). In the present study, conducted in Berlin, we further 
scrutinized the nature of PHS on two classic versions of the Stroop task, manual and vocal. To 
this aim, we collaborated with Rasha Abdel Rahman, who has long-standing experience in the 
study of language production with ERPs, which in many ways overlaps with the vocal Stroop 
task. Birgit Stürmer joined the team to bring in her vast knowledge about ERP research on 
cognitive control. Together we aimed at investigating how inhibition processes of cognitive 
control are involved in different Stroop task versions. This was greatly facilitated by a recent 
methodological development in eliminating articulation artifacts in the ERP in which both 
Werner Sommer and Rasha Abdel Rahman had been involved. This new method allowed – for 
the first time – to directly compare the mechanisms underlying the Stroop conflicts in the two 
task versions (reflected in long-latency ERP components) and their modulation by PHS. Ongoing 
studies aim to extend the application of PHS to other executive functions in order to address the 
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A B S T R A C T
The preference for high-over low-calorie food and difficulties in inhibiting the desire for high-calorie food are
important factors involved in unhealthy food choices. Here, we explored posthypnotic suggestions (PHS), aiming
to increase the desire for vegetables and fruits, as a possible new tool to induce a preference for low-calorie food.
Following the termination of hypnosis, PHS was activated and deactivated in counterbalanced order, while
event-related brain-potentials were recorded. Two tasks were administered, a food-face classification measuring
implicit food preferences, where stimuli were categorized as showing food items or faces, and a Go-NoGo task
measuring inhibition, where food items were selected as being appropriate for making a salad or not. In the food-
face classification task without PHS, the early visual P1 component, a marker of stimulus reward-associations,
was larger in response to high-than low-calorie food pictures; PHS eliminated this difference. PHS also yielded
faster RTs and larger amplitudes of a late positive component in low-versus high-calorie items. Hence, PHS
appeared to neutralize the positive perceptual bias toward high-calorie food items and enhance the effective
processing of low-calorie items by increasing motivated attention. In the Go-NoGo task, PHS decreased the
NoGo-N2; PHS increased the early Go- and NoGo-P3, possibly by turning low- and high-calorie items more
pleasant and unpleasant, respectively, requiring more proactive control to inhibit task-irrelevant food-related
emotions. Further, in the Go condition, PHS quickened the rejection of salad-inappropriate high-calorie items
and increased the amplitude of late-P3, indicating facilitated classification of high-calorie items and increased
response monitoring. Together, PHS effectively increased the preference for low-calorie food and the inhibition
of impulses toward high-calorie food; therefore, PHS may be a promising tool for supporting healthy and sus-
tainable food choices.
1. Introduction
Unhealthy food preferences and food choices contribute to the
global burden of disease and environmental sustainability (Clark,
Springmann, Hill, & Tilman, 2019; Forouzanfar et al., 2015; Haddad
et al., 2016). For example, the number of obese and overweight in-
dividuals with a body mass index (BMI) > 25 has grown steadily in
most countries (Rodgers, Woodward, Swinburn, & Dietz, 2018). Tra-
ditional measures have fallen short of stopping the obesity epidemic
(OECD, 2017) and have yet to show their effectiveness to change diets
towards healthier and more environmentally friendly patterns as sug-
gested by the Lancet commission (Willett et al., 2019). Therefore, novel
tools are needed to help individuals to shift their food preferences to-
wards healthier choices and resist temptations by unhealthy options.
The present study explores posthypnotic suggestions (PHS) as a possible
way to modify food preferences. Of the plethora of factors determining
food consumption (e.g., Stok et al., 2017), we targeted two psycholo-
gical variables, food preferences and the inhibition function (Guerrieri,
Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2008; Nederkoorn, Guerrieri, Havermans, Roefs,
& Jansen, 2009; Nederkoorn, Houben, Hofmann, Roefs, & Jansen,
2010.)
Preferences for fatty, sweet, or salty food, are central in determining
the health outcomes of diets (e.g., Clark et al., 2019) and the global
burden of disease (Haddad et al., 2016). For example, obese individuals
tend to consume more high-calorie food, rich in sugar and fat in com-
parison to individuals with normal weight (Ebbeling et al., 2004;
Schrauwen & Westerterp, 2000; Seidell, 1998). Food preferences are
already influenced in utero and during breastfeeding by the mother's
diet (Maier-Noth, 2019; Wilson, 2015) but are subject to alteration or
entrenchment throughout life (Emond et al., 2019).
Unhealthy preferences are reinforced by the ubiquitous availability
of these kinds of food in modern affluent societies. For some individuals
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2020.104713
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overcoming the negative influences of unhealthy food preferences is
more difficult than for others. Thus, food consumption is related to the
inhibition (Dohle, Diel, & Hofmann, 2018), the executive function (EF)
responsible for the suppression of prepotent but inappropriate re-
sponses (Diamond, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000). Corroborating this no-
tion, Nederkoorn et al. (2009) observed that implicit preferences for
high-calorie food are most detrimental in individuals with low inhibi-
tion abilities. In a meta-analysis Yang, Shields, Guo, and Liu (2018)
reported significant deficits in inhibition and EFs in over-weight and
obese individuals. Blocking EFs with transcranial magnetic stimulation
of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) increased consumption
of snack food (Lowe, Hall, & Staines, 2014). In adolescents, poor EFs are
a predictor of obesity (Tee, Gan, Tan, & Chin, 2018). Finally, in-
dividuals with higher BMI showed less efficient EFs (e.g., Prickett,
Brennan, & Stolwyk, 2015; Smith, Hay, Campbell, & Trollor, 2011),
especially in terms of inhibition (Bartholdy et al., 2017). Therefore, in
addition to food preferences, inhibition of reflexive but inappropriate
desires appears to be an important factor in food choice.
In the present study, we assessed the effects of PHS, tailored to in-
crease the preference for healthy food and – by implied contrast – in-
hibit impulses toward high-calorie food. That means, even though we
did not expect participants to reject or devalue high-calorie food items
as our PHS targeted low-calorie food (fruits, vegetables), it seemed
conceivable that participants inhibited their desire for high-calorie
items. To understand the mechanisms of PHSs one should consider that
hypnosis is a state of consciousness with three central properties, con-
centration on oneself, dissociation from the surroundings and increased
suggestibility (Green, Barabasz, Barrett, & Montgomery, 2005). PHSs
are presented during the hypnotic state but will be activated only after
the termination of hypnosis by a specific cue such as an associated hand
gesture. Multiple studies have shown that, rather than abandoning self-
control, hypnosis directs and implements more effectively one's cogni-
tive control repertoire (e.g., Iani, Ricci, Gherri, & Rubichi, 2006; Raz
et al., 2003; Raz, Fan, & Posner, 2005; Sheehan, Donovan, & MacLeod,
1988; Zahedi, Stuermer, Abdel Rahman, & Sommer, 2019; Zahedi,
Stuermer, Hatami, Rostami, & Sommer, 2017), and may work like a
very efficient form of mental practice (Zahedi et al. in prep). In cog-
nitive behavior therapy hypnosis is frequently used to change cognitive
biases and preferences towards particular types of stimuli or mental
contents (Hertel & Mathews, 2011; Kihlstrom, 2014; Kirsch,
Montgomery, & Sapirstein, 1995; Milburn, 2010). Also, it is shown that
hypnosis can affect perception; for instance, visual perception (Schmidt,
Hecht, Naumann, & Miltner, 2017) and pain perception (Perri, Rossani,
& Di Russo, 2019) have been modified successfully with hypnosis; in-
terestingly, in both studies, the changes in perception were related to
changes in brain activities, such as the P3 component. Although, to our
knowledge, no previous study has applied PHSs to food preferences, in
children they can be modified already by simple stories presented
outside of any hypnotic context (Duncker, 1938) and also by food ad-
vertisements (Emond et al., 2019). It is important to consider that
hypnotic-like experiences are defined as conditions where someone is
concentrated on a special object and dissociated from other objects,
such as in reading an engaging book or watching TV (Shor & Orne,
1962). In this sense, advertisements might be even more similar to
hypnosis as they may provoke not only concentration and dissociation
but also aim to induce increased suggestibility. Further, in an inter-
esting study, Ludwig et al. (2014) used PHSs to induce disgust toward
pictures containing different food categories, when they were super-
imposed on a background with a specific color, such as green or red.
Notably, their PHS was not directed toward the food stimuli themselves
but to the background color. The changes in the perception were cor-
related with decreased activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC), possibly showing that PHSs caused participants to devalue
objects suggested to be disgusting. Therefore, we expected PHSs to be
capable of changing food preferences.
In order to assess the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the
changes obtained by PHSs, we measured event-related brain potentials
(ERPs) derived from the EEG elicited by pictures of food. ERPs are a
valuable addition to behavioral measures because they provide insight
into the cognitive processes mediating between stimuli and responses.
Especially as it has been shown that different ERP component, such as
P1, N1, P3, and late positivity complex (Allen, Iacono, Laravuso, &
Dunn, 1995; Terhune, Cardena, & Lindgren, 2010; Zahedi et al., 2019)
were modulated by PHSs in different tasks. Of special interest for the
present study was the effect of different categories of depicted food on
certain ERP components. The first components of interest were the
early visual components P1 and N1, likely generated in extrastriata and
inferotemporal cortex, respectively (e.g., Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes,
2010; Meule, Kubler, & Blechert, 2013; Toepel, Knebel, Hudry, le
Coutre, & Murray, 2009). P1 amplitude has been reported to be larger
to reward-associated in comparison to neutral or punishment-asso-
ciated stimuli (Hickey et al., 2010; Schacht, Adler, Chen, Guo, &
Sommer, 2012), and was positively correlated with craving for the
presented stimuli in smokers (Donohue et al., 2016). Pictures of high-
calorie/high-fat food has been reported to elicit a smaller N1 compo-
nent (150–200 ms) than their counterparts in the studies of Meule et al.
(2013) and Toepel et al. (2009).
Another component of interest is the late parietal positivity (LPP)
which increases to affective relative to neutral stimuli, and is attributed
to motivated attention directed at these items (Schupp, Flaisch,
Stockburger, & Junghofer, 2006). LPPs to pictures of food have been
reported to be larger than to non-food items, to increase as function of
hunger (Nijs, Franken, & Muris, 2008; Nijs, Muris, Euser, & Franken,
2010; Stockburger, Schmalzle, Flaisch, Bublatzky, & Schupp, 2009;
Stockburger, Weike, Hamm, & Schupp, 2008), of immediate or delayed
consumption (Meule et al., 2013), and whether the depicted food was
edible or rotten (Becker, Flaisch, Renner, & Schupp, 2016). Therefore,
early and late ERP components appear to be suitable measures of the
immediate significance (early components) of food or motivated at-
tention directed at them (LPP).
Some food-related ERP studies tapped into self-regulation or EFs.
Thinking about short- or long-term consequences of high- or low-calorie
food pictures yielded a positive correlation between emotional eating
and the LPP (Meule et al., 2013). Deliberately increasing or decreasing
appetite for high-calorie food pictures affected long-latency but not
earlier ERP components (Sarlo, Ubel, Leutgeb, & Schienle, 2013). Fur-
ther, in Go-NoGo tasks, the amplitude of the N2 component to NoGo
stimuli – taken as a sign of conflict (Enriquez-Geppert, Konrad, Pantev,
& Huster, 2010; Liu, Xiao, & Shi, 2017) - was larger when food rather
than non-food items served as NoGo stimuli (Watson & Garvey, 2013)
and the N2 amplitude predicted the amount of food consumed after the
experiment (Carbine et al., 2017).
For assessing food preferences and EFs, we utilized a face-food
classification and a Go-NoGo task, respectively. In the former task,
pictures of different food items were presented intermixed with pictures
of faces, while participants should classify these two picture categories
by choice-response button presses. This calorie-unrelated task of ex-
plicitly classifying stimuli into food or face categories (Fig. S.4 in sup-
plementary materials), aimed to distract participants from developing
hypotheses regarding the experimenters’ intentions and to measure
implicit changes in food preference induced by the PHS. As the specific
properties of food pictures, such as calorie content or tastiness of the
depicted food items, are irrelevant for accomplishing this task, it can be
considered to tap into implicit food preferences. As our PHS aimed to
render low-calorie items more desirable and attractive, we expected
faster responses to the low-calorie items during the PHS-active than in
the PHS-inactive condition; no response-related PHS effects were an-
ticipated for high-calorie food items. In the ERPs of the food-face
classification task, we expected PHSs-related modulations of P1 and
LPP components, indicating alterations in reward-associations and
motivated attention, especially to low-calorie items, respectively.
In the Go-NoGo task, participants were instructed to press a button




in response to frequent high-calorie food items (Go responses) and
withhold their response to infrequent low-calorie items (NoGo condi-
tion). NoGo trials are considered to challenge the inhibition function (Jr
& Pennington, 1996; Miyake et al., 2000; Roberts; Weisbrod, Kiefer,
Marzinzik, & Spitzer, 2000), because during them a frequent and
therefore prepotent response shall be withheld. The NoGo-P3 compo-
nent has been consistently related to inhibition, but the NoGo-N2 was
related to different factors, such as response inhibition, conflict mon-
itoring, or emotion regulation (e.g., Albert, Lopez-Martin, & Carretie,
2010; Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010; Gajewski & Falkenstein, 2013; Liu
et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2014; Zhao, Lin, Xie, & Liu, 2019). Notably,
emotional stimuli may disrupt the inhibition process (e.g., Rebetez,
Rochat, Billieux, Gay, & Van der Linden, 2015; Schulz et al., 2007;
Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007) and affect both N2 and P3 compo-
nents. Yang et al. (2014) reported, when NoGo stimuli were emotional
facial expressions – either positive or negative – rather than neutral
expressions, response time to Go stimuli and NoGo-N2 amplitudes de-
creased. In addition, P3 amplitudes to emotional facial expressions,
when serving as Go or NoGo stimuli were bigger than to neutral ex-
pressions. Zhao et al. (2019) found that task-irrelevant emotionally
positive background pictures reduced the NoGo-N2 amplitude relative
to neutral pictures and increased the NoGo-P3, even after strictly con-
trolling for arousal in the emotionally loaded stimuli.
Our PHS aimed to change low-calorie food items into the one and
only desirable food category, hence inducing positive emotions toward
these items and likely reducing the desirability of high-calorie food
items, possibly inducing negative emotions. Therefore, we expected
activated PHS to affect both Go and NoGo conditions. Specifically,
without PHS we expected pronounced conflicts when the frequent
button-pressing response was to be inhibited and, therefore, a salient
NoGo-N2 and NoGo-P3 (Enriquez-Geppert et al., 2010; Gajewski &
Falkenstein, 2013). However, in the PHS-active condition, as NoGo
stimuli should become more desirable and pleasant we expected a
smaller NoGo-N2 and an increased NoGo-P3 (Albert et al., 2010; Yang
et al., 2014; Zhao et al., 2019). Simultaneously, as in PHS-active con-
dition high-calorie items should become less desirable or even aversive,
we expected an increased Go-P3.
2. Methods and materials
2.1. Participants
Although many hypnosis studies include only highly hypnotizable
individuals (e.g., Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Raz et al., 2003; Raz
et al., 2005; Zahedi et al., 2017; Zahedi et al., 2019), testing also
medium hypnotizable participants, facilitates generalizing the effects
(Jensen et al., 2017). Therefore, in the current study, we included both
medium and highly hypnotizable individuals, based on the Harvard
group scale of hypnotic susceptibility, form-A (Shor & Orne, 1962,
1963) translated to German (Bongartz, 1985). From 443 ( =M
= =years range SD29.0 ; 16–77, 16.4) volunteers in screening ses-
sions, we invited 22 individuals who had obtained more than 7/12
points to the present study, out of whom 12 were medium hypnotizable,
that means, they had scores between 7 and 9. In the HGSHS twelve
different suggestions are presented to participants, ranging from eyelid
catalepsy to heaviness in hands and so forth (Shor & Orne, 1962); based
on the objective scores, that is, yes-no questions regarding whether
each suggestion was executed or not, a score between 0 and 12 will be
assigned to each participant. One participant was unwilling to continue
after EEG preparation and another one was excluded due to problems
with EEG recordings. Out of 20 final participants ( =M
= =years range SD27.3 ; 21–54, 2.12) 14 were female; all were
omnivorous and none was obese or anorexic (BMI 20–30). All partici-
pants reported normal or corrected to normal visual acuity as well as
normal color vision. Based on the participants’ report, none of them
were diagnosed with a psychological or neurological disorder, and in
the last two months none of them had used or withdrawn from any
psychoactive drug. The study had been approved by the ethics com-
mittee of the Institut für Psychologie of the Humboldt-Universität zu
Berlin. Prior to the experiment, signed consent had been obtained.
Participation was compensated either with 8 € per hour or course
credits.
The sample size of n = 20 in our study was based on two factors:
First, on a power analysis with expected effect sizes derived from our
previous studies (e.g., Zahedi et al., 2017; Zahedi et al., 2019); the
estimated power (Kreidler et al., 2013) for both RTs and ERPs was
above recommended values, >1 0.9 (Cohen, 1988, 2016).
Second, on sample sizes of previous PHS studies (e.g., Iani et al., 2006;
Iani, Ricci, Baroni, & Rubichi, 2009; Raz et al., 2003; Raz et al., 2005;
Sheehan et al., 1988; Zahedi et al., 2017; Zahedi et al., 2019), which
were n 20high hypnotizable .
2.2. Hypnosis and post-hypnotic suggestions
The hypnosis narration was recorded in German and presented from
tape, in order to provide identical wordings for all participants; how-
ever, if participants needed more elaboration, some additional sugges-
tions related to relaxation were presented by the experimenter A.Z., a
certified hypnotizer who was present in all sessions. These suggestions
were either progressive muscle relaxation (PMR), breathing techniques,
or other suggestions similar in nature (Hammond, 1990, 1998). Before
hypnosis, participants chose either a forest or beach scenario for the
following hypnosis narration. The induction and deepening stages of
hypnosis (for detail please see Hammond, 1990; Hammond, 1998), was
succeeded by a suggestion about feeling a lightness in the body and by
the following PHSs (translated from German):
“While you are responding to the tasks, you will hear the sound of a
bell; and when you have heard it you will feel a lightness in your
body (bell). The lightness is like what you have sensed before and
retained in your fist, but now another feeling also accompanies this
lightness, a craving, voracious desire for vegetables, fruits and all
sorts of healthy food. Your stomach contracts with even a picture of
vegetables. Even their picture is so desirable and appealing that it
increases your appetite, and makes you want to eat them. While you
are performing the tasks, whenever you see their picture your ap-
petite and desire for vegetables and fruits, that are very healthy and
full of vitamins, will become voracious; and this exclusive desire for
vegetables and fruits will get stronger and stronger during the ses-
sion. When you hear the sound of the bell for the second time, ev-
erything will go back to normal, like before the first sound of the
bell; even your hunger will disappear like it had never existed; ev-
erything will go back to normal.”
PHS was given twice in a row in order to consolidate the association
with the bell ring. Then, hypnosis was terminated with the countback
technique (for detail please see Hammond, 1990; Hammond, 1998).
2.3. Materials and instructions
2.3.1. Food-face classification
Both experimental tasks were programmed in Presentation software
(Version 19.0, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, www.
neurobs.com). In the food-face classification task, 80 food and 80 face
pictures were presented twice, in random order on a white background
(i.e., 320 trials in total), requiring choice responses with the index
fingers between food and face pictures; the assignment of index fingers
to picture categories was counterbalanced. Thus, participants were
asked to decide whether a presented picture contained a face or a food
item. This task ensured that participants attended to all stimuli, without
demanding any differentiation between food categories, such as high-
versus low-calories. Notably, as task demands were the same for all
food items, any observed differences in ERP or performance between




different food categories can be attributed to the perception and pro-
cessing of food categories rather than tasks or strategies.
Face pictures showed either neutral or happy facial expressions. The
food items had two levels of calorie content, that is, high- and low-
calorie, and two levels of valence, that is, neutral and positive valence,
resulting in 40 trials in each subcategory (e.g., low-calorie, high va-
lence). Food pictures were adopted from the database of Blechert,
Meule, Busch, and Ohla (2014) and controlled for color composition,
contrast, brightness, size, and image complexity (please see supple-
mentary materials for details). At the beginning of the task, participants
were familiarized with the task by five practice trials during which
feedback was given; during the subsequent trials, no feedback was
provided. Each trial started with a fixation cross presented for 500 ms,
replaced by a picture for 1000 ms, and followed a 500-ms blank screen.
Trials were terminated as soon as a response was produced or after 2s.
Reaction times (RT) were defined as the interval between stimulus and
button press onset; correct responses were defined as pressing the
button associated with the picture category; all other responses (i.e., no
response or pressing the wrong button) was considered errors.
2.3.2. Go-NoGo task
The Go-NoGo task consisted of 80 high- and 40 low-calorie food
pictures, representing the Go- and NoGo-trials, respectively. The fol-
lowing task instruction was given:
“Imagine that you are to make a salad. Please press the button in
response to any item that you do not want to put into the salad, and
refrain from responding when you want to put an item into the
salad.”
Hence, for successful task completion, participants should respond
to the 80 high-calorie food pictures (i.e., Go trials) and refrain from
pressing the button for the 40 low-calorie food pictures (i.e., NoGo
trials). Pictures for the Go-NoGo task were adopted from the database of
Blechert et al. (2014). Pictures of both categories were comparable with
respect to color composition, contrast, brightness, size, complexity, and
valence (please see supplementary materials for details). The response
finger for the Go trials was fixed for each participant but counter-
balanced across the sample. Five practice trials were used at the be-
ginning of the task where participants received feedback; no feedback
was provided thereafter. The pictures were shown on a white back-
ground in randomized order with each trial lasting 2 s; each trial started
with a fixation cross, shown for 500 ms, replaced by a picture for
1000 ms, followed by a 500-ms blank screen. Trials terminated either
after 2 s or with the response. RTs were defined as the interval from
stimulus onset to button press. Button presses to high-calorie items and
their absence to low-calorie items was considered correct responses;
everything else was considered as an error (i.e., no response after high-
calorie or response after low-calorie).
2.4. Design and procedure
Participants were to abstain from eating at least 2 h prior to coming
to the study, which resulted in an abstention period of at least 4 h
before the tasks started. After participants had completed a demo-
graphic questionnaire, the EEG cap was mounted, followed by hypnosis
induction, including PHS. After termination of hypnosis, both experi-
mental tasks were administrated twice, with PHS activated or deacti-
vated. The order of tasks was fixed, with the food-face classification
task administered first and the Go-NoGo task second. For each parti-
cipant, one run of the tasks was with PHS activated and the one with
PHS deactivated; the order of PHS activation conditions was counter-
balanced. After the tasks, sample of horizontal and vertical eye-move-
ments and blinks were recorded, to be used for offline eye-movement
corrections.
During tasks participants sat on a chair approximately 70 cm away
from the monitor, resulting in a viewing angle of ± °1.5 for the stimuli
used. The whole session lasted about 3.5 h, including 1 h of EEG pre-
paration, 1 h of hypnosis, and finally 45 min for each run of experi-
mental tasks.
2.5. EEG recordings and pre-analyses
EEG was recorded from 44 Ag/AgCl electrodes, mounted in an
elastic cap (Easy Cap, FMS GmbH, München, Germany), according to
the 10–20 international system, and 6 electrodes located outside of the
cap. Four of these external electrodes were used for EOG recordings,
two electrodes below each eye for vertical EOG, and two at the outer
canthi for the horizontal EOG; two electrodes were placed at the mas-
toids, with the left one serving as online reference. Signals were re-
corded with Brainamps DC amplifiers (Brain Products GmbH, München,
Germany), at a sampling rate of 500 Hz without additional filters.
Impedances were kept below 10 kΩ. Triggers for stimuli and responses
were inserted online into the EEG data by synchronization between
Presentation software (Version 18.0, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.,
Berkeley, CA, www.neurobs.com) and BrainVision Recorder (Brain
Products GmbH, München, Germany).
After recordings, EEG data were recalculated to average reference.
For eye movement artifact correction, the recorded samples for hor-
izontal and vertical eye movements and blinks were fed into the BESA
Research 6.0 software and rectifier matrices were produced for each
participant and applied to their EEG recordings by a linear derivation
method. Electrophysiological data were bandpass filtered at 0.05–40 Hz
and the raw data inspection functions, consisting of standard criteria
such as Min-Max (200 μV in 200 ms), low-activity (0.05 in 200 ms) and
max gradient (200 μV in 200 ms), were applied to reject segments with
artifacts. Data were segmented, averaged, and analyzed with EEGLAB
(Delorme & Makeig, 2004). Further, all segments with other artifacts,
and/or incorrect or missing responses were eliminated, resulting in a
loss of less than 10% of all trials. In order to reduce the smearing effects
of trial to trial latency variability, especially in late components, we
reconstructed the ERP signals after latency correction with residue
iteration decomposition (RIDE) (Ouyang, Sommer, & Zhou, 2015).
2.6. Data analyses
All behavioral data analyses were conducted using R software
(http://www.R-project.org/.); for ERP data analyses MATLAB (version
8.6.0 (R2015b). Natick, Massachusetts: The MathWorks Inc.) was em-
ployed. For statistical testing, analysis of variance (ANOVA) was uti-
lized with repeated measurement factors PHS activation (active vs.
inactive), Calorie (high vs. low), and – when applicable - Valence (high
vs. neutral) and – for behavioral data – order as between-subject vari-
able (active-inactive (AI) vs. inactive-active (IA)). For post-hoc tests, the
Bonferroni correction was used, and adjusted p-values are reported; for





Food and face stimuli were analyzed separately because the ex-
perimental factors differed. ANOVA of RTs to food stimuli (Fig. 1A and
B) revealed a main effect of calorie content, =F (1, 18)
< =p4.9, . 05, .21p
2 , an interaction of calorie content and PHS,
= < =F p(1, 18) 5.1, . 05, .22p
2 , and a three-way interaction be-
tween calorie content, PHS and order of PHS activation,
= < =F p(1, 18) 6.1, . 05, .25p
2 . Planned post-hoc t-tests of the two-
way interaction between calorie content and PHS, showed no calorie
effect when PHS was inactive ( =High.cal Low.cal




=SD8.4 ms, 57.4 ms) but faster responses to low calorie items when
PHS was active ( = =SDHigh.cal Low.cal 33.0 ms, 45.2 ms),
<p . 001. For the three-way interaction between calorie content, PHS
and order of PHS condition, post-hoc t-tests showed that in the inactive-
active order, the calorie effect was significant in the PHS-active con-
dition ( = =SDHigh.cal Low.cal 39.2 ms, 51.4 ms), <p . 001.
For error rates (Fig. 1C), ANOVA showed a three-way interaction
between calorie content, PHS and order of PHS conditions,
= < =F p(1, 18) 5.4, . 05, .23p
2 . However, post-hoc tests did not
yield any specific calorie effects.
For face stimuli, ANOVA did not reveal any main effects or inter-
actions between factors in RTs or error rates.
3.1.2. Event-related potentials
ERPs to face and food stimuli were analyzed separately because
experimental factors and important aspects of ERP waveforms differed.
In food picture-elicited ERPs the P1 component (Fig. 2A) was measured
in the 90–140 ms time window at a posterior ROI (electrodes P8, PO9,
PO7, PO8, PO10, O2 and Iz). ANOVA showed a main effect of calorie
content, = < =F p(1, 19) 5.4 , . 05, .22p
2 , and an interaction be-
tween calorie content and PHS, = < =F p(1, 19) 5.2 , . 05, .21p
2 ; no
other main effects or interactions were present. Planned post-hoc tests
revealed a significant calorie effect in the PHS-inactive condition
( =High.cal Low.cal 0.48 μV, =SD .15), =F p(1, 19) 9.6 , < =. 01, .34p
2 ,
but none in the PHS-active condition ( =High.cal Low.cal 0.05 μV,
=SD .14), <F 1. Further, although the low-calorie P1 amplitude in-
creased in the PHS-active relative to the -inactive condition
( =PHS .active PHS.inactive 0.35 μV, =SD .12), = < =F p(1, 19) 8.5 , . 01, .30p
2 , the
high-calorie amplitude did not differ between the PHS conditions
( =PHS active PHS.inactive .08 μV, =SD .13), <F 1. For the face-
elicited P1 (Fig. 2B), measured in the same ROI and time window, there
were no experimental effects.
For the N1 component (Fig. 2A), measured in a posterior ROI
(electrodes P7, P8, PO9, PO7, PO8, PO10, O1, Oz, O2 and Iz) during the
130–180 ms time window, ANOVA revealed only a calorie content
effect ( =High.cal Low.cal 0.15 μV, =SD .08), =F (1, 19) 4.9,
< =p . 05, .20p
2 . For the N170 to faces (Fig. 2bB), measured in the
same ROI and time window, there was a valence effect
( =Pos.val Neu.val 0.27 μV , =SD .12), = <F p(1, 19) 5.9, . 05,
= .23p
2
Right. Topographies of average ERPs across all conditions (map
scaling: −3.0 to 3.0 μV), effects of calories (high minus low), hypnosis
(PHS active minus PHS inactive) and valence (positive minus negative);
map scaling: −0.5 to 0.5 μV. Green electrode sites show the ROIs used
for the analyses.
For LPP (Fig. 3aA), measured in the 280–580 ms time window at a
central ROI (electrodes Cz, CP1 and CP2), ANOVA revealed an inter-
action between calorie content and PHS, =F (1, 19) 5.0,
< =p . 05, .21p
2 . Planned post-hoc tests revealed that LPP ampli-
tudes were not significantly different in the PHS-inactive condition
( =Low.cal High.cal 0.0 μV , =SD .17), <F 1; however, in the PHS-
active condition the P3 amplitude to pictures of low-calorie food
was significantly bigger than to high-calorie items
( =Low.cal High.cal 0.44 μV, =SD .20), =F p(1, 19) 5.2 ,
< =. 05, .21p
2 . In the same ROI, within the 580–730 ms time window,
ANOVA showed a trend for larger amplitudes during the PHS active
than in the inactive condition, = = =F p(1, 19) 3.7 , .06, .15p
2 .
For face-elicited ERPs (Fig. 3B), there were no experimental effects,
neither in the 280–580 ms or 580–730 ms time windows.
Right. Topographies of average ERPs for effects of calories (low
minus high) and hypnosis (PHS active minus inactive); map scaling:




For the Go-NoGo task, all Go and NoGo trials showed high- and low-
calorie food pictures, respectively; valence was controlled across sti-
mulus categories and, hence, was no experimental factor. ANOVA of
RTs (Fig. 4) revealed a main effect of PHS, =F (1, 18)
< =p9.4, . 01, .34p
2 , because participants were faster in responding
to high-calorie pictures during the PHS-active than -inactive condition
( =PHS.active PHS.inactive 21.1 ms, =SD 30.9). ANOVA of error
rates did not yield any significant effects for either the Go
( =PHS.active PHS.inactive 0.6, =SD 4.2) or NoGo condition
( =PHS.active PHS.inactive 0.4, =SD 2.0).
3.2.2. Event-related potentials
In the Go-NoGo task we focused on the P2–N2 and P3 components.
For the P2–N2 both frontal and parietal regions were selected (for
Fig. 1. Performance in the food-face classification task. Means and interquartile
distances, and outliers are given as a function of PHS activation condition and
calorie content, and post-hoc tests between calorie content are shown, for (A)
RTs and (C) error rates. (B) Means and interquartile distances as function of
PHS activation condition, calorie content and PHS activation order and con-
trasts between calorie content for RTs.




Fig. 2. Left. Grand average ERPs for the P1 ROI to (A) food pictures of different calorie contents and PHS activation conditions and (B) to faces of neutral and positive
valence and PHS activation conditions. Highlighted areas show the time windows used for analyses.
Fig. 3. Left. Grand average ERPs for the P3 ROI to (A) food pictures of different calorie content and PHS activation conditions and (B) to faces of different PHS
activation conditions. Highlighted areas show the time windows used for analyses.




review please see Folstein & Van Petten, 2008; Polich, 2007). In a
frontal ROI (electrodes F3, Fz, F4, FC1, FCz and FC2), during the
210–270 ms time window (Fig. 5A), ANOVA with repeated measures
factors Go-NoGo condition and PHS activation showed an interaction
between both factors, = < =F p(1, 19) 5.6 , . 05, .22p
2 . Planned
post-hoc comparisons in the PHS-inactive condition revealed a strong
Go-NoGo effect ( = =SDNoGo Go 0.34 μV, .18), =F (1, 19) 5.5 ,
< =p . 05, .22p
2 , which was absent in the PHS-active condition
( = =SDNoGo Go .13 μV, .18), ( <F 1). In addition, there was a
significant PHS effect in the NoGo condition
( = =SDPHS.active inactive 0.42 μV, .16), = < =F p(1, 19) 6.9 , . 05, .26p
2 ,
but not in the Go condition ( = =SDPHS.active inactive 0.09 μV, .12),
( <F 1).
In the same time window a parietal P2 ROI (electrodes P7, P3, P4,
P8, PO7, PO8, O1 and O2) (Fig. 5B), showed a main effect of Go-NoGo
condition, = < =F p(1, 19) 5.7, . 05, .23p
2 , and an interaction be-
tween the Go-NoGo condition and PHS activation,
= < =F p(1, 19) 5.9 , . 05, .23p
2 . Again, planned post-hoc tests in
the PHS-inactive condition, revealed a strong Go-NoGo effect
( = =SDNoGo Go .47 μV, .12), = < =F p(1, 19) 14.1 , . 001, .42p2 ,
Fig. 4. Performance in the Go-NoGo task. Means and interquartile distances as a function of PHS condition, and ANOVA results are shown for (A) RTs, (B) error rates
in the Go condition (commission errors), and (C) in the NoGo condition (omission errors).
Fig. 5. Left. Grand average ERPs superimposed for Go and NoGo and PHS activation conditions for (A) frontal and (B) parietal ROIs. Highlighted areas show the time
windows used for the analyses.




which was absent in the PHS-active condition
( = =SDNoGo Go .05 μV, .15), ( <F 1). Furthermore, a
significant PHS effect was present only in the
NoGo condition ( = =SDPHS.active inactive 0.38 μV, .18),
= < =F p(1, 19) 4.4 , . 05, .19p
2 , but not in the Go condition
( = =SDPHS.active inactive .02 μV, .11), ( <F 1). Together, the results
for both the anterior and posterior N2 ROIs indicate a clear N2 to NoGo-
stimuli without PHS, which was abolished by PHS activation.
Right. Topographies of average ERPs across all conditions (map
scaling: −2.0 to 2.0 μV), effects of Go-NoGo conditions (NoGo minus
Go) and hypnosis (PHS-active minus PHS-inactive); map scaling: −0.5
to 0.5 μV. Green and magenta electrodes show the P2- and N2-ROIs,
respectively.
In ERP waveshapes and topographies two subcomponents of P3
were distinguishable, an early P3 (Fig. 6A) in the NoGo and a later P3
(Fig. 6B) in the Go condition (for review please see Polich, 2007). The
early P3 was measured in the 410–510 ms time window in a cen-
troparietal ROI (electrodes Cz, CP1 and CP2). ANOVA showed a
main effect of PHS ( = =SDPHS.active inactive 0.48 μV, .22),
= < =F p(1, 19) 4.6 , . 05, .19p
2 , and a main effect of Go-NoGo
condition ( = =SDNoGo Go 1.23 μV, .34), =F (1, 19)
< =p13.0 , . 005, .40p
2 .
For the late P3 (Fig. 6B), measured in the 550–850 ms time-window
at a frontocentral ROI (electrodes FC5, FC1, FCz, FC2, FC6, C3, Cz and
C4), ANOVA indicated a main effect of Go-NoGo condition,
= < =F p(1, 19) 5.3 , . 05, .21p
2 , and an interaction between PHS
activation and Go-NoGo condition, = < =F p(1, 19) 8.1 , . 05, .29p
2 .
Planned post-hoc tests revealed a significant PHS effect in the Go
condition ( = =SDPHS.active inactive 0.33 μV, 20), =F (1, 19)
< =p4.4 , . 05, .19p
2 , but not in the NoGo condition
( = =SDPHS.active inactive 0.10 μV, .17), ( <F 1); further, there was
no Go-NoGo effect when PHS was inactive ( =Go NoGo
=SD0.13 μV, .18), <F 1 , but it was very clear when PHS was active
( = =SDGo NoGo 0.68 μV, .21), = < =F p(1, 19) 9.9 , . 01, .34p
2 .
Right. Topographies of average ERPs across all conditions, effects of
task (for the early P3: NoGo minus Go, and for the late P3: Go minus
NoGo) and hypnosis (PHS-active minus PHS-inactive).
For the early P3 topographies map scaling: −0.8 to 0.8 μV.
For the late P3 topographies map scaling: −1 to 1 μV. Green elec-
trodes show the ROI used for the analyses.
4. Discussion
By employing two tasks and ERP recordings, we explored the effects
of PHS to increase the value of low-calorie food over high-calorie food
by inducing craving and desire for salads, fruit and vegetables in re-
sponse to pictures of these food items. A food-face classification task did
not involve calorie content as task-relevant dimension but required the
classification of pictures as representing food or faces. A Go-NoGo task
explicitly required the categorization of food items as being suitable or
non-suitable for making a salad, aligning with the distinction of low-
and high-calorie items. Therefore, calorie content of the depicted food
Fig. 6. Left. Grand average ERPs superimposed for different task and PHS activation conditions for (a) the early P3 and (b) the late P3. Highlighted areas show the
time windows used for the analyses.




was an explicit part of the task. Since the task was devised as Go-NoGo,
it measured the inhibition function and its modulation by PHS.
4.1. Food-face classification results
In the food-face classification task, responses during PHS activated –
but not during PHS inactivated - were faster to low-as compared to
high-calorie food items, demonstrating the transfer of PHS to crave for
low-calorie food into performance. As calorie content was irrelevant to
the task at hand, faster responses to low-calorie items indicate that
these stimuli were implicitly processed more efficiently. This finding is
in line with the idea that a positive bias toward a specific type of sti-
muli, especially when they are relevant for the current concern of the
individual (e.g., hunger or desire), increases the effectiveness of sti-
mulus processing (for review please see Pool, Brosch, Delplanque, &
Sander, 2016).
ERPs shed light on the mechanisms behind this performance effect
of PHS. It is remarkable that already around 100 ms (90–140 ms) high-
calorie pictures elicited a bigger P1 amplitude in response to high-
calorie images when PHS was inactive. Importantly, activation of PHS
eliminated the differences in P1 amplitude in response to low-versus
high-calorie pictures. As the P1 amplitude has been reported to be
bigger in response to reward-associated stimuli (Hickey et al., 2010),
and to be positively correlated with craving (Donohue et al., 2016), the
present results seem to indicate that without PHS our participants
craved for high-calorie food; this is plausible because at the time of
testing they had abstained from food for at least 4 h and probably were
at least slightly hungry. However, when PHS was activated, it neu-
tralized the initial bias for high-calorie food. This alteration in early
neural responses during visual processing indicates that PHS effects are
not confined to deliberately increasing or decreasing appetite (Sarlo
et al., 2013) but may affect more elementary processing stages. To our
knowledge, this is the earliest effect of calories reported so far. Other
studies have also reported rather early – albeit somewhat later – calorie
effects in the N1 component (Meule et al., 2013; Toepel et al., 2009).
However, different food abstention-durations might have contributed to
different observations in P1, as hunger can affect the rewarding value of
food stimuli. In Meule et al. (2013) study participants had abstained
from food for 2 h, hence for a shorter amount of time than in the present
study; Toepel et al. (2009) had not reported abstention duration. We
should point out that the presence and absence of P1 amplitude as a
function of PHS inactive and active, respectively, rules out that the P1
effect is due to low-level visual differences of stimuli because PHS ac-
tivation conditions were balanced in order and stimuli had been con-
trolled for a number of important low-level properties. These results
complement imaging studies showing that high- and low-calorie food
cues are processed differently in the brain (Frank et al., 2010; Killgore
et al., 2003) and that this distinction is made automatically and rather
early during visual processing.
A reverse effect as in the P1 was found in the LPP amplitude
(280–580 ms). Here, no calorie effect was present when PHS was in-
active, apparently in line with similar negative findings of others (e.g.,
Becker et al., 2016; Meule et al., 2013). Interestingly, activating PHS
markedly changed this situation, increasing the amplitude of the LPP to
low-relative to high-calorie items. Effects of affect or emotion in this
late positive potential are usually interpreted as a sign of increased
motivated attention (Sarlo et al., 2013). Summarizing, inducing an
early positive bias for low-calorie food by PHS, suggesting to desire
low-calorie stimuli caused more efficient processing of low-calorie food
items, which was shown in faster response times (Hickey et al., 2010;
Pool et al., 2016), and directed motivated attention towards these
items, as indicated by increased LPP amplitudes (Donohue et al., 2016;
Sarlo et al., 2013).
Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that the responses and ERPs to
faces did not show any effects of PHS, demonstrating that the observed
effects with respect to food stimuli were domain specific.
With regard to ERP components reflecting the association of stimuli
with reward, we targeted the P1 component in the food-face classifi-
cation task. Previous studies have shown the P1 to be larger to stimuli
that were associated with higher degrees of reward (e.g., Donohue
et al., 2016; Hickey et al., 2010; Schacht et al., 2012); therefore, the P1
amplitude seems to be a marker of the perceived associational value of
stimuli with reward. Since we were interested in the perceptual changes
induced by PHS in associational reward values of a stimulus, the P1
amplitude appeared to be a suitable target component. Of note, com-
ponents associated with response outcome, such as the feedback-related
negativity (FRN) (e.g., Fromer, Sturmer, & Sommer, 2016) or reward
positivity could not be employed since in our food-face discrimination
task no feedback regarding performance was given. Further, the FRN,
usually analyzed in the 200–400 ms time window in feedback stimulus-
synchronized ERPs, is closely related to response adjustments and
learning after response production. However, since in our task no
feedback was present no adjustments of response were expected, and
therefore, the FRN was not applicable.
4.2. Go-NoGo task results
In the Go-NoGo task, the calories of the depicted food were ex-
plicitly relevant for the task, which required pressing a button to high-
calorie food items, unsuitable for making a salad, and to withhold this
response to salad-suitable low-calorie food items. Hence, we expected
that (1) without PHS, inhibition would be required to suppress the
prepotent response of pressing a button when an infrequent, non-pre-
ferred, low-calorie item rather than a preferred, frequent, high-calorie
item was presented. (2) When PHS was activated, the low-calorie food
items should be the only desired food category (i.e., elicit positive
emotions), and high-calorie food items should be diminished in desir-
ability or even elicit negative emotions.
These hypotheses were supported by neural data. The differences
between high and low-calorie items in the anterior N2 component,
which is considered to indicate response inhibition, emotional regula-
tion or conflict-monitoring (Albert et al., 2010; Enriquez-Geppert et al.,
2010; Folstein & Van Petten, 2008; Ouyang, Schacht, Zhou, & Sommer,
2013), and its posterior P2 counterpart, were clearly present when PHS
was deactivated but vanished when PHS was activated. Furthermore,
PHS increased both Go-P3 and NoGo-P3. These findings are in line with
reports of Yang et al. (2014) and Zhao et al. (2019) that the NoGo-N2
was decreased when the eliciting stimulus was emotionally arousing
rather than neutral, whereas Go-P3 and NoGo-P3 were increased. The
reasons why emotions disrupt inhibition in Go-NoGo tasks (e.g.,
Rebetez et al., 2015; Schulz et al., 2007; Verbruggen & De Houwer,
2007) might be that stimulus-induced emotional arousal is an auto-
matic response which is not relevant and even disruptive for the task at
hand and needs to be inhibited. This may be akin to the situation in
Stroop tasks where word meaning is irrelevant and disruptive. In the
Stroop task, when participants had to deploy more inhibition, an am-
plitude decrease in N2 and increase in P3 have been observed (Zahedi
et al., 2019). Therefore, emotionally arousing Go and NoGo stimuli may
require more proactive control (Braver, 2012) in order to inhibit dis-
ruptive emotional response, inflating Go- and NoGo-P3, and decreasing
NoGo-N2.
In both PHS-inactive and -active conditions, the early P3 was bigger
in the NoGo than in the Go and the late P3 was bigger in NoGo con-
dition in comparison to Go, which is common finding (e.g., Gajewski &
Falkenstein, 2013; Liu et al., 2017; Polich, 2007; Yang et al., 2014;
Zhao et al., 2019). As only in No-Go situations it is necessary to inhibit a
prepotent response, the early P3 component, which might be related to
recruitment of cognitive control (Polich, 2007; Zahedi et al., 2019)
expectedly was bigger in the NoGo than in the Go condition. However,
the late P3, mostly following the response, might be related to response
monitoring (Polich, 2007), and therefore, might have been more pro-
nounced in Go than in No-Go trials.




In the Go-NoGo task, we also found that during activated PHS, Go-
responses were quickened. It is important to consider that in the present
design, the response terminated stimulus presentation, and therefore, in
our task faster responses might be considered as an escape from an
emotionally negative situation. Yang et al. (2014) had also observed
faster responses to emotional facial expressions as compared to neutral
faces. It seems that more proactive control deployed due to emotional
contents of stimuli, enhances their detection and processing, manifested
in shorter RTs to Go stimuli.
4.3. Limitations and perspectives
Here it is necessary to discuss some points regarding different as-
pects of our study. First, in our Go-NoGo task, the instructions requested
participants to imagine making a salad and to decide, which items they
did not want to put into the salad, with the assumption that participants
would exclude (by button press) high-calorie items and include (by not
responding) low-calorie items. One might argue, that some participants
might have wanted to include meat or cheese, that is, high-calorie
items, in their salad. However, our high-calorie pictures did not show
such items that could be deemed appropriate for a salad (e.g. diced or
sliced cheese or meat); in addition, error rates were very low in the Go-
NoGo task, indicating that the paradigm worked as intended.
Noticeably, as we used a Go-NoGo task in which the assignment of
the low- and high-calorie items to Go and NoGo conditions were fixed
and did not include pictures of non-food items, we cannot rule out that
the observed effects are not specific for the nutrition value or even for
food items. However, in the food-face classification task, PHS effects
had proven to be food-specific. Future studies aiming at the inhibition
function might investigate the specificity of the effects by using also a
reverse assignment of low- and high-calorie items to Go and NoGo
conditions and a condition with non-food items.
Second, in the present study, since we included medium-hypnotiz-
able participants as well as high-hypnotizable participants, according to
the normative data (Bongartz, 1985; Shor & Orne, 1962, 1963), our
sample is representative of about 61–75% of the normal population.
Although our results cannot be generalized to the whole population, the
current study is among the first to attempt to enhance the general-
izability of PHS effects by including also medium-hypnotizable parti-
cipants as suggested by Jensen et al. (2017).
Third, one may ask whether the present design precluded confounds
with task demands. For the design of PHS studies it is important to point
out that hypnosis induces relaxation (e.g., Kirsch et al., 1995; Klein &
Spiegel, 1989; London, 1961; London, Cooper, & Johnson, 1962; Lynn
et al., 2019; Milburn, 2010), which might induce a confound, when PHS
after hypnosis is compared with a condition without hypnosis (Zahedi
et al., 2017). In order to control for such a confound, we administrated
hypnosis with PHS at the beginning of our single session, followed by
activating and deactivating PHS in counterbalanced order. Therefore,
our design effectively reduces many potential confounds, such as re-
laxation due to hypnosis, demand characteristics, or order of testing.
Further, even though our PHS explicitly suggested an increase in desire
for low-calorie food, our PHS did not include any demands, instructions
or strategies with regard to the task performance (i.e., classifying faces
and food, or selecting food items, suitable for making a salad). In par-
ticular, one of our tasks assessed implicit preferences by asking parti-
cipants to respond to food items, that is, to both high- and low-calorie
items, with the same finger. Hence, the task demanded the exact same
response in order to prevent participants to develop any hypotheses
regarding the experimenters' intentions. Also, the ERP components used
are very hard to be altered intentionally, especially early components
such as the P1 component, and our stimuli were matched for low-level
properties (for details please see the supplementary materials. To-
gether, the multiple controls included in the design intended to obscure
as much as possible the hypotheses of the study and ensure that changes
in the participants’ reactions were due to PHS.
Furthermore, our design utilized a counterbalanced repeated-mea-
sures design with a fixed order of tasks within each PHS condition, in
which we randomly but in equal proportion assigned participants to
PHS activated - PHS inactivated or PHS inactivated – PHS activated
condition orders. Therefore, factors such as practice, fatigue and hunger
were controlled. And even though the Go-NoGo task was always the
second of two tasks, we should point out that we did not compare the
effects of the Go-NoGo with the food-face classification task, but only
compared the effects of a given task between PHS activated or PHS
deactivated. Therefore, as the Go-NoGo was always the second task, the
observed results could not be attributed to other factors such as prac-
tice, hunger or fatigue; the same reasoning holds true for the food-face
decision task. Furthermore, the tasks that we employed were designed
to be concise with durations of less than 20 min and participants re-
ceived enough resting-time in between tasks in order to ensure that
time on task would not affect results. Furthermore, the food-face clas-
sification task was short and easy it is unlikely that the Go-NoGo task
effects would depend on the position of the task within the block.
One of the interesting questions, which can be investigated next is
how individual differences in food preferences might relate to PHS ef-
fects in larger samples. Notably, the main goal of the current study was
to investigate whether PHSs can affect food preferences. Other ques-
tions of interest would be the endurance of the effects over time and
their transfer to real life situations.
5. Conclusions
In conclusion, the results of the food-face classification and the Go-
NoGo task show clear and specific effects of the food-type related PHSs.
The food-face classification task can be considered as implicit with re-
spect to the calorie dimension as it was task-irrelevant. By im-
plementing PHS, suggesting desiring low-calorie food, an increase in
implicit preference for low-calorie items and hence, reduction of an
advantage for high-calorie-food at the early visual processing level was
observed, followed by increased motivated attention and enhanced ef-
fective processing of images containing low-calorie items. The Go-NoGo
task that required the explicit consideration of the calorie dimension
indicated that PHS increased the pleasantness of low-calorie items and
rendered high-calorie food less desirable; therefore, Go and NoGo sti-
muli may have both become emotionally arousing. Hence, deployment
of excessive proactive control may have been necessary to inhibit task-
irrelevant food-related emotions, decreasing the NoGo-N2 and inflating
early Go- and NoGo-P3s. In addition, increased proactive control may
have enhanced classification of salad-inappropriate, high-calorie food
items and increased late Go-P3, possibly indicating enhanced response
monitoring. Together these findings indicate that PHS is suitable to
modulate food-preferences at several levels of processing. Therefore,
PHS could fruitfully be employed in both studying and modulating the
cognitive and affective subprocesses related to food preferences. The
present results indicate that suitable PHS may support individuals in
adjusting their food preferences if they desire to do so.
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